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The following study seeks to examine the emergence and development of the 
sociology of knowledge in Germany in the period from 1918 to 1933. Particu- 
lar emphasis is placed upon the distinctive features of this tradition and upon 
three central figures connected with this tradition - Max Scheler, Georg Lukäcs 
and Karl Mannheim. The theoretical and practical context within which the 
diverse strands of this tradition emerged are investigated in order to show, in 
part, the extent to which the central problems of the sociology of knowledge 
were located within philosophical, sociological and practical crises in Germany. 
In the case of Scheler, Lukäcs and Mannheim, it is argued that they all devel- 
oped a sociology of knowledge or a critique of ideology out of an earlier con- 
corn with a sociology of culture and, in some instances, with the crisis of 
modern culture. Furthermore it is argued that it is not possible to fully com- 
prehend their sociology of knowledge or critique of ideology without taking into 
account the meta-theoretical intentions of these writers. In part, this in- 
voives an examination of what Lenk has termed the 'tragic consciousness' of 
Weimar sociology and, more specifically the thesis of the 'powerlessness of 
the mind' (Schaler) and the 'homelessness of the mind' (Mannheim). The 
inclusion of Lukäcs within the context of this tradition in the sociology of 
knowledge necessarily raises the issue of the relationship between the 
sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology, not merely in terms of 
LukacsI relationship to Mannheim but also in the Iight of the contemporary 
debate surrounding Ideologie und Utopie. Hence, as a way of highlighting 
contemporary assessments of and contributions to the sociology of knowledge, 
some attention is devoted to the debates and controversies that surrounded 
this discipline in Weimar Germany. 
iv 
Finally, some of the aims of the sociology of knowledge suggest that it was 
intended as a new foundation for the social sciences. It is argued that this 
must be understood both in the light of the methodological preoccupations of 
writers like Mannheim and in terms of earlier methodological controversies. 
In turn, it is suggested that, at this level, there are some affinities between 
this aspect of the sociology of knowledge and more recent attempts in Germany 








The emergence of the sociology of knowledge in Germany after 1918 repre- 
sents the development of an important tradition in this area of sociology. 
This field of investigation which emerged in Germany after the First World War 
and was variously termed 'Erkenntnissoziologie', 'Soziologie des Erkennens', 
'Soziologie des Denkens', 'Soziologie des Wissens', 'Soziologie des 
Geistes', and, most commonly, 'Wissenssoziologie', developed in a manner 
quite j istinct from that of other traditions in this discipline. It cannot be 
argued that the problems which the German sociology of knowledge confront- 
ed originated in the Weimar period in Germany. Other attempts to establish 
a sociology of knowledge had already been, made by Durkhe1m and his foI Iowersi 
and by Pareto. 
2 The elements of another tradition, broadly contemporary, may 
3 
also be traced in the writings of Thomas, 0 ooley and Mead. . When attent- 
ion is drawn to the problem of ideology, which certainly forms a central focus 
of the German tradition, any claim to originality must remain weak. The 
general discussion of the problem of the relationship between knowledge and 
society may certainly be traced back to the contributions made by Bacon, Vico, 
Helvotius and others. 
4 Within Germany itself, the discussion of ideology, 
which plays a crucial role in the development of this tradition, only came to 
the fore after the writings of Hegel and, more especially, Marx. 
S 
If 
However, the German sociology of knowledge does not merely develop out of 
these earlier writers. There exists no simple linear development from Bacon 
through Marx to the German sociology of knowledge as a naive history of ideas 
2 
approach to the development of the discipline would suggest. Rather, these 
writers within the German tradition of the sociology of knowledge were faced 
with distinctive problems - both practical and theoretical - which they attemp- 
ted to solve. Like any other new theoretical development these writers comm- 
enced from earlier theoretical frameworks or paradigms even though they 
sought to establish their own conceptual realm. In other words, they did not 
read the works of earlier writers within a social and theoretical vacuum but 
within a distinctive context. Any attempt to account for the distinctiveness 
of the German sociology of knowledge must examine this context. 
The sociology of knowledge as a distinctive discipline emerged in Germany 
shortly after the end of the First World War and the German Revolution. 
Scheler's articles 'Die positivistische Geschichtsphilosophie des Wissens 
und die Aufgaben einer Soziologie der Erkenntnis'6 and 'Weltanschauungen, 
Weltanschauungslehre und Wissenssoziologie'7 and Wilhelm Jerusalem's 
'Soziologie des Erkennens'8 all appeared in 1921. Lukäcs' collection of 
essays, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein9 appeared in Berlin in 1923, 
though the key[to]essays on orthodox Marxism and class consciousness were 
written in 1919 and 1920 respectively, whiist the essay on reification was com- 
pleted in 1922. Karl Mannheim's first major article to be published- in 
fact his doctoral dissertation, 'Die Strukturanalyse der Erkenntnistheorie' - 
appeared in 1922.10 Grünwald, the only writer to systematically examine 
the field, is therefore correct in suggesting that 'The epoch after the World 
War in the period between 1921 and 1924 can be designated as the point of 
time in which the sociology of knowledge was gradually constituted as a 
distinctive discipline. 111 These early writings were followed by the more 
3 
substantial contributions of Max Scheler In his collection of essays Schriften 
zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre which appeared in 1923 and 1924,12 
in his edited collection Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens in 192413 
and Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft in 1926.14 None of Lukäcs' 
later works in this decade had the same impact as History and Class Conscious- 
ness though his essay 'Moses Hess und die Probleme der idealistischen Dial- 
ektik' published in 1926 Is worthy of mention. 
15 
Mannheim's major work in 
this period.. Ideologie und Utopie, appeared in 1929.16 From around 1924 on- 
wards, the number of essays on the sociology of knowledge increased and 
reached a peak around 1930, largely as a result of the controversy surrounding 
I 
Mannh'eim's Ideologie und Utopie. Thus the sociology of knowledge in Ger- 
many may be seen to occupy a definite circumscribed time period from 1920 
to 1933. 
It is probably true to say that no other tradition in the sociology of knowledge 
created such controversy in sociology and philosophy. 
17 In Lukäcs' case, 
this statement can be extended to the political sphere, as the critique,, of his S 
major work in this period testify. 
18 
Yet there at present exist only two 
studies of the emergence of the sociology of knowledge in Germany, both 
written from perspectives which are in no way comprehensive but rather are 
in some ways limited. 
The first, and older of the two, is the work by Ernst Grünwald, Das Problem 
der Soziologie des Wissens, which appeared in 1934.19 Grünwald does dis- 
cuss the development of the sociology in Germany during the Weimar era but 
his account is largely in terms of intellectual history and does not attempt an 
4 
explanation for its emergence except in relation to intellectual trends. It is 
difficult to see how such an explanation could emerge from Grunwald's cate- 
gorisation of the various theories in the sociology of knowledge which commenc- 
es with a dichotomy between psychological and historical theories of the relat- 
i onshi p between knowledge and society and is later "extended into positivist, 
positivist-Marxist, non-positivist and historicist theories. Yet Grünwald 
does, for the first time, attempt to bring together the various contributions 
to the German sociology of knowledge as well as suggest his own mode of 
dealing with the problems it faced. 
The second study by Lenk, Marx in der Wissenssoziologie20has, as its cen- 
tral theme, the response of the German sociology of knowledge to Marx's 
critiquesof ideology. As such it concentrates on the work of Scheler and 
Mannheim, the former already having been discussed in an earlier study by 
Lenk. 
21 
Somewhat surprisingly, it contains no detailed discussion of Lukacs' 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Lenk attempts to show that the socio- 
logy of knowledge in Germany is a manifestation of what he terms a tragic 
consciousness peculiar to social theory in that period. Lenk had originally 
applied this thesis to the work of Max Scheler but here it is generalised to 
cover the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge as a whole. Lenk Is 
study, however, is concerned largely with what he takes to be the transform- 
ation of Marx's original establishment of a critique of ideology into the 
sociology of knowledge, a transition which he sees as negative in its import. 
i 
Yet Lenk's study does contain many important theses on the development of 
the sociology of knowledge and these will be examined below. 
This is not to suggest that there exist only these two studies of the German 
5 
tradition in the sociology of knowledge. In the post Second World War per- 
iod, sociologists and philosophers have written on the sociology of knowledge 
in Germany, for example, Lieber, 
22 Schaaf23 and many others. However, 
with the exception of the two studies by Grünwald and Lenk, there still remains 
no systematic attempt to chart the development of the German tradition in the 
sociology of knowledge and to examine its place within sociology. This is 
not to deny that there do not exist- many more recent discussions of ideology 
in society. In fact, to take but one important example, the critique of ideol- 
ogy has been a central concern of the Frankfurt School, though its earlier key 
members, notably Horkheimer and Adorno, have been hostile to the sociology 
of knowledge as a branch of study. 
24 
If attention is turned to the reception of this tradition within British and 
American sociology then the absence of any substantial examination of the 
German sociology of knowledge becomes more apparent. The introductory 
studies by Horowitz and, more recently, Hamilton do not devot any special 
attention to the German tradition, though Hamilton does discuss Scheler's 
contribution. 
25 Stark's introduction does discuss in some detail the work 
of Scheler, though again It is not especially concerned with an examination, 
of the whole tradition. 
26 It also lends support to the view that the subject 
was defined in a very narrow manner. Most recently, work by Berger and 
Luckmann specifically attempts to distance itself from the German tradition. 
27 
It does, however, raise some of the issues which concern the present study in 
so far as it argues that the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge is 
quite distinctive in many respects. 
Many writers have indeed argued that the sociology of knowledge as it developed 
in Weimar Germany confronted a quite specific configuration of problems that 
were unique to that tradition. Berger and Luckrnann, for instance, argue that 
'The sociology of knowledge originated in a 
particular situation of German intellectual 
history and in a philosophical context. 
When the new discipline was subsequently 
introduced into the sociological context 
proper, particularly in the English-speaking 
world, it continued to be marked by the 
problems of the particular intellectual situ- 
ation from which it arose. ' 28 
They go on to suggest that perhaps this accounts for its marginal position with- 
in contemporary sociology since the original problems appear no longer rele- 
vant. Berger and Luckmann suggest that 
'the sociology of knowledge remained a per- 
ipheral concern among sociologists at large, 
who did not share the particular problems 29 
that troubled German thinkers in the 1920s. 
This 'peripheral concern' is echoed even by Mannheim himself later in his 
work, and long after his emigration to England and abandonment of concern 
for the sociology of knowledge, when he refers to the , sociology of knowledge 
as 'this marginal field of human knowledge'. 
30 
However, what is required is 
some explanation of the neglect of this tradition in the sociology of knowledge 
and this cannot be found directly in the work of Berger and Luckrnann. 
Any attempt at an explanation of the neglect of this tradition in the sociology of 
knowledge would be greatly aided by an account of the emergence of the socio- 
logy of knowledge in Germany itself. The two explanations are Inter-connected 
in that it seems probable that, to some extent, an account of the one problem 
could be applied in an inverse form to an account of the other. Wolff, in a 
survey of work on the sociology of knowledge in the United States, has pointed 
7 
to a number of tendencies which characterize work in this area. He comm- 
ences with 
'two tendencies that have characterized most, 
though not all, American writings in thiMfield: 
impatience with epistemology and rejection of 
the idea that the sociology of knowledge occupy 
Itself with it and, perhaps more than animosity, 31 indifference toward Marxism and ignorance of it. 
Conversely, a preoccupation with epistemological problems and an active 
response to the Marxist discussion of ideology certainly characterizes the 
German tradition in the sociology of knowledge. Wolff further suggests that 
in the United States two further tendencies are apparent in the work on the 
sociology of knowledge. The first is that it usually 'takes an ahistorical- 
systematic, rather than a historical approach'32 to its subject matter. The 
second characteristic is its 'attention to social psychology and to G. H. Mead 
in particular' . 
33 
Again it is apparent that historicism lies at the very centre 
of concern in the German tradition, whilst its relationship to social psychol- 
ogy is rather weak. If one takes account of Berger's assertion that Mead's 
social psychology could provide the basis for a micro-sociology of knowledge, 
then it is, clear that such a concern is absent in the German tradition which, 
almost without exception, treated its problems at the macro level. 
34 
A much simpler and equally relevant reason for the neglect of this tradition 
has been the absence of translations of the major works. This argument, 
however, can be applied in the opposite direction. If it could be shown that 
` Anglo-American sociology remained hostile or indifferent to the German trad- 
ition in the sociology of knowledge, then this could account for the reluctance 
to translate the major writings. Yet the actual situation with respect to 
translations. appears more complex. Of the central figures in this tradition, 
Max Scheler has fared worst as far as Anglo-American readers are concerned. 
His major work in the field, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft remains 
untranslated with the exception of one brief extract. 
35 
The first of Scheler's 
major works to appear in English was the translation of Wesen und Formen der 
Sympathie in 1958.36 The posthumous collection of some of his essays., 
Philosophische Weltanschauung, including an important essay 'Die Formen 
des Wissens und die Bildung' appeared in translation in the same year. 
37 
That little interest was shown in Scheler's sociology of knowledge in the 
Anglo-American world is indicated by the appearance of the first article on 
his work in this area by Schiipp in 1927 and the second by Becker and-Dahlke 
as late as 1942. appeared 
38 
'The early writings of Lukäcs, and particularly Geschichte und Klassenbewuss- 
tsein are often seen by many writers as relevant to the sociology of know- 
ledge in Germany but none have systematically examined the importance of 
this work for the development of this discipline. 
39 Indeed, this major work 
by Lukacs, which originally appeared in 1923, did not even reappear in Ger- 
many 
Until 1968. This is due in part to Lukäcs' own disavowal of this work 
40 
as his recent introduction' to the new edition suggests. In the intervening 
period, however, this work did exercise a significant, if somewhat subterr- 
anean, influence on European Marxism. It has quite recently appeared in 
41 
English forty-eight years after its original publication. 
I 
The writings of Karl Mannheim, however, have appeared in English over a 
period of years. In particular, Ideologie und Utopie which appeared in Ger- 
8 
many in 1929, was published in English in 1936.42 it is this work which is 
ý97 
most often mentioned in connection with the German tradition in the sociology 
of knowledge. Whilst Mannheim published a number of his own works in the 
period which he spent in England, almost none of them were from his most 
productive period in terms of his contribution to the sociology of knowledge, 
that is, from 1918 to 1933. The important essays from this latter period 
did not appear in translation until 1952 when Essays on the Sociology of Know- 
ledge appeared. 
43 
Later Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology appear- 
ed in 1953 and Essays on the Sociology of Culture appeared -in 1956.44 Even 
then, some important essays on the sociology of knowledge remained untrans- 
lated, notably 'Ideologische und soziologische Interpretation der geistigen 
Gebilde' which only appeared in translation in 1963.45 Kettler has pointed 
to the existence of a number of other manuscripts from Mannheim's German 
writings which remain untranslated. 
46 Perhaps even more remarkable is the 
fact that these essays on the sociology of- knowledge written during the period 
in which Mannheim was in Germany were not even reprinted in Germany until 
1964.47 
It is true, then, that Mannheim's contribution to the sociology of knowledge 
in Germany is available, with some exceptions, in English translation. Yet 
the nature of these translations, especially that of Ideologie und Utopie is 
worthy of comment at this point. Commenting on the 1936 translation, Wolff 
suggests that 
'It Is doubtful whether a more literal version ... 
would have led to the success of the book in 
which Louis Wirth's and Edward Shils' rendit- 
ion has resulted. Their version, however, re- 
places relatively idiosyncratic German by relative- 
ly standardized English, thus presenting us with 
a book of a character quite different from the origin- 
al. This Is not said in order to criticize but to 
10 
point to a problem, which is that of the im- 
plications and consequences of choosing faith- 
fulness as against understandability as the 
first criterion of a translation. ' 48 
Quite apart from the difficulties inherent in any translation, it would appear 
'that Mannheim himself made many modifications to the translation. 
49 
How- 
ever, it does not appear to have suffered as badly as its French translation, 
50 
as Gabel has pointed out. 
Whi Ist the English translation does retain some of the urgency of the original, 
the nature of the crisis which Mannheim experienced and detailed in 1929 is 
somewhat obscured. This-is important for any attempt to understand the im- 
pact. of that work upon philosophy and sociology In Germany. It will be argued 
below that the translation further obscures the connection which exists between 
that work and Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Many writers have sugg- 
ested that a connection does exist, though none have documented systematic- 
ally the nature of that connection. 
51 
Often this has taken the form of general 
statements to the effect that Mannheim was engaged in a debate with Marxism, 
a thesis which has also been advanced for the writings of Max Scheler. 
52 
If the three figures in the development of the sociology of knowledge in vary- 
ing degrees have fared badly in terms of availability and nature of English 
translation of their works, then this is even more true of other contributors to 
the field. In fact none of these contributions has appeared in English trans- 
lation. This is true of Alfred Weber, Wilhelm Jerusalem, Alexander von 
Schelting, Max Adler and many others. - It is true also of many writers whose 
work is essential to the understanding of this tradition. The most notable 
example here is the work of Wilhelm Dilthey but relevant works of Ernst 
11 
Troeltsch are also worthy of mention in this connection. 
53 
The preceding remarks on the availability and nature of English translations 
alone cannot account for the neglect of this tradition in the sociology of know- 
ledge. The remarks by Wolff cited earlier on the distinctive features of the 
American response to the sociology of knowledge suggest that hostility to and 
ignorance of the German tradition must form a further contributory factor. 
This negative response was earlier expressed by Popper in The Open Soceity 
and its Enemies where he wrote 
'The sociology of knowledge is not only self- 
destructive, not only a rather gratifying object 
of socio-analysis, it also shows an astounding 
failure to understand precisely its main subject, 
the social aspects of knowledge, or rather, of 
scientific method. ' 54 
it has been restated, more forcefully, in a discussion of the recent method- 
ological dispute in German sociology. Here Popper comments ý, 
'I have been for many years a critic of the 
so-called "sociology of knowledge". Not 
that I thought that everything that Mannheim 
(and Scheler) said was mistaken. On the 
contrary, much-of it was only too trivially 
true. What i combatted, mainly, was 
Mannheim's belief that there was an essent- 
ial difference with respect to objectivity be- 
tween the social scientist and the natural 
scientist, or between the study of society 
and the study of nature. The thesis I com- 
batted was that it was easy to be "objective" 
in the natural sciences, while objectivity in 
the social sciences could be achieved, if at 
all, only by very select intellects: by the 
"freely poised intelligence" which is only55 
"loosely anchored in social traditions". ' 
What Popper does highlight, from his own perspective, is the concern which. 
the German tradition expressed for the social factors responsible for the 
development of scientific thought, though he never systematically analyses 
12 
any of their discussions. 
A less hostile response, but again one which is closely associated with em- 
piricism and a concern for natural scientific knowledge is to be found in a 
recent discussion by Elias. He argues that Marx's dualistic paradigm of 
consciousness and society 
'has dominated with particular force enquiries 
into the sociology of knowledge; there it has 
greatly contributed towards delaying the trans- 
ition from a dogmatic philosophical to an un- 
dogmatic scientific stage at which theoretical 
and empirical studies can proceed dialectically 
in cross-fertilization with each other. ' 
56 
I 
The association of the terms 'dogmatic' with the 'philosophical' character- 
izes 
much 
of the discussion of the sociology of knolwedge and points to the 
importance of a further factor which may account for the neglect of the German 
tradition. 
Sociology, within the Anglo-American traditions, has developed as a dis- 
tinctive discipline in its own right with, until recently, few links with phil- 
osophy, though in various situations and at various times it has had close 
ties with economics and with social psychology. This is, not to suggest that 
such sociology did not often rely upon philosophical premises. Rather, it 
is more accurate to suggest that these premises often remained unexamined. 
Most often these traditions were legitimated by recourse to a philosophy of 
science based either upon positivism or empiricism. In solar as the em- 
I 
piricist orientation to social phenomena predisposes researchers towards 
certain methodologies and techniques then there would be a tendency not to 
examine these areas of social life not amenable to such methodologies. 
Even if such areas were examined - for example, ideologies in various forms - 
13 
then the discussion would take on a character peculiar to these method- 
ologies. This is the implication, for example, of Merton's contrast between 
the development of the sociology of knowledge in its European versions and 
the development of mass communications research in the United States. 
57 
With respect to an understanding of the German tradition in the sociology of 
knowledge, what is of relevance here is the difficulty faced by an empricist 
tradition in coming to terms with other traditions. In part, Mannheim, 
Scheler and Lukäcs developed their social theories out of an idealist tradition 
in philosophy. In a problematic manner, Lukäcs and, to a lesser extent, 
Mannheim also developed their theories of social consciousness out of Marx's 
writings and those of his' successors. For diverse reasons, neither tradition 
is readily amenable to an empiricist interpretation, except at the expense of 
falsification of these traditions. 
58 
To take but one example, it will be apparent from later discussion that the 
German tradition in the sociology of knowledge is largely anti-positivist and 
deeply committed to German philosophical traditions associated with the 
. 
Gei stewissenschaften. The neo-Kantian problematic of the duality of the 
natural and cultural sciences, of nomothetic and idiographic sciences ad- 
vanced most notably by Rickert and Windelband, informs much of the dis- 
. 
cussion in the sociology of knowledge in this tradition. Habermas, comment- 
e 
Ing on the neglect of this discussion in Germany itself, suggests that 
'The lively discussion of the methodological 
distinction between natural and cultural 
scientific research which was first opened 
by neo- Kant i ani sm is today forgotten; the 
problematic which it sparked off does not 
appear real any more. ' 59 
14 
Habermas goes on to attribute this neglect to the apparent success of the 
positivist orientation within the German social sciences. This has further 
implications for_ any attempt to comprehend the German tradition in the 
sociology of knowledge. 
If it can be argued that the positivist tradition has achieved relative success 
in the social sciences then, like other traditions, it will attempt to rewrite 
the history of those sciences in such a way that their previous development 
was characterized by the steady advance of its own standpoint. As Kuhn's 
remarks on the development of the natural sciences suggest, this could take 
the form of an attempt to show that the history of sociology, for example, is 
a history of the steady accretion and accumulation of knowledge such that 
earlier conflicts within the discipline are minimized to such an extent that 
victory appears inevitable for those who are in fact the victors. 
60 In another 
context, Gouldner has pointed tD the limits of this convergence theory of in- 
tellectual development. The encouragement of a search for continuity with 
the past in any examination of a theoretical tradition 
'seeks to reveal a tacit consensus of great 
minds and, by showing this, to lend credence 
to the conclusions that they are held to have 
converged upon unwittingly. Convergence 
thus becomes a rhetoric, a way of persuading 
men to accept certain views. ' 61 
Gouldner goes on to suggest that this procedure leads to the neglect of 
theoretical conflict 
'The ideology of convergence implies that if 
great theoriests can be shown to have come 
to a consensus unbeknown to themselves, 
then it is these tacit agreements that are 
theoretically productive, rather than the 
polemics to which the men themselves 
often gave their attention. ' 62 
15 
Certainly the empirical tradition in sociology would judge the sociology of 
knowledge to be unsuccessful both in view of its incapacity to generate em- 
pirical propositions and because of its preoccupation with metaphysics or 
even with philosophical problems. Such a standpoint could only extract 
from the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge either a few empiri- 
cal propositions or a negative judgment upon th-e" whole enterprise. Neither 
response could provide any basis for an understanding of why the sociology 
of knowledge was preoccupied with its distinctive problems, or why it took 
on such a distinctive form in Germany. 'in the former case, the German 
sociological tradition would be seen as marred by the late development of a 
strong empirical tradition. Oberschall, for example, in an examination of 
the development of the empirical in sociology in Germany, certainly views 
this as a negative. factor. 
63 In the latter case, the attempts by Mannheim 
to pose epistemological problems in a sociolgical context would be judged in 
a wholly negative manner. 
64 
Therefore, a basis for the understanding of this tradition in the sociology of 
knowledge must first be sought within the writings on the sociology of know- 
ledge and not on the basis of criteria, classificatory systems and theories 
which are external to these writings. This initial process, however, in no 
way excludes the subsequent assessment of the sociology of knowledge from 
other standpoints. It merely intends that an account of this tradition should 
I commence 
from a reconstruction of, for example, what the contemporary 
writers themselves saw as the task of the sociology of knowledge, which 
problems they saw as urgent and why, and how they attempted to solve these 
problems. It is only by commencing from these writings that it is possible 
to provide an account of why the sociology of knowledge took on so distinctive 
16 
a form in Germany and why it posed the problems in a specific manner. 
Further, the writings themselves provide many clues as to the context - both 
theoretical and practical - in terms of which their work can be understood. 
Such a mode of proceeding may go some way to avoiding the immediate 
negative judgment of the sociology of knowledge within this tradition and its 
consequent neglect. Since the writers within this tradition saw their activity 
as important, as vital to the understanding of contemporary theoretical and 
practical concerns, then an initial reconstruction must attempt to answer why 
this was the case. Again this does not preclude an assessment which may 
Y in many ways be negative, rather it attempts to avoid this pre-judgment from 
obscuring many important features of this tradition. 
The preceding remarks should not be taken as an indication that the sociology 
of knowledge within the German tradition possesses no contemporary relevance. 
Even though it may be subsequently concluded that many of the solutions to 
the problems which it: faced cannot be viewed as satisfactory from a number 
of vantage points, it will be argued that the problems which it posed do re- 
main, even though within much of the contemporary sociological enterprise 
they are treated as surpassed or irrelevant. For instance, it is at least 
plausible to argue that the development of the sociology of knowledge in 
Germany can be seen as an important chapter in the Methodenstreit in the 




this respect the following study attempts to contribute to the discussion, re- 
opened by Habermas, on the logic of the social sciences. 
In some respects, the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge already 
, 17 
raises many of the issues developed by Habermas' in Knowledge and Human 
Interests which intends 'analyzing the connections between cognition 
(Erkenntnis) and human interests'. In this work, Habermas attempts to 
'reconstruct the pre-history of modern positivism', and whilst that study 
deals with many stages of reflection in Kant, Hegel, Marx and Di Ithey which 
are particularly relevant for the sociology of knowledge as it developed in 
Germany, he does not concern himself with that tradition, even though the 
latter is certainly important for what Habermas terms 'the process of the 
dissolution of epistemology' . 
66 
In fact, the sociology of knowledge was 
itself concerned with the transformation of traditional epistemology and the 
substitution of a social epistemology. His prefatory remarks are relevant 
for the present study which also attempts to reconstruct a much smaller part 
of the discussion of the relation between cognition and human interests. 
Habermas argues that 
'Retreading this path from a perspective that 
I ooks back towards the point of departure 
may help to recover the forgotten experience 
of reflection. That we disavow reflection is 
positivism. ' 
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Habermas and others have reopened many of these stages of reflection on the 
nature of social theory and the relationship between cognitive process and 
Interests. That this discussion is much in evidence at least within Germany 
may be evinced from the continuation of the earlier Methodenstreit at various 
levels of analysis. The present study is intended as a minor contribution to 
one chapter of that debate, though it is not exclusively concerned with it. 
.F 
Commencing from contemporary writings of social theorists in this field, the 
wider aim of this study is to explicate the central features of this tradition 
in the sociology of knowledge. In other words, it will be necessary to examine 
what the writers themselves saw as important problems to be solved, why 
18 
they engaged in this particular intellectual and practical project, what they 
saw as the aims of their study, how they proposed to carry it out, and what 
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Antecedents and context 
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CHAPTER ONE 
In an attempt to understand the distinctive nature of the German tradition 
of the sociology of knowledge in the Weimar Republic, it is important to re- 
examine not merely the immediate theoretical and practical context of its 
emergence but also its antecedents. This should not be intended as an 
invitation to rdtraco, for instance, the development of a theory of ideology 
from Bacon, Helvetius, Hofbach, Destutt de Tracy down to the twentieth 
century. 
1 Rather, our concern will be with those philosophical and sociol- 
ogical traditions that inform the sociology of knowledge that developed in 
Weimar Germany. Here the focus of attention might be on such traditions 
as the Marxism of the Second International, Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie and 
Weltanschauungslehre, Nietzsche Is critique of ideology, Simmel'a theory 
of alienation, Weber Is theory of values and Troeltsch's historicism. In 
turn, some of throe traditions also permeate the theoretical crises in Weimar 
Germany - such as 'the crisis of historicism' (Troeltsch) or the Wissen- 
schaftsstreit. 
2 
Indeed, the whole atmosphere of crisis permeates much of 
the writings on the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany, Mannhe i rrr 
for instance, saw his Ideologie und Utopie as itself 'conscious of an intellect- 
ual crisis situation' . 
On the other hand, whereas Mannheim often saw this crisis as an intellect- 
ual one, there is little doubt that it was itself a part of a wider social and 
political crisis in Weimar Germany that surfaces in various forms in the 
sociology of knowledge. Often, the sociology of knowledge itself is seen 
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to emanate from these practical crises. Scheler, for example, as we shall 
see, suggests that the relativist outlook permeating the sociology of know- 
ledge has its roots in the new parliamentarism. Similarly, one cannot 
fully comprehend Mannheim's theory of political ideologies without being 
aware that Ideologie und Utopie was written in the context of a crumbling 
fragmentary/political structure in the latter part of the Weimar Republic. 
In Lukäc's case, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein is itself both a theoret- 
ical and political response to the revolutionary aspirations of sections of the 
Marxist tradition and the failed revolutions In Hungary and Germany. In 
3 
terms of an oversimplified model of the socio-political and economic con- 
stellation in Weimar Germany, one can point to three periods. The first is 
the aftermath of the First World War 'defeat', the Revolution of 1918/19, the 
political and economic upheaval down to 1923, including the uprising of March 
1921. This is the period in which Luk6cs' essays that constitute Geschichte 
und Klassenbewusstsein were written. For Lukäcs, of course, his role in the 
Hungarian Revolution and participation in Bela Kun's short-lived revolution- 
ary government and his subsequent exile are also of central importance. This 
period between 1918 and 1923 may perhaps be characterised as one of near- 
total dislocation and uncertainty. It was, for Lukäcs, the period of adherence 
to what he later termed'messianic Marxism'. The second period, character- 
of ised as thatA'relative stabilisation' extends from 1924 and the Dawes Plan 
down to the financial collapse of 1929. Lukäcs, in a later account of German 
philosophy and social theory, located Scheler's sociology of knowledge within 
this period. 
4 
One might add that most of Mannheim's work on the sociology 
of knowledge also falls within this period. The third period from 1929 to 1933 
is characterised by the economic collapse of the German economy and the 
Increasing disintegration of the political structure. The fragmentation that 
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characterised the parliamentary political scene gave way to an increasing 
polarisation and, what was crucial for Mannheim, the collapse of parties 
occupying the middle ground of the political spectrum. - Though, strictly 
speaking, this final period cannot be said to -inform Mannheim's Ideologie 
und Utopie - since it was completed in 1928 - Mannheim nonetheless incor- 
porated this fragmentation of the political structure into his sociology of 
knowledge, both in his paper on competition and in Ideologie und Utopie. 
Furthermore, as will be evident from an examination of the reception of Ideal- 
ogle und Utopie, the fact that it was published In 1929 ensured that Mannheim 's 
contemporaries would recognise that the 'intellectual crisis' of which he spoke 
was itself part of a much deeper crisis permeating the Weimar Republic. 
5 
What this suggests is that the sociology of knowledge was not merely viewed 
as an academic discipline concerned with broad theoretical issues but itself 
contained practical and sometimes overtly political aims. Scheler and Mann- 
heim both saw a significant pedagogic role either for a Weltanschauungslehre 
or for the sociology of knowledge. ' Much of Mannheim's later work is intent 
on relating his sociology of knowledge insights to the contemporary situation. 
This becomes most explicit in Ideologie und Utopie where one of its immediate 
aims - and that of the sociology of knowledge - is 'a diagnosis of the times'. 
In Lukäcs case, the practical political intentions of the critique of ideology 
contained in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein are openly presented. But 
In Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie, too, the problem of ideology is also 
located within the context of a discussion of theory and practice. 
In examining both the philosophical and sociological context and the pract- 
Ical socio-economic and political context of the sociology of knowledge in 
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Weimar Germany, an attempt will be made, wherever possible, to investigate 
these contexts initially in the light of the sociology of knowledge's own inter- 
ests. In this way, they cease to be 'external' contexts but a constituent 
element of our textual understanding. Conversely, the works themselves 
must be seen as interventions in the crises 
^controversies 
of both the 
theoretical and practical domains and not merely writings about these crises. 
It is possible to see in the various philosophical and sociological traditions 
that were taken up by the sociology of knowledge important modes of reflect- 
ion upon Issues that the sociology of knowledge later dealt with. A sociology 
of culture, a theory of ideology, hermeneutic and historicist reflection upon 
the problem of interpretation, a sociological-biological critique of reason, 
a base-superstructure model of society, a theory of cultural alienation, 
Weltanschauungsanalyse and the relativist problematic are amongst some of 
the central themes in the sociology of knowledge in Germany. All had been 
developed within the various philosophical and sociological traditions that the 
sociology of knowledge was to take up in Weimar Germany. At the end of 
his. essay on 'Wissenssoziologie', Mannheim very briefly reviews its develop- 
ment and highlights the most important of its forerunners. 
6 
Those that are 
most relevant to the German tradition are Marx, Nietzsche, Dilthey and - 
Mannheim adds - for the modern period, Lukäcs and Scheler. Since Lukäcs 
and Scheler are associated with this tradition and are discussed in detail 
below, it would seem reasonable to examine the first three writers for their 
significance in the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany. 
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But in itself this would not give us a sufficiently clear focus upon the specific 
problems raised by the sociology of knowledge and its distinctive mode of 
dealing with them. Rather, we need to know in advance what the common 
features of the sociology of knowledge were. 
There is little doubt that one of the central features of the sociology of know- 
ledge was either a confrontation with the theory of ideology or an attempt to 
develop it further or, finally, an attempt to transform it into a sociology of 
knowledge. One might provisionally assume that the source of this theory 
of ideology and its extension in the sociology of knowledge lay in Marx's 
critique of ideology. But even in the case of Lukäcs, whose Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein seems most obviously to be a Hegel ian-Marxist reinter- 
pretation of Marx's critique of ideology, we find that his theory of ideology 
and reification is embedded in fundamental strands of German sociology, 
however critical of them he might be. In Mannheim's case, it has often 
been assumed that the roots of his sociology of knowledge lay in Marx. 
Gronwald, for instance, suggests that 'Mannheim's philosophical position 
is that Of a historicism derived from Marx and Dilthey interspersed with 
phenomenological elements' . In the course of the discussion surrounding 
Mannheim's paper on competition, he himself agreed that. 'Marx has in- 




case - and he was less obviously concerned with the development of a 
theory 
of ideology - one is confronted with a bewildering aray of influences. As 
Corer suggests, 
'As one proceeds to read his work, one is 
struck even more forcibly by the variety of 
his intellectual forebearers. Besides 
Husserl, Influences of Dilthey, Bergson, 
of German neo-vitalism, and above all of 
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Nietzsche, are unmistakable. But Schelsr's 
thought is also deeply marked by Saint August- 
i ne and Pascal, by Cardinal Newman and Saint 
Francis. ' 9 
Of course, not all of these are responsible for Scheler's quasi-biological 
base-superstructure theory of knowledge and ideology. It is probably 
Nietzsche who is central to this aspect of his work. 
Thus, whereas Et first sight it might-. seem apparent that the theory of idea I- 
ogy in the sociology of knowledge is derived from Marx's work, the situation 
appears more complex. The specific constellation of intellectual currents 
is well expressed by Barth with reference to the theory of ideology in 
Weimar Germany: 
'The problems that emerge with the concept of 
ideology in the present period, in their scope 
and comprehensiveness, become intelligible 
primarily on the basis of the intellectual- 
historical background which has been formed 
with the amalgamation of motives of recent 
historicism and philosophy of life together 
with Nietzsche's biological-sociological 
critique of reason and Marx's base-super- 
structure doctrine. 1 10 
Barth highlights the four central strands that are important for an under- 
standing of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge; Marx, 
Dilthey (Lebensphilosophie), historicism and Nietzsche. In order to give 
some indication of the specific form which the theory of ideology (Ideol- 
cgienlehre) took in Weimar Germany, we may point to Barth's account of its 
four basic presuppositions. He highlights them as follows: 
11 In the anthropological conception, the irrational. 
will and drives take over the leading functions. 
Intellect and reason appear as epiphenomena 
that owe their emergence to human beings'need 
for orientation to the world and that are created 
and prove successful as- instruments in the ser- 
vice of the life-struggle. Human intellectual 
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equipment is a form of adaptation to the general 
struggle for the maintenance and development 
of existence. 
2 By means of the primacy of the will over reason, 
the main body of human activity is situated in 
this practical behaviour that is to be character- 
i sed, in the broadest sense of the word, as the 
economy. With the recognition of the predom- 
inance of the wi II over the mind and reason, the 
view is endorsed that the will directed-toward 
I ife's welfare and the institutional forms in 
which it operates relate to human intellectual 
functions lind their creations in the same way 
as the material base relates to the ideological 
superstructure. . This viewpoint is dangerous 
in so far as it supports the tendency to believe 
that cognitive and concrete - practical behaviour 
can be separated from one another and in so far 
as it encourages the impression that the econ- 
omic welfare of life takes place without the co- 
operation of intellectual functions. However, 
as Marx correctly remarked, the economy is 
always composed of both intellectual and 
mental labour ... 
3 Since intellectual activity develops originally 
in the closest contact with the provision of 
life and orientation to the world, since there- 
fore it is assumed that it is linked with concrete- 
practical interests, there emerges the belief 
that, in its apparently "pure" development, its 
primary determination, to operate in the service 
of life, is not sacrificed. 
4 There exists a relationship of dependency between 
the world of objective and subjective mind, on 
the one hand, and the economic-social basis, 
on the other. This dependency is embodied in 
an insidious and dubious metaphor: it is main- 
tained that the contents and forms of the mind 
are the "expression" of these material existential 
foundations and their organisation. ' 11 
We can see already, in the outline of the four fundamental presuppositions 
of the theory of ideology, that it would be erroneous to assume that this 
theory of ideology embodied in the sociology of knowledge is simply taken 
from Marx. Therefore, one of the tasks of illuminating the context within 
which this theory of ideology is developed in the sociology of knowledge in 
02 
Germany will be to examine its understanding of Marx's critique of ideology. 
In turn, this is only possible if we can examine this understanding in the 
light of its mediation through the Marxism of the Second International and 
German sociology itself. 
in his study of the reception of Marx's work in the sociology of knowledge 
in Weimar Germany, Lenk demonstrates how far this tradition relied for its 
understanding of Marx's critique of ideology upon interpretations of Marx 
that had already gone some way towards 'destroying' Marx's critique of 
ideology. 
12 
Lenk argues that the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany 
obtained its interpretation of Marx either from the Marxism of the Second 
International or from German sociology itself in the writings of Simmel, Max 
Weber and Troeltsch. Despite the fact that Lenk seeks to draw a sharp demarc- 
ation line between Marx's and Engels' notions of ideology and base-super- 
structure notions that can hardly be maintained unproblematically in the light 
of recent analyses by Wei Imer, 
13 
Bdhler14 and others, his account of the 
Marxism of the Second International and of Engels' own later work suggests 
that the development of vulgar Marxism was already well under way. before 
the substantive development of sociology in Germany. That, is, Lenk argues 
that the base-superstructure model of society, which itself presupposes two 
realms of existence, was already present in Marxism itself. For instance,. 
Lenk suggests that 
'In comparison with Marx, Engels exhibits a 
preference for concepts that signify a causal 
or interactional relation between base and 
ideology, expressions such as "mirror-image", 
"reflection", "economic reflection", .. etc, 
that in part are also already applied by Marx 
but which do not yet possess this dominating 
character as in Engels. 1 15 
33 
The simple reduction of the superstructure to a material base is therefore 
already present in Marxism itself. So, too, is the absence of reflection 
upon the nature of the truth of this 'consciousness' in the superstructure. 
Similarly, the naturalisation of society in the scientific and positivistic 
interpretation of Marxism also reduces any dialectical notion of the subject- 
object relationship to that of 'interaction'. Socialism as a scientific world 
view sought to understand Marxism as a world view 
'that encompassed nature, history and society, 
In' it science and politics, theory and practice 
are identical in the sense that politics is merely 
the application of scientific knowledge. ' 16 
A second tendency towards the 'scientization' of Marxism lay in the opposite 
tendency 
'which commenced from a critical separation of 
empirical propositions and normative implications 
within Marxist theory. ' 
17 
The implications of this 'scientific' Marxism, especially in its first variant, 
for the sociology of knowledge and probably already evident. Lenk main- 
talns that 
'If law-like regularities are valid for nature and 
society to the same extent, then the social base 
must be explained as the authentic reality - in 
the sense of an ontologised ens realissimum; the 
superstructure however, must be explained as a 
relatively Insignificant epiphenomenon for the 
real movement of history and the social process. '18 
The naturalisation of society in this world-view must also lead to the demise 
of the significance of human practice. It is this view of Marxism, amongst 
others, that Lukacs criticized under the rubric of 'orthodox' Marxism. 
20 
In 
the sociology of knowledge, the two-sphere notion of reality is, as we shall 
see, at the centre of Scheler's sociology of knowledge. In its extreme form, 
this ontological separation of base and superstructure leads to what Scheler 
34 
, __, 
himself termed 'the powerlessness of the mind', or, in a different context, 
to Mannheim's notion of 'the homelessness of the mind'. 
The vulgar Marxist tendency was not merely present within the orthodoxy 
and revisionism in the Second International. This interpretation of Marx- 
ism was, Lenk maintains, also widely accepted in German sociology. Key 
figures in this tradition accepted the interpretation of Marxism advanced by 
the orthodoxy such as Kautsky and sought to counter its 'one-sidedness' . 
For instance, as Bosse suggests, in a study of the relationship between 
the sociology of religion and Marx's critique of ideology in the work of Max 
Weber and Troeltsch, 
'Troeltsch and Weber, with their critique of 
"economism" and "materialism" claim to 
have refuted the core of the Marxist critique 
of ideology. They presuppose the unity and 
continuity of the Marxist critique of ideology 20 
from Marx to their Marxist contemporaries. I 
This is not to suggest that they did not differentiate between their Marxist 
contemporaries or that Weber, for instance, - as Lt5with argued21- was 
not primarily concerned with a critique of orthodox Marxistssuch as Kautsky 
Nonetheless, Marxism as the 'materialist interpretation of history' was 
criticized for its economic mono-causality whilst, at the same time, it 
was viewed as a fund of possible working hypotheses. Its approach to the 
study of society became one of many possible approaches. Specific aspects 
of Marx's theory, such as the theory of alienation and commodity fetishism, 
were - with the exception of Si mme l22- almost completely ignored in both 
German sociology and orthodox Marxism. Both were taken up by Lukäcs 
as central themes in his Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. But in the 
sociology of knowledge, insofar as it either remained fixed upon this earlier 
m 35 
interpretation of Marxism (Scheler) or failed to take up these aspects of 
Lukacs' work whilst retaining others (Mannheim? ), a theory of alienation 
was developed sometimes explicitly but often implicitly that had its origins 
not in Marx but in various traditions in German philosophy and sociology. 
The reduction of Marx's critique of ideology to a base-superstructure theory 
of society, in which the causal relationships posited between the two led 
to the superstructure becoming an epiphenomenon, could also lead to the 
1 
substitution of a theory of ideology without its critique. The simple positing of 
connections between base and superstructure as a theory of ideology can 
i 
reduce the truth claims of propositions, theories, etcin the superstructure 
to more assertions that are invalidated merely by virtue of being socially 
rooted in the base. In other words, their truth claims are ignored. To 
what extent this was the direction in which the sociology of knowledge moved 
must be-examined later. 
A critique of ideology, although not systematically developed in his work, 
can also be found in the writings of Nietzsche. This critique of ideology - 
as Barth23 and, more recently, Funke24 have shown - is perhaps as im- 
portant as the theory of ideology taken over by the sociology of knowledge 
from Marxist orthodoxy and German sociology's understanding of Marx for 
an understanding of the sociology of knowledge itself. In examining the 
relevance of Nietzsche's work for the sociology of knowledge, it will not 
bo possible to do more-than outline some of the salient features of his 
critique of ideology and his philosophy of history. Its significance for the 
sociology of knowledge, however, is particularly evident in Scheler's work 
but Mannheim also argued that, aside from Marx, 
36 
'The other source of the modern theory of ideology 
and the sociology of knowledge is to be found in 
the flashes of insight of Nietzsche, who combined 
his concrete observations in this area with a theory 
of drive-structures and a theory of knowledge that 
is reminiscent of pragmatism. Though he too em- 
ployed sociological imputation, it is largely the 
categories "aristocratic and democratic cultures" 25 to which he imputed specific modes of thought. ' 
Is this, in fact, where the relevance of Nietzsche's work for the sociology 
of knowledge lies? 
In his examination of Nietzsche's theory of ideology, Barth draws attent- 
ion to the connection in his work between his biological and sociological 
critique of reason and truth, on the one hand, and his theory of ideology on 
the other. The latter is a constituent element of the former. Nietzsche's 
critique of reason is one that reduces the whole cognitive apparatus back to 
a biological basis, and in particular 'the will to power'. He engages in a 
radical destruction of logical forms and laws which he views as merely mani- 
festations of the will to power. In more general terms, the search for know- 
ledge in all its forms is reduced to a function of the will to power: hence, 
questions of truth become questions of power. 
But this search for truth and quest for knowledge is itself an essential social 
need. The intellect creates a world for us that is of value to us but it is 
a world of illusions. As Nietzsche put it: "We only live through illusions' 
or 'The fundamental aspect of all that is great and lively rests upon illusion. 
The pathos of truth Ieads to decline' . 
26 
Hence, the most general conse - 
quence of the intellect is delusion about onesself and the world since its 
creations ignore the fact that it is itself merely an organ of the will. Man, 
for his part, is not interested in 'the truth' as such but merely in the use he 
37 
can put it to. In his theories and his morality, man seeks to establish 
timeless, and reified (the concept of Verdinglichung occurs often in Nietzsche's 
work) notions that ignore 'the eternal flux of all things', 'the eternal trans- 
formation'. Hence, 'There are no eternal facts: just as there are no absolute 
truths' . 
27 
The 'relative' truths that we produce are the result of our prag- 
matic interests. In this connection, Habermes has suggested that 
'Nietzsche's "theory of knowledge" ... consists 
in the attempt to comprehend the categorial frame- 
work of the natural sciences ..., the concept of 
law'. .., the operational basis of experience ..., 
and the rules of logic and calculation as the re- 
Ia priori of a world of objective illusion that 
has been produced for the purposes of mastering 
nature and thus of preserving existence. ' 28 
This ! world of objective illusion' - that also exists in the moral sphere too - 
is relative because both intellect and drives are, for Nietzsche, 'reducible 
to the will to power', it is also 'a perspectivistic Illusion' since this world 
'can be interpreted differently, it does not have a 
meaning behind it, but innumerable meanings. - 
"Perspectivism". It Is our needs that interpret 29 
the world; our instincts and their pro and con. 
The theory of knowledge must therefore be replaced by a theory of perspect- 
ives -a task not carried out by Nietzsche but by a doctrine of world views 
(Weltanschauungslehre) and the sociology of knowledge. 
The key to Nietzsche's critique of ideology lies in his 'universal reduction 
of psychological, Intellectual and social forms and contents of life to the 
will to power'. 
30 
We may take morality as an instance of one of these 
a 
forms that isAcentral focus of attack in Nietzsche's critique of ideology. 
Nietzsche posits a diversity of moral systems that fulfil the needs of vari- 
ous social strata which are themselves either emergent or declining, power- 
less or dominant. This diversity is related to the diversity of their creat- 
38 
ors and agents and takes a hierarchical form: 
'Each class and each strata possess the moral- 
ity'that is appropriate to its interests and its 
will to power. For Nietzsche, the principle 
of this social order rests in the polarity of 
domination and subordination, command and 
commanded, leaders and led. .. The sociol- 
ogical aspect of his critique is thus manifested 
in the fact that he investigates the notions of 
moral behaviour as to whether they are the ex- 
pression of an elite or a mass. ' 
31 
Barth goes on to suggest that the whole of the 'superstructure' in Nietzsche's 
critique of ideology possess an instrumental character; it is the instrument 
of vital interests of the organism and especially of the will to power. It 
thus robs both reason and the mind of any autonomy and removes any 
questions of truth from this 'superstructure' . The mind is always directed' 
(dirigiert) by the will to power even in a period of the devaluation and in- 
version of valued (another central theme in Scheler's social philosophy32). 
In such a period there exists a 'war of the mind', a struggle for power but 
in the form of a struggle betwoen 'value-judgments' and an attempt to devalue 
those of one's opponent. These value-judgments change with the conditions 
of life but they, in turn, can be reduced to drives and impulses, i. e. to a 
biological basis. Hence, the mind is merely a part of a larger organism 
and is distinguished from biological processes only by its 'sophistication'. 
As Nietzsche put it, the mind is 'merely a means as an instrument in the 
service of higher life' I. 
Nietzsche's radical critique of ideology, with its socio-biological reduct- 
lonism, its elite-mass mode of society, its destruction of truth claims 
and hence its predication of relativism (or 'perspectivism') is, as we shall 
see, central to an understanding of Scheler's sociology of knowledge and, 
39 
to *a lesser extent, that of Mannheim. But even in Mannheim's sociology 
of knowledge, which is deeply impregnated with a historicist standpoint, 
Nietzsche's philosophy of history, as an early instance of this historicism, 
is also relevant. 
33 
History is significant for Nietzsche only insofar as 
'history serves life'. It too is instrumentalised. In his critique of 
ideology, we have also already come across the importance of perspectivism. 
Historical knowledge, too, is possible only through perspectivism. Each 
approach to history presupposes an interest structure that is dependent 
upon specific life-situations. Mannheim, too, often traces these life 
situations back to world-orientations and forms of the will. But more 
significant for an understanding of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is 
Dilthey's Lebensphilosphie, Weltanschauungslehre and theory of Verstehen. 
Lenk, in his study of the sociology of knowledge, suggests that, alongside 
the critique and reception of Marx, historicism is the most important strand 
of German sociology since Simmel. He maintains that 
What links historicism and Marxism with one 
another in the. perspective of German sociology 
is the interpretation of intellectual categories 
and forms as expressions of the existential 
realm that lies behind them. 1 34 
What differentiates historicism and Marxism, he argues, is the concept of 
existence to which intellectual forms are reduced: experience (Erlebnis) in 
the one case and the concrete totality of social phenomena in the other. 
However, in order to approach Dilthey's work, in particular, it is necessary 
to take a more specific focus. The significance of Dilthey's work for 
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and especially for his earlier writ- 
ings has already been alluded to; namely, than Marx's work was inter- 
preted by Mannheim in the spirit of Dilthey. 
35 Similarly, Grünwald 
40 
argues with reference to Dilthey's work that in it 
'there lie contained in nuce all the difficulties with 
which subsequently historicism and the sociology 
of knowledge founded upon it had to struggle. ' 36 
0 
These include the delineation of the form of existence to which knowledge 
is related, the understanding of expressions of that existence, the inter- 
pretation of world-views, the relativity of world-views and the attempt 
to synthesize these world-views. 
37 
0 
In his theory of the Geisteswissenschaften and his critique of historical 
reason, Dilthey takes as his starting point a cognitive subject that is not, 
as in Kant, a transcendental ego but 'the whole human being' as a historical 
and psychological reality - existing within a real Iife-process. The activity 
of consciousness is related, therefore, to effective life. The human sciences 
are to be grounded in the context of experience (Erlebnis), expression 
(Ausdruck) and understanding (Verstehen). Experience Is the fundamental 
'fact of consciousness'. The contents of this individual experience are 
contextual in character. They are located within the context of the 'course 
of life' (Lebensverlauf). This flow of life contains 'our notions, eval- 
uations and purposes'. Life (Leben) is thus more comprehensive that ex- 
perience, and individual experiences are to be interpreted in the context of 
life as a totality. Schn1delbach describes their status as follows: 
' If, along with Dilthey, one interprets ex- 
perience as the unity of inner and outer, 
subjectivity and objectivity and as an ele- 
ment in the context of life, then "life" 
too must also be understood as such a 
unity, i. e. not as a transcendental meta- 
physical principle (but] ... after Hegel, 
i. e. after the discrediting of absolute ideal- 
Ism, "life" is the concept of totality that ... 
enters in the systematic place of Hegel 's 
"absolute spirit". ' 38 
41 
Hence, the concept of life becomes both the transcendental basis for the 
critique of knowledge and the constitution of the historical world and a meta- 
physical principle (later developed by countless philosophers as Lebens- 
phi losophie) . 
However, what is of significance for the sociology of knowledge is not 
merely its own attempt to ground historical knowledge (especially in Mann- 
heim's unpublished essays 
39) 
but also the importance of the hermeneutic 
problem of interpretation and understanding (Verstehen). Individual ex- 
periences, for Dilthey, are manifestations of life. The relationship between 
the two is reflexive since the interpretati on of experiences and their object- 
i vat i ons in terms of life is itself to return to human beings themselves who 
constitute this life. Hence, the totality of human studies constitutes the 
scientific self-understanding of life, that is, the self-knowledge of humanity. 
The orientation of the knowing subject, therefore, and its attitude with regard 
to its objects is what constitutes the human sciences. The cognitivo sub- 
ject interprets the objectivations of life in the light of his own life-experien- 
ces, I. e. within the context of life itself. 
But this interpretation of the objectivations of life is also located historically 
and temporally. The model of historical understanding is the autobiography 
since 
'The autobiography is the highest and most 
instructive form in which the understanding 
of life confronts us ... here we approach 
... the roots 
of all historical interpretation. X40 
Historical understanding, therefore, must be rooted in individual experience. 
But the instance of the autobiography is also instructive in that it is one in 
which 
42 
'the distance between the subject of under- 
standing and the object of understanding is 
here demonstrably mediated by the "living" 
identity of subject and object, a phenomenon 
that, according to Dilthey is constitute for 
historical knowledge as such. ' 41 
In other words, the relationship between subject and object is unproblematic. 
In order to comprehend the significant of Dil they's notion of historical know- 
ledge and the sociology of knowledge, we must examine his notion of history 
and historicity further. 
Dilthey's tendency, in his earlier writings at least, to provide a psycholog- 
ical foundation of history in the individual human subject leads him into 
considerable difficulties. One of these is highlighted by Lieber when 
he argues that 
the attempt to make psychology the foundation 
of history and to view the origin of all historical- 
social differentiation in a general psychological 
structure as a dynamic form of life, in fact leads 
him back to a strange unhistorical view of history 
and society. ' 42 
In his later writings, Dilthey attempts to deal with the temporality of life. 
Time as something concretely experienced is located in life: 
In life ... the present encompasses 
the 
notion of the past in memory and that of the 
future in fantasy, which follows its possibilities, 
and in the activity that, within these possibilities, 
sets purposes. Thus, the present is filled with 
the past and carries the future in itself., 
43 
Each of these dimensions of time are to be apprehended in different ways 
since 
When we look back in memory, we comprehend 
the context of the past element of the flow of 
life with 
the category of meaning (Bedeutung). 
When we Ii ve in the present that is filled with 
realities we experience in intuitive understanding 
" their positive or negative value, and as we hold 
43 
out the future before us there emerges out of 
this process the categories of purpose. 1 44 
In short the past is apprehended through the category of meaning or sig- 
nificance, the present through that of value and the future through purpose. 
Of these categories, the crucial one for Dilthey is that of meaning 
'Only the category of meaning overcomes the 
mere juxtaposition, the mere subordination 
of aspects of life. And just as history is 
memory and this memory belongs to the cate- 
gory of meaning then, so too, is this the 45 
genuine category of historical thought. ' 
Lieber draws the implication from this that 'history must always have 
already occurred in order for it to be able to be comprehended as a signifi- 
cant context of meaning' . 
46 
The problems of ex post interpretation and 
the imputation of meaning are central to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. 
Similarly, the past (ideology), the future (utopia) and the present 
('diagnosis of the times') in his theory of ideology can also be related 
to Di Ithey's distinctions. 
However, within the context of Dilthey's philosophy of history, there exist 
another set of problems that are crucial, to the German tradition In the 
sociology of knowledge: the analysis of world views. 
47 
Since a philoso- 
phy is bound up with the times in which it emerged, difference philosophical 
systems - at this level of analysis, philosophy, too, is reduced to a world- 
view - confront one another in their 'historical anarchy' . 
Since they strive 
towards universally valid knowledge, this confrontation, this 'anarchy' is 
Inevitable. As we shall see, Mannheim's critique of existing epistemolog- 
les is precisely that they claim absolute validity and. yet are existentially 
bounded. However, the similarities between Dilthey's Weltanschauungslehre 
" and Mannheim's sociology of knowledge-go much deeper. 
44 
ii (they produces a theory of the development of world-views that is not 
confined merely to philosophy. At the roots of elementary world-views 
i es the experience that 
'Every great impression shows man a particular- 
side of life; the world appears in a new light; 
our attitudes towards life develop as such experiences 
are repeated and combined. ' 48 
Dilthey distinguishes between these lower forms of world-view (perhaps 
what Mannheim would also term 'world-view') and a higher form (what 
Mannheim would term an 'ideology') as follows: 
'Such attitudes towards life ... form the lower 
stratum for the formation of world-views. These 
try to solve the enigma of life on the basis of the 
experiences in which the individual's varied relat- 
ionships to life are reflected. In the higher forms 
of world-views,. one procedure is particularly 
prominent-understanding something which cannot 
be grasped as it is given to us by means of some- 
thing more distinct. ' 49 
It is in this second level that philosophy belongs and it is at this second 
level that 'the historical anarchy of these systems' of philosophy takes 
place. Di Ithey argues that 
'In each of the definitions of philosophy, only 
one aspect of its essence appears. Each of 
them is merely the expression of a standpoint 
which philosophy adopted at one stage in its 
history. Each states what to one or more 
thinkers in a certain context seemed requisite 
and possible as its role. Each of them defines 
a particular group of phenomena as philosophy, 
excluding from this group the other things often 
so-called. The great oppositions of standpoints, 
contending with equal force, gain expression in 
the definitions. They assert themselves over 
against one another with equal justification. 
And the dispute can be settled only if a stand- 
point above the factions can be found. ' 50 
Dilthey's solution is to provide, a 'philosophy of philosophy' that will 
examine existent philosophies. This is possible because, despite the 
45 !I 
'historical anarchy' of philosophies, the same types of world-view recur 
again and again in the historical process. They are confined to naturalism, 
subjective idealism and objective idealism. Since they confront one 
another 'with equal justification' no rationally groundable decision can be 
made in favour of any one of them; any decision can only be an existential 
one. Lieber draws a further implication from Dilthey's analysis of world- 
views; namely, that within the history of philosophy, 'what has become 
fact and objectivated in this history becomes the irreducible norm for the 
historical self-interpretation and self-creation of men. 1 
51 
This constancy 
in the recurrence of the same types of world-views probably derives from 
Dil the y's notion of human nature, as when he maintains that 
'A common human nature and the arrangement by 
which individuality is produced are vitally related 
to reality which is always and everywhere the same; 
life always shows the same sides. ' 52 
This would appear to conflict with his own view that, once 'voluntary theory' 
developed we became aware of 'the relativity of every historical form of 
life' . 
53 
But perhaps, for Di I they, "human nature' Is prior to 'life'. 
i 
As will be clear from an analysis of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, 
the situation of conflicting, irreconcible world-views is the starting point 
for his theory of ideology. The synthesis of world-views to be undertaken 
by a 'philosophy of philosophy' in Dilthey's work is performed by the 
sociology of knowledge in relation to competing ideologies. As Gadamer 
has argued, many of Dilthey's own problems arise from his 'entanglement 
in the impasses of historicism, 
54 
The historicism of Dilthey and later 
writers constitutes a further significant dimension in the sociology of know- 
ledge, particularly in Mannheim's. 
46 'I 
It has already been suggested by Lenk that historicism, interpreted in its 
widest sense, is, along with the reception of Marxism, one of the essential 
impulses in the sociology of knowledge. Lenk argues that the whole Lebens 
philosophie tradition had an important influence upon the concept of historical 
development. The element of directedness, and its progressive element are 
lost in a merely formal dynamism of 'dull will and drive'. 
55 
History 
ceases to have a meaning. Its meaning and truth are instead derived from 
the soul of creative individuals. As we have already seen in Dilthey's work, 
the search for a synthesis within- or, rather, from without - this stream of 
life is a central intention of his Weltanschauungslehre. In other writers, 
such as Simmel or Troeltsch and later in the sociology of knowledge itself, 
there is a persistent searching for a cultural synthesis when faced with the 
relativist consequences of historicism, This cultural synthesis is to be a 
synthesis not merely of streams of thought but is also to be relevant for 
practice. It is most fully developed perhaps in Troeltsch's writings on 
historicism. 
In the period around and shortly after the First World War, historicism, 
as a mode of thought and philosophical position that interpreted the validity 
of concepts and norms only in terms of the historically given and accepted 
a throughgoing historical relativism, 
56 
was seen by many to be in a crisis. 
This crisis, it was assumed, could be overcome. Heussi, - in a later study 
of the crisis of historicism, suggests that 'the crisis of historicism is the 
crisis of historical thought in the years after the World War' 
57 
and includes 
the work of Mannheim within this context as well as that of Troeltsch. In 
his essay on the crisis of historicism, Troeltsch defines historicism as 
'the historicization of our whole knowledge and 
47 
experience of the intellectual world, as it emerged 
in the course of the nineteenth century. We see 
here everything in the flux of becoming, in the 
endless and ever new individualisation, in the 
determination by what has passed and in the 
direction of an unrecognised future. The state, 
law, morality, religion and art are dissolved in 
the flux of the historically emergent. . .' 
58 
Noticeably, it is the 'superstructure' that is historicized here, the whole 
of the cultural and intellectual apparatus. In the period around the First 
World War, 'all previously self-evident standards were shaken and thereby 
all images of development'. 
59 
It was a period of 'general historical re- 
lativism', scepticism towards history and often deep pessimism. More 
specifically, the crisis of historicism had to deal with the epistemological 
and logical problems of the study of history, to confront the introduction of 
sociological elements into historical research and explanation and 'the 
shaking of ethical systems of value'. The latter results in 'the anarchy of 
values' and the struggle of value systems one with another. Troeltsch sees 
the solution to this crisis 'in 'a new contact between history and philosophy' : 
'Historicism longs for ideas, philosophy for life. Both can be helped by 
such a connection'* 
0 
Elsewhere, Troeltsch calls more forcefully for a 
. cultural synthesis. 
But it is clear that such solutions remain firmly an- 
chored within the historicist problematic. This is the starting point for 
one of the key dimensions of the sociology of knowledge. In its final form 
in Mannheim's work, we are still confr onted with the demand for a cultural 
synthesis as its solution. 
Within the sphere of sociology and social theory itself, Lenk has. argued, 
48 
with some plausibility, that from the beginning of the century at least 
German sociology was permeated by a 'tragic consciousness'. 
61 
onsciousness' "61 He 
suggests that it may be summarised in the form of three central motifs: 
'Firstly, in the first quarter of our century sociology 
reflects the process of independence of circumstances 
and institutions created by individuals from human 
needs. State organisations, bureaucratic appar- 
atuses and political institutions have, as a result 
and to a considerable extent, taken on a self- 
dynamic that is hardly controllable any more ... (theory of alienation) : secondly, in these sociolo- 
gical outlines, the sphere of economic, political 
and social relations and decisions of power ("real 
factors", interests, "social being") confronts the 
sphere of values ("ideal factors") that is relative- 
y unbounded by the former (two-realm-theory); 
thirdly, the intellectual-ideal sphere, measured 
against the "massivity" of the social base, takes 
on a more or less unreal, powerless character 
(thesis of powerlessness) .' 
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Included within this 'tragic consciousness' and as one of its central 
strands - as can be seen from the theoretical references - Is the sociology 
of knowledge itself. Lenk even goes so far as to suggest that this tragic 
consciousness is-also characteristic of the whole of the crisis symptoms 
of the German cultural and human sciences in the inter-war period that has 
Its roots in 'the collapse of German imperialism'. Insofar as this is the 
case, it would appear to lose its specific interpretative value for the 
sociology of knowledge in Germany. On the other hand, these tragic 
dualisms do recur continually in the sociology of knowledge - especially in 
the work of Scheler - even though they do not have their origins there. 
Rather, along with some of the philosophical tendencies that have already 
been discussed, it is necessary to examine in this context the relevance of 
two central figures in the German sociological tradition - Simmel and Max 
Weber - for the development of the sociology of knowledge. 
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In Simmel's case, we can point to the importance of his theory of cultural 
alienation not merely for Mannheim's sociology of knowledge but also for 
Lukacs'theory of culture. 
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In Philosophie des Geldes and elsewhere in his 
writings on culture, Simmel presents us with a theory of cultural alienation 
and an unbridgable subject-object duality that is manifested in the gulf 
between subjective and objective culture. 
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This duality within his theory 
of cultural crisis gives it its tragic pathos. Though there are many apparent 
similarities between Simmel Is theory of alienation and that of Marx, the 
central thrust of his argument is against historical materialism. Simmel 
makes this clear in the preface to Philosophie des Geldes where he explicitly 
states his intention 
'to construct a new storey beneath historical 
materialism such that the explanatory value 
of the incorporation of economic life into the 
causes of intellectual culture is preserved, 
whilst these forms themselves are recognised 
as the result of more profound valuations and 
currents of psychological, even metaphysical 
preconditions. ' 65 
Such an intention ensures that the forms of alienation and estrangement that 
Simmel discusses will constitute merely a part of a wider tragic situation. 
Simmel's theory of cultural alienation rests upon the separation of human 
beings from what they themselves have produced. Onemight add that this 
separation might just as easily be described initially as objectification 
rather than alienation. The theory of alienation is also rooted in the con- 
frontation of individuals and 'society' : 
'The interaction between individuals is the starting 
point of all social formations ... Further develop- 
ment replaces the immediacy of interacting forces 
with the creation of higher supra-individual format- 
ions. .. These formations ... are ideal products 
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of human conceptions and valuations, which in 
our mind now stand beyond the will and action 
of the individual as "pure forms". 1 66 
There exists, for Simmel, an eternal conflict between individual energies 
and will, on the one hand, and their forms of historical expression on the 
other. 
Even where Simmel is most explicit in his account of alienation, as when 
he examines the consequences of the division of labour, the instances that 
he provides - though reminiscent of Marx's early writings - are located 
within the context of the development of a theory of subjective and objective 
culture. This theory is predicated upon an inevitable dualism of subject 
and object that can no longer be united dialectically. Thus, Simmel is 
here concerned with the increase in 'material culture' and the lag in 'in- 
dividual culture', with the 
'accentuation of the enigmatic relationship which 
prevails between social life and its products on 
the one hand and the fragmentary life-contents of 
individuals on the other. ' 67 
Hence, when Simmel produces instances of the alienation of the producer 
from his product and where 'the product is completed at the expense of the 
development of the producer, they are to be located within this context. One 
must concur with Lenk that 
'Where Marx speaks of the "development of forces 
of production", Simmel moves in the direction of 
the development of the 'history of culture' that is 
dependent upon this sphere but has become detach- 
ed from it. "Objectified labour" becomes trans- 
formed into "forms of historical expression of life". 
"Living labour" , however, is enlarged with "ever 
flowing ... ever extending life". ' 68 
In contrast to Dilthey, who at least is concerned with historical currents 
and historical knowledge, Simmel, according to Kracauer, 'interprets the 
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historically diverse as a chaos'. Similarly, the development of the money 
economy and the various instances of alienation, although we can often see 
them as being located only within capitalism, are given no historical location 
by Si mme I. Instead, as Kracauer suggests, 'he introduces examples from 
all periods of history or he works with the supra-historical significance of 
intellectual types'. 
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In his later writings, the location of these fragments and indeed all social 
phenomena within 'life' becomes more apparent . Kracauer argues that for 
Simmel 
'Life becomes to him an absolute principle out of 
which all phenomena can be explained and to 
which the many forms of existence, objective 
structure and norms as well as the subjective 
interpretations of diverse entities must equal 
be traced back ... He was indeed convinced 
that from a single standpoint the world can 
never be fully comprehended. ' 1 71 
The totality is to be found, rather, in 'the absolute flowing movement' of 
Iife. The relativist problematic permeates Simmel Is work too. 
i 
Another theme in his later writings is the crisis of culture, a crisis that is 
to be located once more in our alienation from culture. As Ludwig Marcuse 
expressed this alienation: 'Simmel suffered from the powerlessness of 
72 thought (Ohnmacht des Denkens) before life'. More clearly than in 
Philosophie des Geldes concrete forms of alienation become merely part 
of a 'very general cultural predicament'. The paradoxical'fate of the con- 
tents of culture' is that 
they were originally created by subjects and for 
subjects: but in their intermediate form of object- 
ivity, which they take on ..., they fcllow an 
Immanent logic of development. In so doing 
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they estrange themselves from their origin 
as well as from their purpose. ' 73 
This separation of subjective and objective culture, of 'ideal' and 'real' 
factors, as well as the explicit relativism of particular perspectives con- 
stitutes a significant strand of the sociology of culture and knowledge in 
Weimar Germany. 
Although neither Scheler nor Mannheim ascribe to Max Weber a major role 
in the development of the sociology of knowledge in Germany - even though, 
as in Mannheim's case, Weber's work plays a significant part - nonetheless, 
certain aspects of his work are relevant to its emergence. If we include 
Lukäcs within the context of this tradition, then Weber's theory of rationality 
and the process of rationalisation are much in evidence in Lukäcs' de- 
lineation of reification in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. This is 
quite apart from the use that Lukäcs makes of the notion of 'imputation' 
(Zurechnung) and 'objective possibility' both in his earlier works and In his 
studies on class consciousness. 
74 
4 
Lenk points to two aspects of Weber's work that are important for an under- 
standing of the context of the sociology of knowledge - his 
individualistic 
methodology and his postulate of value-freedom. 
Sociology, for Weber, is 
to commence from individual social action and not from collective action 
by, for instance, social classes or parties. If individual social action 
was the basis for a sociology, then methodologically 
it must also be in- 
dividualistic in its orientation. As he wrote in 1920: 
if I am now a sociologist ... I am so essentially 
in order to put an end to the use of collective con- 
cepts, a use which still haunts us. In other words: 
even sociology can only start from the action of one 
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or a few, or many individuals, i. e. pursue 
a strictly "individualistic" method. ' 75 
On this basis, it is possible to understand part of his critique of historical 
materialism. Individual meaningful social behaviour takes place between 
individuals. Any teleological understanding of history and any notion of 
developmental tendencies in history are the result of, as Lenk put it, the 
'hypostatisation of particular value-judgments into quasi-scientific proposit- 
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ions'. 
Within the context of a theory of individual social action, it is not surpris- 
ing that Weber should have seen as the greatest threat to the individual, the 
progressive rationalisation of all spheres of life. In particular, the inevitable 
bureaucratisation of the political sphere and, under socialism, the economic 
sphere left little to choose between the two. On balance, Weber remained 
committed, as Mommsen has shown, to 'the principle of individual enter- 
prise' . 
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The process of rationalisation, the increasing 'disenchantment 
of the world' and the all-pervasive bureaucratisation of modern society to- 
gether made it increasingly difficult to conceive of individual social action. 
The individual becomes, as in the Simmel Is theory of alienation, Increas- 
ingly powerless. Scheler, in this context, spoke of Weber's' exaggerated 
' love of darkness, of tragic insoluble tension in life, a love for the Irrat- 
tonal as such' . 
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However, Lenk sees a further consequence of Weber's methodological in- 
dividualism and, in particular, his neo-Kantian tendencies in the strict 
separation of fact and value. He suggests that 
Insofar as ... the realm of value, in which 
particular acting individuals participate, Is 
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I ocated in an extra-social sphere, that, for 
its part, possesses no visible connection with 
social realities, the possibility of a critical 
analysis of social relations disappears in 
favour of an immanent-theoretical critique 
of knowledge. ' 79 
This immanent-theoretical critique operates with abstract ideal-types that 
are elevated to 'objects' of knowledge. The realm of value is excluded 
from the scientific examination of social phenomena which is governed by 
the principle of value-freedom. The preservation of an autonomous realm of 
values is, as we shall see, one of Scheler's central aims. 
Another related central theme in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is the 
conflict and competition between world views and ideologies. For Weber, 
at least in 'Wissenschaft als Beruf', the postulate of Werturteilsfreiheit was 
essential 'because the diverse orders of value in the world stand in an in- 
soluble struggle with one another'. 
so 
Furthermore, 
'there, in fact, the diverse Gods also struggle with 
one another and indeed for ever more ... The 
old plurality of Gods, disenchanted and therefore 
in the form of impersonal forces, rise from their 
graves, strive to gain power over our lives and 
again resume their eternal struggle with one another. '81 
Science itself can never bridge or overcome this eternal struggle. Hence, 
the scientist must perform, as Lenk puts it, a kind of 'internal division of 
labour' between his scientific activity and his activity as a concrete in- 
dividual. But the maintenance of this value-freedom postulate is to be 
distinguished from one of the sociology of knowledge's aims. As Lenk argues, 
'Compared with the sociology of knodledge's demand 
for a cultural synthesis, Weber's postulate of the 
value-freedom of scientific statements - despite its, 
as ever, disputed character - must be characterized 
as much more realistic. ' 
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Lenk also suggests that in Weber's writings, the demand for the value-freedom 
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of scientific thought stands in place of a critique of ideology. 
Nonetheless, Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, and in particular his 
analysis in Ideologie und Utopie, attempts to grapple with the value-freedom 
of the social sciences - and politics in particular - as well as calling for a 
cultural and political synthesis. His theory of ideology also posits the 
development of a value-free concept of ideology. But, much more so than 
Weber, Mannheim is concerned to advance beyond the separation of theory 
and practice that is evident in Weber's scientific demarcations. In so doing, 
it may be that he oversteps the boundaries of science altogether. This, how- 
ever, can only reinforce the extent to which the sociology of knowledge had 
not only theoretical but practical intentions. It is to these practical intent- 
ions and the socio-historical context of the sociology of knowledge that we 
must now turn. 
IV 
6 
There can be little doubt that the sociology of knowledge in Germany was 
conceived of not merely as an academic contribution to another branch of 
sociology but also as a response to various crises in German intellectual 
life and society. These crises were not necessarily ones that would spring 
readily to mind after a detailed analysis of Weimar Germany but they re- 
present those crises in intellectual life and society that were perceived to 
be urgent and significant by those who developed the sociology of knowledge. 
Perhaps nowhere is this crisis situation more accutely stated than in Mann- 
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heim's retrospective examination of German sociology that he published in 
1934. There he argues that 
'German sociology is the product of one of the great- 
est social dissolutions and reorganisations, accom- 
panied by the highest form of self-consciousness 
and of self-criticism ... a process of social 
dissolution and crisis is not simply a negative 
process. For the significance of crises lies in 
the fact that they are not simply disintegrations 
but are, rather, the attempts which society makes 
to overhaul the whole of its organisation ... In 
this context, then, sociology is seen to be not 
only the product of this process of dissolution but 
also a rational attempt to assist in the reorganisat- 
ion of human society, to help in the reorganisation 
and readaptation of the individual himself ... If the function of a period of crisis and upheaval is 
defined in this sense, then the period since 1918 
may be truly described as the most dynamic period 
in the history of German society. It was the most 
dynamic period of society because these two decades 
saw a continuous and incessant shifting and dis- 
placement of social forces. ' 83 
However, when we come to examine writings on the sociology of knowledge 
for an investigation of these 'social dissolutions', we find that it is hardly 
in evidence. Indeed, in Mannheim's case, the crises are almost always 
seen as intellectual. Thus, in Ideologie und Utopie, the most overtly 
political of Mannheim's German writings, Mannheim is concerned with the 
'crisis situation of thought'. This is despite the fact that he also argues 
that the concepts of ideology and utopia reveal 'the possibility of false con- 
sciousness'. What this suggestsis the extent to which the sociology of 
knowledge views its field of study as firmly located within the 'superstructure' I. 
In a similar vein, Mannheim's description of the 'three debts to the dynamic 
forces of the last fourteen years' owed by German sociology comes nowhere 
near to grasping the significance of the 'dynamic forces' and crises of 
" 
Weimar Germany. Instead, they too are located within the realm of con- 
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sciousness. These three forces are: 
1 The awareness that every social fact is a function 
of the time and place in which it occurs. .. 
2... the whole sphere of spiritual life appears in 
the new light of this constant variability ... 
3 Besides this visible interdependence between 
objective facts and ideas, this social mobility 
and dissolution reacts upon the human psyche; 
thus a period of social upheaval has its psychic 
aspect too .. .' 
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Only the third of these forces comes close to raising at least the possibility 
of an examination of the recent changes in German society. 
Elsewhere, Mannheim can only relate the development of German sociology - 
and with it the sociology of knowledge - and its distinctive concerns to the 
most general of social changes. In his essay on sociology in Germany, for 
instance, he attributes its emergence to two factors. The first is that 
'the new sociology arose at an hour when the 
economy broadened into a world economy, 
when nations and countries were brought 
closer, but also were ranged against one 
another, when the occident broke into the 
orient. . .' 
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This led, Mannheim argues, to a radical questioning of our position and 
situation in the world. The second factory 
lay within German society itself: 
'social strata and classes which in decisive 
matters were previously present only in a 
passive capacity and whose will, range of 
Instincts, thoughts, and habits had been 
passed by, broke into the power structure 
and into the sphere of consciously attended 
culture with claims of their own. 1 
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This is presumably an oblique reference to the emergence of the working 
class - and possibly 
the middle classes too - into the political and cultural 
structure of the Weimar Republic after 
their exclusion in Wilhelmian Germany. 
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But once again, the result of this intervention is merely seen as raising 
the question, 'Who are we? ', both in terms of the present and also historically 
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Within his writings on the sociology of knowledge, it is difficult to gain a 
clear conception of Mannheim's notion of society. The search for such a 
conception is necessary in terms of Mannheim's own programme for the 
sociology of knowledge. As a 'diagnosis of the times', it is remarkably 
reticent about the composition and structure of the society within which that 
'diagnosis I is to take place. In the essay on competition, it is evident 
that Mannheim adopts a pluralist notion of^composition of German society. 
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It is composed of competing strata and social classes who objectify their 
world-view within various institutional arrangements such as political parties. 
In much of Ideologie und Utopie, despite the existence of the concentration 
of world views and ideologies into a limited number - already suggested in 
the essay on competition - Mannheim is again reluctant to delineate the 
composition and structure of the society within which these ideologies hold 
sway. -On occasion, these ideologies are located within the context of class 
antagonism but in the main world-views and ideologies are seen to be com- 
peting rather than conflicting with one another. This. would give support to 
the view that Mannheim operates with a market model of society, at least 
with regard to world-views and ideologies. In the chapter on Utopia, how- 
ever, Mannheim more often applied a model of society based upon domin- 
ation and subordination, though its features remain unclear. 
If we turn to Scheler's sociology of knowledge and his contemporary writ- 
ings, there can be little doubt about' his conception of German society. Its 
too, is a vision of the crises and dissolution of the social structure but from 
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a distinctive perspective. It springs from a conviction that society, in- 
eluding its rulers, has become decadent. It is a model of society that is 
firmly based upon a division between incapable elites and 'unruly' masses. 
Shortly before the First World War, Scheler argued that the basis and funda- 
mental direction of society is provided by elites. It is 
5eL uie pc«<ern afU ieuUers. 
This view of the primacy of elites is retained in his post-war writings and 
'Not an impersonal "idea" (Hegel), not a free- 
floating "set of laws of reason" or the rational 
will (Kant and Fichte), not a law-like ... 
ongoing development of reason and science 
(Comte), not the dark, hardly noticable fate 
of blood-mixing (that) determines, in the 
ast instance, what exists and what will be, 
the structure and development of social groups 
but. the existing dominant minority of these who 
.. _a u__ __LL___ ___J 2 RQ 
within the context of the increasing threat to aristocratic and higher values 
by the masses. The elite is necessary to overcome the perversion of values 
that has taken place with industrialization. Scheler's critique of capital- 
ism is that of the neo-romantic anti-capitalist. It is a critique that is con- 
stantly wary of the 'unruly' masses who are susceptible to ideologies. 
Marxism, for instance, is 'a typical ideology of the oppressed and a critical 
Protest ideology'. 
90 Schaler consistently describes the German economy 
as 'capitalist'. Its problems, however, are most often viewed as religious 
or psychological in origin. Thus, in a lecture in 1920, Scheler asks 
'How can and should new, living religous and 
moral motors be developed In the soul of our 
people that will give back to them once more 
the will, energy and desire and satisfaction of 
work. ' 91 
German society is, for Scheler, a capitalist society which does contain social 
classes but they are not the most significant social groupings. 
In an 'age 
of adjustment' to the increasing proletarianisation and massification of 
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society, it is elites and masses that are Scheler's central categories, just 
as it is presumably an intellectual elite that, by developing the sociology 
of knowledge, will seek to preserve 'essential' values. 
In fact, Scheler saw the sociology of knowledge as itself emerging out of 
a confrontation with the extreme relativism that has its origins in democrat- 
isation and the development of parliamentarianism. He states that 
'The new relativistic study of world-views is the 
theoretical reflection of this democratic parliament- 
arianism which extends to world-views. ' 92 
This process of democratisation threatens the maintenance of absolute values 
held by a traditional intellectual elite which is faced with 'the increasing 
unruliness and uncontrollability of the masses and of capitalistic finance 
grown independent of its creators' . 
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In this age of adjustment or adapt- 
ation (Zeitalter des Ausgleichs), one is confronted with a bewildering aray 
of adaptations: 
'mutual adaptation of race tensions; mutual 
adaptation of the mentalities and the ways 
of regarding oneself, the world and God in 
all the great cultures, mutual adaptation 
between the special capacities of the male 
and female principles in Man; mutual adapt- 
ation between comparatively primitive and 
hypercivilized mentality; relatively mutual 
adaptation between youth and age in the sense 
of adequate evaluation of each other's spiritual 
attitudes; mutual adaptation between class- 
logics, class conditions and the rights of the 
upper and lower classes ... 1 
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In such an age of adaptation, it becomes all the more important to preserve 
traditional elites from extinction. 
Such a metaphysical vision of contemporary German society is far removed 








World War period. There is no doubt at al I that Lukäcs I analysis of German 
and other central European societies - such as Hungary - was in terms of the 
crises of capitalist societies. This is true, at least, for his post-1917 analyses 
after his 'conversion' to Marxism. 
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What is in doubt is whether LukäcsI 
analysis of capitalism constitutes a 'renewal I of Marx's critique of capital- 
ism or whether it is based upon a combination of Marx's analysis of commodity 
fetishism, Weber's theory of bureaucracy and, possibly, elements of Simmel Is 
theory of alienation. , These issues will be discussed below. For the present, 
it is important to note that what Lukäcs took to be the crisis of European and, 
particularly from 1921 onwards, especially German society was. located for 
him in the 'ideological crisis of the proletariat'. As Grunenberg argues, 
after the events of March 1921 in Germany and the failure of the workers' up- 
rising, 
'Lukäcs took up the "ideological crisis of the 
proletariat" as the fundamental problem as 
such and, in contrast, placed the analysis of 
the objective factors in the background. ' 96 
The development of a revolutionary consciousness, Lukäcs argued in Gesch 
ichte und Klassenbewusstsein, should be a precondition of any revolutionary 
strategy that deals with naked class conflict. Empirically existent class 
consciousness or 'everyday' class consciousness is not Lukacs' concern. 
With the increasing failure of the working class movements in Germany and 
elsewhere, Lukäcs could only develop the notion of an 'imputed' class con- 
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sciousness that was based on a social class's 'objective possibilities'. 
Paradoxical as this may seem, Lukäcs' analysis of the crisis of capitalism 
also appears to centre around a crisis of 'consciousness' though, unlike 
Mannheim, this crisis is specifically located within a particular class, the 
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proletariat. What this means, however, is that we cannot turn to Lukacs for 
an account of the crisis of German society that Mannheim saw as the source 
of German sociology and the sociology of knowledge. The 'ideological crisis 
of the proletariat', however, is the source of a critique of ideology that sought 
to overcome this crisis through the postulated development of a revolutionary 
class consciousness. 
Yet when we argue that the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology 
have not merely theoretical but practical aims or intentions, then this is now- 
where more apparent than in Lukäcs' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. 
Lukäcs himself saw this work as an attempt 'to clarify the theoretical problems 
of the revolutionary movement' and to re-examine the methodology of critique. 
The methodological dispute surrounding Marx's mode of procedure in his critique 
of political economy, for instance, is not a merely theoretical issue. Rather, 
Lukäcs maintains that 
'the logical conclusion for the dialectician to draw ... 
is not that he is faced with a conflict between different 
scientific methods, but that he is in the presence of a 
social phenomenon and that by conceiving it as a socio- 
historical phenomenon he can, at once refute it and 
transcent it dialectically. ' 98 
More significantly, Lukäcs develops in this work what Habermas terms 'a 
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philosophy of history with a practical Intent'. Lukäcs' practical Intent- 
Ion lies, then, in an examination of the relationship between the process of 
reification and the generation of a false praxis, the relationship between the 
'ideological crisis of the proletariat' and the development of a revolutionary 
class consciousness, and the relationship between a critique of ideology and 
the organisation of revolutionary party activity. The critique of ideology, for 
Lukacs, is decidedly concerned with the relation between theory and practice. 
Whether Lukacs was successful in his aims must be left to a later chapter. 
j 
For Mannheim, too, the sociology of knowledge is not merely a theoretical 
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discipline but has specific practical intentions. When commenting on the 
contemporary development of sociology in Germany, Mannheim suggest that 
sociology itself exceeds the narrow confines of an academic discipline since 
'the sociological problem constellation in the 
narrower sense transcends itself in two direct- 
ions - in the direction of philosophy and in the 100 
direction of a politically active world orientation. " 
This is because in Germany sociology- 'met philosophical tradition that was 
alive, as well as Marxism as a perspective that was politically activated in 
all its elements'. 
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With regard to the sociology of knowledge itself, Mannheim provides sub- 
stantial evidence for the view that he sees it as having practical aims. The 
longest chapter of Ideologie und Utopie Is not merely concerned with the 
possibility of politics as a science but is also subtitled 'the problem of 
theory and praxis' . The sociology of knowledge's aim in overcoming the 
limitations of ideologies is not merely to provide a 'diagnosis of the times' 
but in order to aid our 'adjustment' to the present social situation. Ideol - 
ogies prevent certain forms of social action and block a 'correct' under- 
standing of the present situation. By 1932, Mannheim was claiming 
rap cticai success for his sociology of knowledge. In the course of his re- 
view article on American sociology, Mannheim argues that 
'a closer contact with central political problems 
involves the danger that judgments of value 
creep into science, reducing it to mere political 
propaganda. In fact, this danger constantly 
threatens German sociology just because It is 
closely in touch with political problems. How- 
ever, if we know about this danger, we can 
take precautions against it, evolving methods 
which help to detect and eliminate political 
bias. .. The desire to treat politically 
im- 
portant problems without being a victim to 
bias was responsible for the development 
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in Germany of a new branch of social science, 
Wissenssoziologie. This new branch of re- 
search, intended to be an organ of critical self- 
control, has already succeeded in detecting and 
subjecting to control important groups of sources 
of error. ' 102 
Mannheim saw the sociology of knowledge as extending the critical intention 
of sociology as a whole since it too 'has from its beginnings been an organ 
of self-reflection and self-enlargement 1.103 Whether Mannheim's re- 
sidual positiv'h 
4ntention 
of removing political bias by means of the 
sociology of knowledge was successful must also be left to a later chapter. 
V 
In examining the writings on the sociology of knowledge in Germany, an 
apparent paradox recurs again and again. On the one hand, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that the sociology of knowledge is a response to crises 
In German society and that the key figures who developed the sociology of 
knowledge saw its concrete practical aims as being every bit as Important 
as the theoretical aims. On the other hand, there . is nowhere a concrete 
analysis of the crises of German society. This suggests that, in fact, the 
perception of these crises is largely in theoretical terms. In his introduct- 
Ion to Ideologie und Utopie, for example, Mannheim asserts that 'this book. is 
Itself conscious of an intellectual crisis situation' to which he can provide 
no ready solution. The crisis which he alludes to crises out of the conflict 
and struggle between systems of world-views, ideologies and forms of life. 
Since, as we shall see, the delineation of these forms of life is largely 
absent, we are left with the conflict of world-views and ideologies as con- 
stituting what Mannheim actually viewed as the crisis. This is not to 
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suggest that he viewed the sociology of knowledge as merely an empirical 
analysis of world-views and ideologies. It was also, for Mannheim, a new 
form of orientation to life and a possible means of synthesizing world-views 
and ideologies. In other words, to state it somewhat crudely, the crisis 
lies in the 'superstructure' - especially as the sociology of knowledge itself, 
with its theses of the 'powerless of the mind' and the 'homeless of the mind', 
had already reduced the critique of ideology to an analysis of superstructural 
phenomena. 
The crisis is a crisis for intellectuals. They play a substantial role within 
the sociology of knowledge, not merely as its creators but also as the source 
of the resolution of the crisis. This is true not merely for Scheler's notion 
of a cultural elite but also for Mannheim's relatively detached intelligentsia 
and for Luk9cs' intellectual vanguard. Within the context of the practical 
intentions of the sociology of knowledge and the critique of ideology, they 
play a central role. In Scheler's case, they are concerned with the pre- 
servation of the essential order of values, in Mannheim's case with a cultur- 
al synthesis, and in Lukäcs' case with the revolutionary party's mission. 
The role of the intelligentsia does not emerge out of a sociological analysis 
of German society. Its origins lie elsewhere. As Lenk argues, 
'Mannheim's theory of the "free-floating intelligentsia" 
does not arise out of a sociological context of problems 
but out of a postulate in the philosophy of culture and 
history. The structural analogy between the formal- 
logical thin strata, that is to form the archimedean 
point from which a transcendence of the relativistic 
consequences of historicism becomes possible, and 
the determination of the "social-intellectual middle" 
is obvious. ' 104 
The intelligentsia are thus an essential part of the contemporary diagnosis of 
\/ 
society and the attempt to construct a sociology of the modern era. But, in 
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Max Scheler : From the Sociology of Culture 





Max Scheler was the principal founder of the sociology of knowledge in 
Germany. His early articles in this sphere - in which he still spoke of 
an'Erkenntnissoziologie' and a 'Soziologie des Wissens' - were pub- 
1 ished in 1921 and 1922.1 Despite Wilhelm Jerusalem's claim to have 
been the first to have discussed this area of sociology in an article in 
Die Zukunft in 1909,2 it is clear from his remarks there that he did not 
develop these ideas in any substantive manner. This Scheler did in his 
edited collection Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens published in 
1924,3 as well as in his two volume collection of essays Schriften zur 
Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre published in 1923 and 1924.4 In 
the same year, in 1924, Scheler presented a paper on 'Science and Social 
Structure' to the Fourth German Sociology Congress which was published 
in the following year. 
5 
In 1926 his major work on the sociology of know- 
ledge Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft was published. 
6 
Yet despite the extent of Scheler's publications in this area, few sociol- 
ogists - either his contemporaries or his successors - have developed 
his theses on the sociology of knowledge or taken up his orientation to 
this sphere of study. More than this, there exist very few published 
works directly on Scheler's sociology of knowledge, despite the exist- 
ence of several hundred contributions to other aspects of his work. 
7 
i Perhaps the major reason for this paucity of works on Scheler's sociol- 
ogy of knowledge lies in the very nature of Scheler's own conception 
of this field of study. Many writers have pointed to the difficulty of 
extracting a specifically sociological study of knowledge from his work 
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in this area. Already in 1924, the sociologists present at Scheler's 
paper on 'Science and Social Structure' complained of the absence of 
sociological content to Scheler's remarks. Scheler's referent, Max 
Adler, asked 
'is what has been presented here sociological? 
Of course, Professor Scheler has at various 
points in his presentation thrown in sociolog- 
ical observations. But the standpoint from 
which the speaker has commenced his work, 
the guiding direction of his thought which is 
the basis of that work is itself not a sociolog- 
ical but an intellectual-historigal (eý istes- 
geschichtlicher) standpoint. ' 
Yet perhaps this is to overlook the relationship between Scheler's con- 
ception of the sociology of knowledge and its relation both to his sociol- 
ogy of culture and to his philosophical anthropology. Indeed it has 
been suggested many times that Scheler's sociology of knowledge 
cannot be understood except in terms of his philosophical intentions. 
Grünwald, reviewing Scheler's contribution in 1932, comments 
It is certainly no coincidence that, for Scheler, 
the sociology of knowledge stands in particular- 
ly close contact with the philosophical total 
system : for it is precisely Scheler's philosophy 
that contains in substantial measure the pre- 
suppositions which alone could meaningfully 
establish a system of the sociology of know- 
ledge. A complete understanding of the 
sociology of knowledge developed by Scheler 
is therefore only possible by recourse to these 
ultimate meta-empirical premises, to which 
j' Scheler - in contrast to any form of positivism - 
openly and proundly refers. ' 9 
Such a judgment could certainly be substantiated by reference to subse- 
quent commentators on Scheler's sociology of knowledge as well as by 
reference to the response of many of his contemporaries. 
10 
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Thus, it might be possible to extract, in an abstract manner , the 
strictly sociological propositions from Scheler's work ('strictly 
sociological' in some empiricist sense) but, in so doing, we would 
necessarily be unable to grasp the precise manner in which the problems 
of the sociology of knowledge were presented. In discussing the emer- 
gence-of this particular tradition in the sociology of knowledge, it is 
essential to provide the original presentation of its problems. It is the 
first task of the present investigation of Scheler's work in this area to 
sketch out, however briefly, Scheler's metaphysical position or his philo- 
sophical anthropology, before proceeding to examine his sociology of 
culture and sociology of knowledge. 
The attempt to outline Scheler's metaphysical position is itself not 
some aim that is external to his sociology of knowledge. That is, his 
metaphysical standpoint should not be understood as part of our back- 
ground knowledge for an estimation of Scheler's sociology of knowledge 
but, rather, is itself part of that area of investigation. On this point, 
Scheler himself is quite explicit. In the preface to the first edition 
of Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Scheler states that 'One 
can only understand tha author's metaphysics when one has read this 
book', and that the book is 'an introduction to the metaphysics of the 
author'. 
11 A recent study of the philosophical presuppositions in 
Scheler's sociology of knowledge by Bracht comments : 
I 
'the results of his philosophy are decisive for 
Scheler's empirical sociology; for these 
(metaphysical D. F. ) theses are introduced 
I nto the sociology without discussion, 
largely as an axiomatic'. 12 
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Indeed, Schaler sees the two contributions which form the major part 
of his Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft as providing the basis 
'for strict methodical metaphysical cognition and thought'. 
13 The 
reasons for the strong reassertion of the role of metaphysics in Scheler's 
sociology must itself be sought in the nature of Scheler's aims in develop- 
ing a sociology of knowledge which we shall discuss later. 
Yet it is not only a Verschmelzung of metaphysics and sociology that 
has worried both Scheler's contemporaries and successors. His fusion 
of metaphysics and sociology in the development of a sociology of know- 
ledge might be said to be pecul iar.. to Scheler. But what the major con- 
tributions to the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge do have 
in common is an attempt to relate epistemological problems to sociology 
and to establish the social determination of epistemological problems. 
This has been one of the decisive areas of dispute in Mannheim's con- 
tribution to this area. But Scheler is also at pains to investigate the 
relationship between the two spheres. Again, in the foreword to Die 
Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft, Scheler states that 
'The simultaneous taking up of a contribution 
to the sociology of knowledge and an exten- 
sive epistemological and ontological study 
in one and the same work might, at first 
glance, excite astonishment. It has its 
deeper basis in my fundamental guiding 
conviction that epistemological investi- 
gations without the simultaneous in- 
vestigation of the social-historical devel- 
opment of the highest types of human 
knowledge and cognition are condemned 
to emptiness and unfruitfulness ... An 
absolute historical constancy of "human" 
forms of reason and principles, which 
the major part of all previous epistemol- 
ogies has naively presupposed as the 
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unchangeable object of their research, is, 
according to the conviction present in this 
book, an idol. ' 14 
That the results of Scheler's investigation of the relationship between 
epistemology and sociology is to substantially reduce the importance 
of epistemological concerns almost completely - since they are socially 
and historically varied - and to assert instead the primacy of ontology 
and a static ontological stability, can only be clearly seen once we have 
examined Scheler's metaphysical standpoint which pervades his sociol- 
ogy of knowledge. 
Our investigation of Scheler's sociology of knowledge, therefore, proceeds 
in the following manner. In the first section of this chapter, an attempt 
is made to analyse the salient elements of Scheler's metaphysics with 
respect to their relevance for his sociology of knowledge. In the second 
section, Scheler's sociology. of culture is examined and in the third 
formal aspects of his sociology of knowledge. It will then be possible 
to examine some of those areas with which Scheler was particularly con- 
corned and this will consist of an analysis of his treatment of science. 
Finally, some assessment will be made of the problems which Scheler 
raised in his attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge and how his 
contemporaries and critics have responded. 
Lenk argues that the key to Scheler's philosophy is 'the question of the 
relationship of "Geist" and "Leben". It is the key to his metaphysics 
p 
and anthropology. The determination of the nature of "Geist" and 
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"Leben" is the central theme of any critical presentation of Scheler's 
philosophy' . 
15 
It would be true to say that the whole of Scheler's meta- 
physics not only rests upon this dualism - and this dualism was, of 
itself, not peculiar to Sche l er - but that it forms the basis for the other 
dualisms that animate his metaphysics and his sociology. In his meta- 
physics, the dichotomies of Sosein and Dasein, essence and existence, 
absolute and relative, spirit and nature, spirit and history play a crucial 
role; in his sociology, as we shall see, ideal factors and real factors, 
ideal sociology and real sociology, 'Geistlehre' and 'Trieblehre' are 
crucial to. his development of a sociology of culture; in his view of soc- 
iety, a biological base and an idealised superstructure, elites and masses 
are central dichotomies. Grunwald, too, has argued that this 'power- 
lessness of the spirit' (Scheler's own phrase) lies at the centre of 
Scheler's metaphysics and that this position is to be derived from the 
ontological dualisms which we have just indicated. However, Grünwald 
suggests that Scheler held this position in common with many of his con- 
temporaries - and he includes Mannheim here - so that 'this conviction 
of the unreality of the spirit is a characteristic not only of the sociology 
of knowledge but of the whole intellectual climate of the present period. 
One can see the contrast most sharply when one Contrasts the theses of 
the sociology of knowledge with, for instance, Hegel 's statement of the 
16 
"powerlessness of nature" and the omnipotence of the spirit. ' However, 
what is important in the present context is not merely to acknowledge the 
I 
significance of Scheler's central motif but to show what was distinctive 
about the way in which these fundamental dualisms basically shaped his 
sociology of knowledge. Lieber, for example, argues that at the basis 
of Scheler's philosophy 'lies the ontologically interpreted separation of 
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existence and essence, nature and spirit as two ultimate ontological 
givens which in their development in his sociology of knowledge are 
basically directed against the Marxist superstructure-base thesis. 117 
In an earlier article, Lieber speaks of Scheler dealing with 'the old 
ontological and static dualism of spirit and life. 1 
18 
It is, perhaps, 
this base-superstructure relationship which seems to give to the sociol- 
ogy of knowledge an apparent affinity with some versions of Marxism. 
However, any examination of the manner in which this relationship 
between base and superstructure is treated and the actual content of those 
two elements will reveal how far away from any kind of Marxist position - 
either mechanistic or dialectical - Scheler really is. 
Scheler's metaphysics seeks to reverse what he takes to be erroneous 
and decadent tendencies in modern thought and life, that is, to correct 
what he saw as the 'subversion of values. ' 
19 
His static dualistic 
metaphysics leads him into innumerable contradictory positions. For 
example, it is clear, as Lenk argues, that a central concern of Scheler's 
philosophical anthropology is the study of Geist as 'a supra-natural 
essence. ' It has already been seen that the Geist-Leben dualism is a 
common feature of much German philosophy of the period. What 
Scheler specifically seeks to do in his metaphysics is to oppose the 
tendency in Lebensphilosophie to reduce consciousness to a stage in 
the development of life, to reduce consciousness to existence. Scheler, 
f 
in contrast, seeks to assert the irreducibility of the human mind. Since, 
for Scholar, human beings are the ones who carry out mental acts and 
realise them in a concrete form, it is the concept of the autonomous 
person who confronts his environment that is crucial to Scheler's 
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preservation of the autonomy of the mind. Yet the human being as 
such has become a problematic entity for Scheler. In 1926 Scheler 
writes 
'We are the age in roughly ten thousand years of 
history in which the human being has become 
completely and absolutely "problematic"; in 
which he no longer knows what he is, whilst 
at the same time he also knows that he does 
not know. 1 20 
Furthermore, to see the Geist as a timeless essence that is embodied in 
the concrete form of the person in the temporal life process is to give to 
the very entity that Scholer seeks to preserve an element of unreality. 
As Lenk puts it, 'the denaturalisation of the mind expresses ... 
its 
impotence in relation to historical reality. '21 The mind seems at 
times to be reduced to a passive recepticle. This difficulty in preserv- 
ing the autonomy of the mind is compounded by Scheler's assertion of 
the identity of physiological and psychic life processes. Scheler in 
fact speaks of the 'functional identity of psyche and physiology. 1 
22 In so 
doing, Lenk argues 'the psychic self is ... reduced to a mere "con- 
sciousness correlate of the vital impulses and life processes". 123 An- 
other commentator, Altmann, speaks of the 'biologization of the self. '24 
Not only does this imply a separation of consciousness and Geist but 
it loads Scheler into establishing what was precisely the opposite of his 
original intention, namely, that Geist is subordinate to Leben. This is 
nowhere more apparent, as we shall see, than in his sociology of cul- 
and the assertion of the primacy of 'real factors. This Geist- ture 
Leben duality certainly presents Scheler with difficulties that he cannot 
resoive, except by coming down in favour of the primacy of the one or the 
other. In an article on 'Spirit and Life in Contemporary Philosophy' 
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published in 1930,25 Cassirer puts two questions to those philosophies 
. which are grounded in this dualistic vision of the world, two questions 
which are central to Scheler's own philosophical and sociological stand- 
point. Cassirer asks how the quite disparate worlds of life and spirit 
can accomplish a homogeneous work and how the spirit is able to exert 
any effect upon a world to whi ch it does not itself belong. The spirit is 
unable to affect anything beyond itself; it is a testimony to 'the power- 
lessness of the mind. 
This paradoxical conclusion is also evident in Scheler's relationship to 
phenomenology. The distinction between essence and existence, be- 
tween Sosein and Dassin is central to Scheler's epistemology. Scheler 
adopts an essentialist notion of truth, that is, a truth which is revealed 
through a phenomenological reduction, through a bracketing of exist- 
ential phenomena. Scheler sees his phenomenology as one which 'goes 
behind all causal connections and reveals the absolute facts. ' How 
much Scheler's epistemology rests upon this pervasive dochotomous 
standpoint may be seen from the schema of epistemological proposit- 
ions which Lenk extracts from Scheler's later writings. 
The distinction between essence [Wesen] and 
existence 
[Dasein) within all that is relatively 
existent is not only one that is taken from the 
phenomenological method but is also an ontic 
one, that is, it exists in the nature of phenomena 
themselves. 
2 This division is universally valid for all possible 
forms of being. 
3 The evidence for the duality of essence Essenz 
and existence [Existenz] can, in principle, be 
shown for any possible intentional object. 
4 Knowledge of essence and knowledge of existence 
are qualitatively distinguished both with regard to 
evidence for them and with regard to their attain- 
ability for the cognitive consciousness. 
5 Existential knowledge, both in its scope and 
content, is more limited than essential knowledge. 
6 As wel I as Kent's formal a priori there exists a 
material a priori, an a priority of essence that 
emerges out of the phenomenological standpoint. 
This material a priori 2ýelongs 
to the phenomenal 
givens themselves. ' 
This ontological notion of knowledge, at every stage, Ieads Scheler back 
into the powerlessness of the mind. -It should be clear that Scheler is 
in no way to be described as an orthodox phenomenologist since his 
philosophy is in many respects antithetical to the phenomenology 
27 
developed by Husserl " To take but one important difference between 
Husserl and Scheler, and again to quote Lenk, 
'Scheler enlarges the division between knowledge 
of facts and knowledge of essences that Husserl 
only intended to be a logical-epistemological 
division in the sense of the phenomenological 
method into an ontologically conceived dualism 
of spirit [Geist] and drives Dran . To the 
metaphysics of the spirit there corresponds a 
study of drives Dran lehrel that provides the 
foundation for his theory of reality ... 
Scheler's dualism allows the sphere of what 
is real to appear ultimately as the manifestat- 
I on of impulsive blind impulses. ' 28 
Scheler's apparent phenomenological standpoint is not only inconsistent 
with that advanced by Husserl and many of his followers, but he also 
seeks to ground phenomenology itself in the ontological premises of his 
81 
11J metaphysics. The cognitive subject who might engage in phenomeno- 
logical reductions and apply the phenomenological method to reality is, 











'Scheler's phenomenology ... contradicts itself since it does not bring the object to 
self-givenness but rather determines its 
object as ideal being. The established 
ideal sphere stands quite unrelated over 
against the free human being. 
Scheler's theory of reality has important implications for the nature of 
the knowledge that the sociology of knowledge investigates and itself 
produces. This knowledge cannot be of the same order as that which 
is produced in other phenomenological accounts that do not share this 
ontologically grounded dualist metaphysics. The objects which Scheler's 
phenomenology reveals are not those that would be recognised in an 
orthodox phenomenological analysis. As Bracht comments, 
B'ut; it is not only in relation to the phenomenological method that the 
nature of the object of Scheler's analyses is questionable. More sign- 
ificantly, perhaps, for his sociology of knowledge are Scheler's notions 
of history and society. 
Scheler's interpretation of history has a religious basis, namely, in the 
doctrine of the Fall. For Schelerrthe notion of progress is completely 
rejected; indeed, the reverse is constantly the case for Scheler. In 
his sociological writings, this is manifested in his analysis of decadence - 
a theme derived from Nietzsche - and in his assertion of the reversal of 
I 
' the hierarchy of human values such that the highest values are now given 
I 
the lowest estimation. Honigsheim suggests that one of the basic 
negative impulses in Scheler's work in his 'insight into the perverted- 
ness of the whole modern bourgeois world. '30 Where Scheler does ex- 
amine something approaching historical events, his account of those 








referring to contemporary mass movements and specifically the youth 
movements of the post First World War period which, for Scheler, 
represent a 'systematic revolt of impulse and instinct', he goes on to 
suggest its cause: 
11 hold this movement to be in no way 
an ephemeral 'after-the-War' apparition - 
it began, beyond a doubt, before the War, 
as the fact of Nietzsche shows - no, I 
hold it to be mass movement, channelled 
deep in the previous course of Western 
history, toward a new distribution between 
the cerebral cortex and the rest of the 
organism, of Man's total 1- 31 
The > change in-. ' Scheler's argument from an actual social movement 
to an account of this movement in-terms of a change in man's phys- 
i . 
iological constitution demonstrates Scheler's desire to explain changes 
in the spirit in terms of changes in basic drives. This kind of argu- 
ment is by no means untypical but., when we come to examine Scheler's 
account of the sociology of culture that he developsz in Die Wissens- 
formen und die Gesellschaft , 
it is important to bear in mind that the 
rather formal analysis presented there is manifested in Scheler's 
other work at this more concrete level. 
The theme of the decadence of the modern world abounds in Scheler's 
post First World War writings, and thus coincides with his attempt to 
develop a sociology of knowledge. In the essay quoted above, Scheler 
speaks of 'the increasing unruliness and uncontrollability of the masses 
and of the machinery of capitalistic finance grown independent of its 
reators' . 
32 Scheler's solution is not in terms of a change in the creators'. 
32 






balancing of technical intelligence and mechanisation by 'a new art 
of contemplation and patientia' . The powerlessness of the mind is 
persistently apparent in these and other passages in Scheler's work for 
the additional reason that there is never any explanation of social pheno- 
mena at this level this level of reality continues to dominate, as it 
were, behind men's backs. 
What is missing in Scheler's philosophical anthropology is a notion of 
society, social system, social structure and other related concepts 
that might mediate between these notions of spirit and drives and impulses. 
The individual person, though a central category in Scheler's philosophy, 
is so robbed-of active characteristics - his consciousness is reduced to 
physiological impulses, his actions regulated by drives - that it is in- 
sufficient to fulfil this mediatory role. In an earlier work, Ressentiment, 
the final version of which was published in 1915, Scheler presents us with 
a residual concept of society that could in no way fulfil this mediatory 
role. There he states that 
"'society" is not the inclusive concept, 
designating all the "communities" which 
are united by blood, tradition, and history. 
On the contrary, it is only the remnant, 
the rubbish left by the inner decomposition 
of communities. Whenever the unity of 
communal life can no longer prevail, when- 
ever it becomes unable to assimilate the 
individuals and develop them into its living 
organs, we get a "society" -a unity based 
on mere contractual agreement. When the 
"contract" and its validity ceases to exist, 
the result is the completely unorganised 
"mass", unified by nothing more than 














The components of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction most 
fully advanced by Töinnes, become emptied of even more content by 
Scheler. Society for Scheler, is composed of helpless elites and unruly 
masses. The masses threaten the preservation of the aristocratic rank 
order of values and the elites are unable to regenerate themselves to 
face the challenge from below. 'In 1925"Scheler speaks - again of 
'our age of disunity and of masses which are no longer controllable' 
and says that 11 know of no time in history when the guiding elites 
were in greater need of true culture and when it was harder to attain' . 
34 
This elites-masses dichotomy again expresses Scheler's own 
'powerlessness of the mind' thesis and, at a somewhat more concrete 
level, parallels the abstract Geist-Leben dichotomy. 
In a fundamental sense, the categories of history and society are absent 
from Scheler's philosophical " anthropology except as empty receptacles 
or vehicles for more basic forces. Where the dualistic view of the 
world establishes itself as a dichotomy between a base and a super- 
structure and where the relationship between the two is viewed in a 
mechanistic manner - either as a mechanistic Marxist base super- 
structure model or here, in Scheler's case with a Geist-Leben duality - 
this leads to a notion of the superstructure which is unreal. In 
Scheler's case, it leads to a thesis of the powerlessness of the mind. 
Furthermore, in Scheler's case, there is not merely a striking absence 
of any dialectical conception of this relationship but also the absence 
of any mediating categories that could engage the two elements. 
Specifically, what is absent In Scheler's philosophical anthropology 
86 fý; k 
is any notion of conscious human activity, of praxis. Instead, Scheler 
presents us in his writings with a rhetoric of passivity - the individual is 
no longer an actor but a receptacle, a medium for the manifestation of 
other forces. Human beings are not conceived in terms of their societal 
relationships and connections but in terms of irrational drives and 
impulses, against which the ideal sphere, the value hierachy is powerless. 
As Troeltsch puts it, 'thus, as with Nietzsche, man is a dead end of 
biological evolution, the sick animal that can only develop itself in an 
intellectual direction and thus absorb its animal drives'. 
35 
The rhetoric 
of passivity - 'essential being is revealed' to man; free will is a 
'negative power to control and release the impulses of drives'; 
'experiences of all kinds ha en' to man, etc. - is instructive in that 
it shows how man as a creator, as an actor, as a transformer is absent 
from Scheler's anthropology. This central feature of Scheler's philo- 
sophical anthropology - on his own admission, that the mind is power- 
less against reality - leads him into a purely conservative position. 
i 
As Lenk aptly states it, 'The assertion that the realisation of the highest 
ranked values can never, -. in whatever manner, be influenced by what is 
socially given, that their manipulability extends only to the relatively 
low values leads, eo ipso to the view that there is no point in striving 
for an improvement in social circumstances. 136 
It was Scheler himself who advanced the thesis of the powerlessness of 
the mind (Ohnmacht des Geistes and also Machtlosigkeit des Geistes)37 
within his sociology of knowledge. But the wider issue of the alienation 
of the mind is already present in his pro-war writings. To give but two 
11 
dýß 
instructive examples, we may turn to Scheler's review of Werner 
Sombart's Der Bourgeois38 and his article on the future of capitalism 
(' Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus' 
39 
written in January and February 1914 
respectively. The first of these articles opens with a dramatic statement 
on the alienation of the mind, the inversion of fundamental values and 
the perversion of intellectual energies. Scheler announces that 
'Amongst the many signs that demonstrates to 
" us the death of the system of Iife under whose 
energy and direction we stillI ive, I can see 
none more convincing than the deep alienation 
that today in its specific system of life. The 40 history of this alienation is still quite young. ' 
Scheler sees manifestations of this alienation in such writers as 
Nietzsche and George. But it extends today beyond writers and poets 
to those in control of economic life such as Walther Rathenau. 
However, what all of them have experience is the same, namely that 
the totality of forces that have erected what 
is typical of the-whole of our contemporary 
system of life could only rest upon a deep 
perversion of all basic intellectual energies, 
upon a delusory subversion of all meaningful 
orders of value. ' 
This alienation is so pervasive that it threatens 'the human type' that 
was responsible for the existence and maintenance of this system of life. 
Although Schaler is extremely vague about the nature of this alienation, 
it is possible to see some central elements of his thesis of the alien- 
ation and powerlessness of the mind. Firstly, it is clear that this 
a 
alienation is intellectual and spiritual. Secondly, it involves the 
inversion of intellectual energies and value systems that were previously 
w 




it is important to note that this alienation does not, for example, 
threaten an economic order but 'the human type' which gave rise to 
capitalism. All this is to suggest that the alienation of the mind has 
become all-pervasive. But elsewhere in this review, where Scheler is 
examining the 'spirit of capitalism', he in fact argues that the in- 
tellectual sphere is the most significant historically since 'the change 
in dominant ideals and images of desires ... is much more funda- 
mental. than that in the historical reality of events'. Thus., on the one 
hand, the intellectual sphere is the most significant in historical change 
whilst,. on the other, it is, threatened by a deep alienation that renders 
it powerless. 
However, what this article already points to with its emphasis upon the 
human type under capitalism is a kind of psychic-biological reductionism 
that is, 
aas 
we shall see, accentuated in ScheIerIs sociology of knowledge. 
This is already evident In SchelerIs notion of capitalism in the second 
article mentioned above where he argues that 
'Capitalism is, in the first place, not an 
economic system of property distribution 
but a whole system of life and culture. 
This system has sprung up out of the goals 
and value preferences of specific bio- 
psych is type of human being, in fact the 
bourgois type. ' 
Hence, the decline in capitalism comes about with the decline in the 
J 
superiority of this type of human being. But even the state socialism 
and its hoped for maximation of welfare that Scholar sees Germany 
moving towards 'with full sails' is itself one of the 'crudest conse- 
quences of the domination of the capitalist spirit'. The only hope of 
overcoming capitalism is through a new human type that Scheler sees 
89 4If 
emerging in the youth movements. ' They are not limited to specific 
social classes or parties but penetrate all classes with their new spirit, . 
43 
Similarly, in his wartime writings, Scheler sees the war as not being the 
result of rationalisable interest but as having its 'roots in the essence of 
Iife itself'. Indeed, Scheler views the war as strengthening the in- 
tellectual existence of a nation, no doubt as a way out of this deep 
alienation and sickness. 
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This vitalism extends, as we shall see, into 
Scheler's sociology of culture and his sociology of knowledge, even to 
the extent that it strengthens the alienation of the mind. Paradoxically, 
the alienation of the mind is then explained by a theory that itself has as 
one of its central presuppositions the alienation of the mind. 
This brief account of the metaphysics, philosophical anthropology and 
earlier social philosophy of Schaler has brought us to the point at which 
we can commence an examination of his sociology of culture which 
Scheler sees as being the foundation for his sociology of knowledge. 
Scheler sees the sociology of knowledge as being an intrinsic part of a 
wider study of the sociology of culture. That is, the problems in the 
,, sociology 
of knowledge - such as the social determination of thought - 
are to be seen within the context of the determination, of culture by 
I social, 'real' factors. In one sense, Scheler shares with Mannheim 
and the early Lukäcs the view that the starting point for an investigation 
of those problems which constitute a sociology of knowledge lies in an 
examination of the nature and determination of human culture. 
90 
However, the way in which these three writers go about this investigation 
differs markedly. This is immediately apparent from Scheler's intentions 
with regard to integrating the sociology of knowledge within the larger 
context of a sociology of culture. In the foreword to Die Wissensformen 
und die Gese. Ilschaft, Scheler states that 'the "sociology of knowledge" 
is, in its first part, concerned with the "essence and order of historical 
causal factors", at the same time with the first positive attempt to 
basically overcome the one-sidedness and fundamental errors of both the 
naturalistic study of history, primarily the economism of Karl Marx, and 
the ideological and scientistic interpretations of history (Hegol and Comte). 
45 
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With this as his central aim, Scheler seeks to develop a 'basic law 
[Grundgesetz] of the changing forms - temporally and according to epochs 
of culture - of the interplay of the intellectual-ideal and impulse driven- 
real determining and influencing factors of historical-social life. 146 
It is worth pointing out here that what Schaler takes as his central areas 
of attack-: - Comte's law of three stages and his positivism, Marxism, 
etc. - are also reproduced in a different manner in SchelerIs own work. 
For example, we have already seen that, in many places, Scheler adopts 
a base-superstructure distinction (this is even more pronounced in his 
sociology of culture) ; in countering positivism, Scheler too asserts the 
possibility of basic laws and provides their axiomatic foundation; in 
attacking Comte's law of the three stages of knowledge, Scheler adopts 
his own three types-of knowledge, but ranks them differently - almost in 
a 
reverse order - to Comte. Scheler goes further and suggests that 
'ultimately we fully accept Karl Marx's statement that it is men's 
bein (though not only his economic, "material" being as Marx takes it 
,I `ý ýý 
ýýý 
i} 
to be) which directs all their possible "consciousness", "knowledge" 
and the boundaries of their understanding and experience I . 
47 
However, 
this affinity with Marx at this point is only apparent. 
S cheler starts out by stating that he wi II investigate 'the fundamental 
fact of the social nature of all knowledge' and will also take into account 
the sociology of knowledge's relationship to epistemology and logic, to 
psychology, to the history of knowledge, to the sociology of culture and 
to 'real sociology (sociology of blood, - power - and economic groups 
and their changing "organisation")'. The sociology by means of which 
these investigations will be undertaken is one that is concerned 'not with 
individual facts and events ... but with rules, types (average and 
logical ideal types) and, where possible with laws'. 
48 This sociology 
is concerned with 'factual, thus not "normative" ... determination' . 
Sociology Is to be divided into a sociology of culture tRuitursoziologie] 
and a sociology of what is real tRealsoziologie] , that is, a 'sociology 
of the superstructure and base of the whole of human life's contents '. 
49 
This duality of the sociological domain presupposes certain kinds of 
I 
investigations in each of these realms; 'a necessary presupposition for 
the sociology of culture is a study of the mind 
[IeistlehrO of men and 
for the sociology of what is real a study of men's drives Trieblehre '. 
It might appear as If this distinction between the two sociologies and the 
two areas of- study is an arbitrary one but for Scheler, however, 'this 
distinction is ... an ontologically and not only 
"methodologically" 
grounded distinction' . 
50 Thus, Scheler's metaphysical presuppositions 





since this field of study is itself dependent upon the sociology of culture. 
Already, however, Scheler's widening of the base of 'the whole of human 
life's contents' into a study of drives and impulses removes the indepen- 
dence of the societal dimension from the centre of a theory of society and 
replaces it with a psychological and biological base. This is exemplified 
in Scheler's assertions that 'without the drive for subsistence and the 
objective goal that it biologically serves - nourishment - there would be 
no economy' or that 'without a drive for power- there would be no state' . 
51 
Yet Scheler argues that sociology will study not merely these two realms 
of the ideal and the real but also the 'interaction of the ideal and the real, 
the mentally and drive-conditioned determining factors'. So, to 
52 
return to the examples of the economy and the state, we find that they are 
not merely determined by drives and impulses since 'without the mind 
and its normative rules there would be no economy, no state' . Whether 
or not this is the case, or the manner in which one of these spheres deter- 
mines or conditions the other, it still remains true that Scheler's social 
categories ultimately remain suspended between the ideal and the real 
spheres. 
However, the key to an understanding of these two spheres - the ideal and 
" the real - lies in the nature of the interaction between them. Scheler 
argues that the goal of 'causal sociology' is the search for the factors 
J 
ý1 
that determine 'the realisation of the ideal and the real' spheres; more 
specifically, the search for 'a lawrof]ordering the realisation of ideal 
factors and real factors'. 
53 
This law should be capable of accounting 








should also be 'a law of the potential dynamic emergence' of the life- 
contents of social groups. The law is concerned with 'the basic type 
of co-operation in the ideal and real factors,. objective mind and real 
life relationships'. 
54 
Scheler argues that the mind can affect what 
might potentially emerge but not what will emerge. In itself it lacks 
'power' or 'effectiveness' in relation to existence. Though its is a 
'determining factor' it js not 'a "factor of realisation" of possible cul- 
lI 
tural development. Negative realisation factors or real selective fact- 
ors ... are rather the real, drive-determined life circumstances, i. e. 
the particular combination of real factors. 155 Scheler freely admits 
that' one consequence of this thesis is that 'the "purer" the intellectual 
sphere, the more powerless it is in the sense of dynamic effects in 
society and history', and that conversely 'the sinking in the evaluative 
level of any intellectual entity ... through increase dissemination and 
gaining of power amongst the masses is thus an inescapable law of all 
human realisatiön of meanings and values. 156 In order to become 
effective, therefore, the intellectual realm must attach itself to real 
forces and tendencies in society, otherwise it will remain a mere potent- 
iality. As Scheler puts it, tlt is only where "ideas" of whatever form 
unite with interests, drives, collective impulses or ... "tendencies" 
that they gain indirect power and the possibility of being realised ... 
The positive realisation factor of a purely cultural constellation however 
is always the fret and the free will of a "small number" of persons, 
primarily the leader, the exemplary figure, the pioneer' who can show a 
majority how to copy and imitate the new cultural trend. The extent 
of influence exerted by the intellectual realm is therefore strictly limited; 
i 
it can aid or modify real factors but cannot realise itself without the aid 
94 
a 
of these factors: 
'Thus, in the intellectual-cultural sphere, 
there exists "freedom" and autonomy for 
what occurs according to its essence, 
meaning and value - but always in the 
real expression suspendable by the 
specific causality of the "base"; one 
might term this liberte modifiable 
("suspensible"). Conversely, in the 
sphere of real factors there exists only 
that "fatalite" modifiable, of which 
A. Comt%3 as aptly and correctly 
spoken. ' 
It is here that Scheler's own thesis of the 'powerlessness of the mind' 
achieves one of its clearest expressions. The intellectual cultural 
sphere may be realised in those directions which the real factors permit; 
the real factors can only be modified by the intellectual-cultural sphere, 
they cannot be fundamentally changed or removed. One important 
vehicle for the realisation of ideal factors is the relationship between the 
elite that creates the intellectual cultural realm and the masses who 
assimilate it and, by implication, make possible its realisation. The 
elite, too, is powerlessness without the masses. The human cultural 
realm is thus basically anchored in the realm of real factors. There can 
be no genuine possibility for mutual interaction or for a dialectical relat- 
ionship. 
Schuler expands his sociology of culture through the further delineation of 
the ideal and real spheres and provides a series of axioms with regard to 
the content and changes that occur within each sphere. This exposition 
is prefaced by a second conjuncture of causal factors that is located in the 
relationship between the various conditioning factors, the relationship of 
the ideal factors to one another (for example, whether they are static or 
95 
dynamic), the relationship of individual forms of real factors to one 
another and, finally, the relations between the major groups of real 
factors to the individual forms of ideal factors. 
Hintze, a contemporary commentator on Scheler's work, aptly remarks 
that although 'the objective just as much as the subjective human mind, 
the individual just as much as the collective mind, is quite incapable of 
producing anything in the real world through its own free creation' and 
although 'the real factors certainly form the base of all culture, yet 
the content and essence of the ideal superstructure is not explicable in 
terms of these real factors but in terms of its autonomous, independent 
qualities'. 
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Thus, for Scheler, there exists 6 set of axioms or laws 
for the nature and development of the ideal and the real spheres. There 
also exists a fundamental contradiction here since these independent 
laws governing the ideal factors cannot themselves be truly independent 
since they are themselves governed by the laws which determine the 
real factors. 
1 
Within the ideal sphere, Scheler distinguishes between an 'objective 
mind' that is a 'meaning content embodied in some material substance 
or in reproducible psycho-physical entities such as tools, works of art, 
language, 
written works, institutions, morals, customs, rites, care- 
monies' and a corresponding subjective mind, 'a changing structure of 
the "mind" of the group which, for the individual member, possesses a 
more or less binding importance or power and is experienced as "oblig- 
atory". ' 
59 These various forms of objective mind and these ideal 
factors exist in a definite relationship to one another; there exists be- 
tween them 'essential and not merely fortuitous empirical dependencies', 
for example, between 'religion, metaphysics, positive science, between 
philosophy and positive science', and so on. These relationships and 
dependencies, however, are a manifestation of their different origins in 
the directions of human drives and impulses. The mind or spirit thus 
exists 'only in a concrete plurality of infinitely varies groups and culture'. 
Schaler here explicitly rejects any Enlightenment notion-of a single 
human reason or of an earlier, though still common, notion of a single 
r) human nature (a single human nature must come into question since the 
plurality of ideal factors rests ultimately upon real factors) : 'To speak 
of some kind of factual "unity of human nature" as a presupposition of 
history and sociology is thus useless, even pernicious'. A common 
structure only exists within the 'cultural elements of a group', with 'a 
cultural concretion'. Similarly, the a priori notion of a universal human 
reason is also to be rejected on the same basis: 'rather the pluralism of 
-groups and forms of culture is the starting point from which all sociology 
commences '. 
60 
At first sight, this assertion of the plurality of-groups 
// 
8 
and forms of cultures may appear to be soundly based and not liable to 
confront Scheler with fundamental problems. But if we consider, further, 
that these groups have diverse intellectual apparatuses and that these 
cultural forms developed by diverse groups are ultimately grounded in 
different human drives then the problem of relativism seems to arise at 
least at a factual level. This Scheler recognizes but goes on to argue 
that such a view may still be opposed to philosophical relativism, 
though not by subsuming the plurality of values and cultural forms under 
the values of one culture - as Schaler argues is the case for Troeltsch - 
96 
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but rather by asserting that 'similar to Einstein's theory within its 
realm - the essential idea of man with regard to the absolute realm of 
ideas and values quite firmly stands much higher above all factually ex- 




It is a feature of all relativist 
positions, Scheler argues, that they are always solved by the assertion 
of the existence of something absolute that stands outside or above them. 
This is not the case with Einstein's theory since nothing stands outside 
the relativities of which he speaks; rather, these relativities are in the 
world. For Scheler, relativities are in the world but, because of their 
determination by real factors, they must be seen to be based on some- 
thing outside both the real and ideal spheres in order to enjoy any in- 
dependent existence. It is at this point that Scheler asserts the exist- 
ence of a sphere about that of the ideal and the real -a transcendental 
sphere can have no relation to human beings since it would itself be part 
of one of. the two spheres. This sphere is, for Scheler, a 'pre- 
presupposition [Urvoraussetzung] of a human history, even of human 
-beings themselves'. 
.F 
Besides the existence of a 'functional isation I of genuine ideas as a 
result of their being taken up by the masses and therefore becoming 
capable of being realised, Scheler develops a series of axioms that deal 
with the cumulative development within a single intellectual structure. 
The 'differentiation and integration of intellectual spheres' should be 
the subject of investigation as Spencer has already shown but the order- 
ing of the levels of this differentiation has, Scheler argues, led to many 
spurious claims. In particular, Scheler seeks to counter the positivist 
claim, specifically that of Comte, that the different spheres of knowledge 
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can be viewed in a hierarchy of historical progression, though to their 
credit, Scheler argues that only Comte, Spencer and other positivist 
philosophers have 'brought epistemology into closer connection with 
sociological statics and dynamics' . 
62 
Comte's mistake, Scheler 
argues, was to take the three forms of knowledge - religious, meta- 
physical, positive - and attempt to'show that each grew out of the other 
in a historical sequence commencing with the religious form. Comte's 
error was to treat as 'temporal stages of development what is de facto 
only a process of differentiation in the mind' . 
63 As Scheler stated his 
position earlier, 'religious, metaphysical, and positive thinking and 
knowling are not historical stages of the development of knowledge but 
permanent attitudes of mind and form of knowledge given with the human 
mind as essential features of it' . 
64 
Scheler does accept the importance 
of the classification of knowledge into these three types and subsequently 
does attempt to provide an investigation of their features and development 
that is based, ostensibly, on his sociology of knowledge in Die Wissens- 
formen und the Gesellschaft. But he does seek to separate the three forms 
of knowledge which he sees as resting on 'three different motives, on 
three entirely different groups of acts of the knowing mind, three differ- 
ent alms, three different personality types, and three different social 
groups. Also the historical forms of movement of these three mental 
powers are essentially different. I65 
A second section of the sociology of the culture therefore has to deal 
with 'the social forms of intellectual co-operation'. The religious form 
of knowledge is organised into 'holy knowledge, religious communities, 
churches, sects'; the metaphysical into 'schools of wisdom' and 
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'educational' communities in the ancient sense'; the positive form, 
based on the division of labour rests on 'teaching and research organ- 
isations' . These forms develop their own form of language, con- 
ventions and axioms. Scheler takes each of these forms of knowledge 
to be genuine, independent forms of knowledge. 
He argues that such forms are to be sharply distinguished from the 
'common mixed forms of collective interests and (supposed) contents of 
knowledge derived from people's membership of strata, occupations, 
classes and parties, strata, occupational, class and party prejudices 
which we wish to subsume under the general title of "prejudices". 166 
The specific quality of this 'illusory knowledge' lies in the fact that 
the roots of the collective interest in this knowledge always remains 
'unconscious' . These prejudices, which do not constitute genuine 
knowledge, are also to be distinguished from ideologies that emerge, 
according to Schaler, in the following manner. He argues that where 
'these systems of automatic and unconscious "prejudices" consciously 
seek to justify themselves behind a particular tendency in religious, 
metaphysical or positive scientific thought or even by drawing upon 
dogmas, principles and theories that emerge out of those higher organ- 
isations of knowledge, the new mixed form of "ideologies" emerges 
"whose most powerful example in recent history is Marxism as a form of 
"ideology of the oppressed". 167 In this early formulation of the notion 
of ideology, we see that Schaler views ideology as having its roots in 
collective 'prejudices' that are formulated within the context of a 
higher form of knowledge. They thus have connections with both base 
and superstructure. 
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There thus exist for Scheler at least three types of potential knowledge 
or apparent knowledge. Firstly, there are the genuine forms of religi- 
ous, metaphysical and positive knowledge that form the centre of his 
field of interest in the sociology of culture and, as we shall see, of 
his sociology of knowledge. There exist, however, two other subordin- 
ate types of pseudo-knowledge. The first is the body of supposed know- 
ledge that is, in fact, a bundle of prejudices that are unconsciously 
absorbed by certain groups in society. The second is, for Scheler, a 
mixture of these prejudices with genuine forms of knowledge, a mixture 
that leads to the distorted form of ideologies. These ideologies would 
i 
appear to emerge out of the attempt to legitimate or justify the prejudices 
of a specific social group and are, in contrast to prejudices, conscious 
constructs. In his sociology of culture, however, Scheler does not 
develop his notion of ideology any further so it is appropriate to consider 
it later in connection with his discussion of social class world views 
and with his notion of the 'relatively natural world view' or world-taken- 
for-granted. 
Scheler's examination of the axioms necessary for developing an account 
of the ideal sphere proceeds in a very schematic manner. As well as 
examining the forms of intellectual co-operation, Scheler argues that 
j 
we must also examine the basic forms of human grouping as such - 
'the fluctuating horde', 'the ongoing Iife community', 'society' and 
the form of personalistic systems of solidarity amongst individuals. 
A sociology of culture must examine how particular phases of know 
ledge emerge with distinctive categorial structures such as the organic 
and the mechanical-technical forms of thought. It must examine the 
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forms of movement in cultural spheres such as that of cumulative 
progress or decline. Scheler hints at a whole series of problems which 
the sociology of culture must examine but he does so in only the most 
programmatic manner, in a manner that is somewhat akin to Gurvitch's 
axiomatic and taxonomical incursions into the sociology of knowledge. 
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Thus far, however, we have only examined the one side of this idea-real 
factor dualism. Within Scheler's discussion of the main elements of- 
his sociology of culture it remains to examine the features of the real 
factors. 
In a sense, Schaler argues that the axioms relating to the ideal sphere 
and its organisation are secondary when compared with 'the deepest and 
most fruitful questions in the sociology of culture' which is concerned 
with the nature of the regular order of effects that the structures of drives 
and real constitutions has upon the development of the ' ideal world of 
meaning' I. This refers to the constant difference between the potentially 
realisable and the actually realised elements of the ideal sphere, to the 
'effectiveness of the real factors in the history of the mind' I. But this 
does not mean that one should subscribe to the fallacy of all naturalistic 
explanations of history which seek to reduce the ideal to the real sphere 
or as Scheler puts it, to assert that 'this ideal world can even be 
"explained" from the real historical world'. 
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Similarly, one need 
not subscribe to the idealist converse of this that real history constitutes 
an unfolding of the human mind. Rather, Scheler argues that the mind 
guides or directs an already ordered phase of the human will but cannot 
itself overrule the movement of real history. Thus, 'where ideas find 
no forces, interests, impulses, drives that are objectivated in institutions, 
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then, in terms of real history, they are ... completely unimportant'. 
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Historical study has to explain the difference between the potentially 
possible work and the realised work but real history does not determine 
'the positive meaning content of the work of the mind' ; rather, ' in a 
definite manner and order it opens and closes the sluices to the intell- 
ectual stream' .' Part of that order in which real factors influence the 
ideal spheres refers to SchelerIIs three major phases of a culture - its 
.. youthful phase, where'guidance is rejected, its collectivistic moment of 
fatality in which the sense of human determination grows and its last 
phase, the massification of life. Scheler here comes close to a 
cyclical theory of human culture. 
However, the key question for the sociology of culture is whether there 
exists in human history a constant or a systematically changing order 
in the effectiveness of the real factors. The three potential determining 
factors Scheler sees as being racial, political or economic and all, have 
been used to provide naturalistic accounts of the determination of human 
culture. Scheler argues that at various stages of human history each 
of these factors has been important and that in the course of a circum- 
scribed cultural process there do exist three phases which correspond to 
the predominance'-of blood relationships, political relationships-and 
economic relationships. However, with regard to the general question 
s 
of the possibility of a single factor always being dominant, Scheler argues 
that 'there exists in the course of history no constant independent variable 
amongst the three highest main groups of real factors: blood, power, 
the economy; but, nonetheless, there does exist a law of ordering of 
respective primacies of them for the intellectual historical restriction 
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or encouragement of realisation, that is, there does exist a diverse law 
of ordering for specific phases of the course of the history of a culture. 171 
Schaler asserts that he can not only establish this law of ordering of the 
three factors inductively by an examination of the course of human history 
but that this law can be established deductively from the study of the 
origins of human drives: to blood relationships there corresponds a 
sexual and propagatory drive, to political relationships there corresponds 
a drive for power and to economic relationships there corresponds a drive 
for survival. As Schaler makes clear in many passages, a central 
motive for his construction of a sociology of culture and a sociology of 
knowledge in this manner is to counter what he takes to be the onesided 
economic determination of society and the ideal sphere that is advanced 
by Marx. He specifically argues that, in contrast to Marx's position, 
'There exists no constancy in the primary 
effectiveness of real factors; rather there 
exists here an ordered variability. None- 
theless, there does exist a fundamental 
relationship of the ideal factors to the 
real factors as a whole ..., that possess- 
es the strictest constancy in all human 
history and in no way permits a reversal 
or even merely a change. t72 
However, the constancy of this relationship between ideal and real fact- 
ors testifies once more, not only to the powerlessness of the mind but 
also to the strength of the structure of drives. This material base is 
I 
not, strictly speaking, a social one but a biological-psychic one. At 
the same time, Scheler assumes that he is preserving some degree of 
autonomy for the ideal sphere over against social existence but this is 
obtained only at the price of a de-historicizing of society. Thus, we 
return to the problem stated earlier, namely, the absence of any mediating 




human praxis and engagement. It is perhaps the absence of such factors 
which makes Scheler's analysis appear so formalistic and static. 
Potentially mediating categories are, as it were, trapped in the dualistic 
metaphysics which Scheler has constructed and which lies at the basis 
of his sociology of culture and, as we shall see, his sociology of know- 
Iedge. 
In commencing an examination of Scheler's most fully developed posit- 
ion on, the sociology of knowledge that is to be found in Die Wissensformen 
und die Gesellschaft, it is necessary to trace the outline of his concept- 
ion of the sociology of knowledge both within that volume and in other 
related writings. By the time that Die Wissensformen und die Gessell- 
schaft had been published in 1926, Scheler had already made a number of 
contributions to the sociology of knowledge. 'Ober die positivistische 
Geschichtsphilosophie des Wissens' had already appeared in 1921 as 
well as a reply to Jerusalem's critique of that essay. 
3 
In 1922 an 
article on 'Weltanschauungslehre, Soziologie und Weltanschauungs- 
setzung'74 appeared which deals not merely with the study of world views 
but also relates directly to the debate surrounding Max Weber's 'Wissen- 
schaft als Beruf' essay - the so-called Wissenschaftsstreit - which will 
/be examined in a subsequent chapter. These two essays and many others 
appeared in three small volumes in 1923 and 1924 under the title 
Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre 
and 
though they are 
not all equally relevant to an understanding of Scheler's sociology of 
knowledgo, some are worthy of attention. In 1924 Scheler published a 





variety of authors under the title Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. 
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At the opening of that volume appeared Scheler's 141 page introduction 
entitled 'Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens'. lt is this long con- 
tribution which - with important additions - appears as the first essay in 
Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft. One of the significant addit- 
ions to the original essay is an extension of Scheler's discussion of the 
sociology of science that arose out of his contribution to the fourth 
German Sociological Association congress in 1924 entitled 'Wissenschaft 
und soziale Struktur' . 
77 
The ether significant addition is Scheler's 
discussion of ideologies in relation to the class structure. The 1926 
volume also contains a long examination of the relationship between know- 
ledge and work which Scheler sets within the framework of a critique of 
pragmatism. The volume concludes with an essay on the role of the 
universities and schools which lies outside our present concerns. The 
second edition of Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft also contains 
a number of relevant pieces assembled by Maria Scheler from his manu- 
scripts and these must also be taken into account when examining Scheler's 
sociology of knowledge. 
78 
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The second section of Scheler's major essay 'Probleme einer Soziologie 
des Wissens' is concerned with Scheler's attempt to develop a sociology 
pof knowledge on the basis of his sociology of culture. This section is 
itself in two parts: the first concerned with formal problems, the second 
with material or substantive problems. As instances of substantive 
problems, Scheler deals with a sociology of the three major forms of 
knowledge that he has already enumerated - religion, metaphysics, 
positive science - and with the reassertion of metaphysics in the face of 
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the domination of science and technology. The discussion of the develop- 
ment of knowledge in relation to political development, and specifically 
what Schaler terms the ' Iogic of classes' and the 'sociological study 
of idols', is enlarged in the 1926 version. The section concludes with 
reflections upon the effects of the world war upon the intellectual structure 
of European societies. . 
Since we shall later examine in detail Scheler's discussion of science 
and labour, this will be omitted for the present and our attention will be 
concentrated upon the formal problems faced by a sociology of knowledge. 
However, we shall be concerned with Scheler's study of the relationship 
between knowledge and class structure since this has a direct bearing 
upon the question as to whether - like Lukacs and Mannheim - Scheler 
sees the critique of ideology as a central concern in the sociology of know- 
edge. 
The sociology of knowledge raises a number of formal problems which, 
for Scheler relate directly to the theory of knowledge and logic and to 
developmental psychology. These problems Scheler formulates in 
three basic axioms of the sociology of knowledge. The first is that 
'the-knowledge that each human being has of being a "member" of a 
society as such is not empirical but a priori knowledge. It genetically 
Precedes the stages of his so-called self- and self-evaluative con- 
sciousness: No "I" without a "We" and the "We" is always genetically 
filled with content before the Commenting on this first axiom, 
Schilpp suggests that the basis for this axiom lies in two of Scheler's 
earlier works, only one of which Scheler refers the reader to. 
so In 
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107 ! 11 
The Nature of Sympathy, Scheler argued that 
in the case of the development both of 
the individual and of primitive man there 
is, to begin with, no differentiation between 
eh-experiences and alter-experiences ... 
at first both flow on together as an undiffer- 
entiated stream of experiences. And if 
there is a tendency in one direction more 
than in the other it is rather in the direction 
of the alter. 181 
However, much research in developmental psychology would suggest thet 
the reverse is the case, namely, that whilst there may be little ego-alter 
differentiation in the early stages of development the child incorporates 
the alter with its identity and not conversely. S chilpp also suggests 
that this axiom has its roots in an even more dubious line of argument 
found in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik where 
'Scheier had already shown that an hypo- 
thetical Robinson Crusoe, who had never 
in his life seen or heard any of his own 
(human) kind, would nevertheless have 
this (a priori) social consciousness 
because of certain act-intentions which 
would be his by virtue of his very nature 
as man and which are intentions directed 
toward others of his kind (even though 
there be no such 'others' actually present 
or empirically known to him). 182 
It Is difficult to'see how the knowledge that each person has as a member 
A 
of a society is not empirical. Scheler can here do no more than assert 
i 
the a priori nature of this knowledge in order to proceed with a quasi- 
/ 
phenomenonological account of social knowledge. One can indeed 
suggest here that the importance of the relationship between self and 
others for the generation of human identity is dealt with more plausibly 
by Hegel83 and by Mead. 
84 




participation in the experiences of his fellow men are realised in various 
ways according to the basic structure of the group' . 
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These may be 
represented ideal typically along a continuum from complete identifi- 
cation - as found amongst 'primitive peoples, the masses, hypnosis, 
in certain pathological states, in the relationship of mother and child' - 
to inference by analogy. The implication of Scheler's association of 
such groups and relationships as instances of complete identification 
would suggest that, to take but one example, the masses are not capable 
of reflective though - which in turn implies that they do not participate 
in the generation of the world of meaning in the ideal sphere. As well 
as enumerating other possible modes of apprehension, Scheler goes on 
to suggest that the basis for the acquisition of knowledge, apart from 
instances of genius, is hereditary. Scheler is convinced that inherited 
"'talents" for the acquisition of knowledge are 
different in origin not only for individuals but 
also for genealogical hereditary races - and -. 
that the chief basis for the specific composition 
of fundamental differentiation of castes, estates 
and occupations lies in these differences in 
peoples rather than in differences in class sit- 
uation, social need or any kind of effects on the 
part of the social milieu: 86 
Once again, Scheler develops an axiom that apparently deals with the 
'sociology' of knowledge and then, as he expands his argument, it 
becomes clear that the relationship that he is examining has its basis 
not in society but in biology or, at least, in some sphere to which 
sociology cannot contribute. 
4 
As part of this second axiom, Scheler puts forward 'two categories with- 
out which the sociology of knowledge cannot develop: namely, the 
87 
group soul and the group mind' . Scheler insists that these two 
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categories 'are not metaphysical entities that basically precede joint 
living and experiencing'. The group soul refers solely to 'those mental 
activities which are not carried out "spontaneously" but which "perform 
themselves", such as expressive reactions or other automatic or semi- 
automatic psychophysical functions' I. In contrast, the group mind 
refers to 'the subject that constitutes itself in the joint performance of 
fully conscious spontaneous acts with an objective-intentional direction' . 
As examples of phenomena based on the group soul, Scheler gives 
myths and fairy tales, customs, folk songs and other similar phenomena; 
as examples of phenomena based on the group mind, Scheler gives the 
statI, law, philosophy, science, etc. Though Scheler has insisted that 
these two notions are not metaphysical, his account of the differences 
between the two readily recalls his earlier distinction between ideal and 
real factors: 'The group soul "lives and grows", as it were, in all" 
human beings even while they sleep; only its effects are "organic" in 
the Romantics' sense. In its origins, the group sould is impersonal, 
anonymous. ' It is 
'always determined in its content, values, 
aims, and direction by personal leaders 
and examples, at any rate by a "small 
number" (von Wieser), an "elite" (Pareto) 
... The group soul is effective in the 
group from "below" to "above", to group 
mind from "above" to "below". 
t3b 
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'Thus, that part of the sociology of knowledge which deals with the 
dissemination of knowledge from the apex of society down to the masses 
and with the distribution of knowledge is concerned with the group mind. 
Though Scheler does not make this clear, such an examination must 
necessarily be restricted by consideration of the real factors which limit 
the reception of such products of the mind and which - for Scheler at 
.. ý, 
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least - seem only to emerge out of a societal elite. It is also unclear 
whether the group soul is to be the concern primarily of a sociology of 
culture or a substantive (real) sociology, though this would appear to be 
the implication both at this point and in the light of Scheler's previous 
discussion. 
The third basic axiom in Scheler's sociology of knowledge 'which is 
also an axiom in epistemology, states that there exists a fixed law of 
ordering in the order of origin of our knowledge of reality ... and in 
the order filling in the spheres of knowledge and correlated objects that 
are constants in human consciousness' . 
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These spheres, which are 
not reducible to one another, comprise: ° 
'a) the absolute sphere, of the real and valuable, of the 
sacred; 
b) the sphere of a co-world (Mitwelt] , pre-world and 
after-world in general, i. e. the spheres of society 
and history or of the "others"; 
c) the spheres of the outer world and the inner world, 
and the sphere of one's own body and its environment; 
d) the sphere of what is thought to be "alive"; 
e) the sphere of the corporeal world which is dead and 
appears as "dead". 190 
Whereas philosophy has unceasingly attempted to reduce these spheres 
to one another, Scheler argues that they are 'irreducible; and, as 
spheres, all are equally genuinely given with every human consciousness'. 
Nonetheless, there does exist 'a fundamental essential order in the 
givenness and pregivenness of these spheres which remains constant in 
all possible human development'. 
The most basic of these orders of pregivenness for a sociology of know- 
ledge is that 'the social sphere of the co-world and historical sphere of 
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the ante-world is pregiven to all subsequent spheres with respect to (a) 
reality, (b) content and concreteness of content'. It is this particular 
order of pregivenness - though Scheler does give examples of others - 
that is central to the sociology of knowledge since it already anticipates 
the conclusions which he derives from these axioms, namely that 
'the sociological character of all knowledge, 
of all the forms of thinking, perception, 
cognition is incontestable: not, of course, 
the content of all knowledge and still less 
its objective validity, but the selection of 
the objects of knowledge according to the 
predominant social perspective of interests; 
that, further, the "forms" of mental acts 
within which knowledge is gained are always 
necessarily sociologically co-coditioned, 
i. e. through the structure of society. i91 
Scheler expresses the second of these conclusions somewhat differently 
in the unpublished notes for this article: 'There exists a sociological 
and historical interest persepective for the world of meaning. But this 
world itself does not emerge out of society and history - only its 
selection. '92 The first of the propositions - 'the sociological charact- 
er of all knowledge' - would, in its unqualified form, lead Schaler into 
sociologism, especially as it is not the 'social' character of knowledge 
that is at issue but the sociological. But the second proposition immed- 
iately qualifies the first since it is only the process of selection of objects 
of knowledge that is at issue and neither the content nor the validity of 
that knowledge. Even this highly qualified proposition remains unclear 
since Scheler does not illuminate his notion of 'Interessenperspektive'. 
Again, one can only infer that, in the last resort, this perspective of 
interests is derived from the drives and impulses that are responsible 
for the realisation of a particular form of knowledge. Scholer assumes 
that it is his third proposition - that the forms of mental acts are 
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sociologically co-conditioned Imitb edingij - which saves his sociology of 
knowledge from the charge of sociologism or, as he charges Durkheim, 
of 'positivistic sociologism'. But this escape is only at the price of 
accepting a timeless and thistorical essentialism. Scheler sees 
sociologism as being avoided 
'if one regards all functional forms of thought 
as leading back to the functionalisation of 
s the interpretation of essences in the thing 
themselves, and views only the particular 
selection which lies beneath this function- 
alisation as the work of societ and its 
interest perspective as against the "pure" 
realm of meaning. ' 93 
Aside from pointing to the problems associated with establishing this 
"pure" realrn of meaning and with the persistence of timeless essences, 
Scheler is confronted with two other difficulties. 
Firstly, he has nowhere shown much interest in delineating either the 
nature of society or its structure, nor, as has already been stated, the 
nature of these interests. Again it can only be assumed that such 
categories are to be filled out by recourse to the real factors. In fact, 
in the unpublished manuscript fragments for this essay he does argue 
that the selection is 'dependent on the construction of the typical drive- 
structure of society'. 
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Scheler does acknowledge that empirical studies 
have already demonstrated the co-conditioning of the classification of 
the world by the divisions and classifications of groups and that 'these 
structural identities of world-views, images of the soul, of God with 
social levels of organisation' are 'a particularly fascinating object of 
the sociology of knowledge', but, in a contradictory manner, he appears 
not to accept basic categories such as the division of labour, except as 
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being based on biological factors. In his reply to brusalem's critique 
of his attack on the positivist standpoint, Scheler takes issue with 
Jerusalem's assertion that all social differentiation derives from the 
division of labour. Scheler offers his own account of social different- 
Tation and asserts that 
'the primary ground for social differentiation 
is differentiation in the innate endowments 
and skills of groups (according to race, in- 
heritance, etc. ) and it is primarily within 
the differentiation of blood tendencies and 
the political power positions of groups co- 
determined by them that the division of 
I abour. beings about differentiation. 
"Castes" and "estates" and their cog- 
nitive communities do not emerge from 
the division of labour. ' 
Once more we see that the real factors are to be reduced to the biological 
level. 
Secondly, Scheler fails to confront a more important but related problem. 
In his sociology of culture, he had already asserted the plurality of cog- 
nitive apparatuses in opposition to Kant's standpoint. In the Zusdtze 
to this essay on the sociology of knowledge, Scheler argues that three 
basic propositions must be rejected: 
1 The constancy of a categorial system that is 
Immanent to consciousness, 
2 historical relativism and interpretation of all 
world views as the fable convenue of a historical 
group, 
3 the "ignorant" making of an exception for our 
world view. ' 96 
Scheler also asserts that the relativist standpoint is itself related to 
a particular type of society when he states that 'the new relativistic 




parliamentarianism that extends into the world-view according to which 
one discusses the meaning of all possible opinions without asserting 
them, one acts without deciding' . 
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Scheler's solution to the 
relativist problem that is associated with the rejection of all three 
propositions is an essentialist conception of truth that lies behind 
relativist standpoints. Knowledge, for Scheler, is rooted in our very 
being. In his lecture 'The Forms of Knowledge and Culture', given 
In 1925, he makes this quite clear when he says 
'Knowledge is an ontological relationship, one 
which assumes that entity and part are forms 
of being. In this relationship, one being 
partakes in the circumstance of another, with- 
out causing this circumstance to change. 
What is "known" becomes "part" of the 
person who "knows" but without displacing 
the other person and without itself changing 
in any way. This ontological relationship 
is established without reference to time, 
space and causality. 198 
In the unpublished additions to the essay on the sociology of knowledge, 
Schafer speaks of 'a system of. relativity of logic, ethics, aesthetics - 
as a consequence of genuine absolutism. Yet this relativity is trans- 
cended through the same history which creates it ... Every stand- 
point in the stream of history has its history which is objective - 
regardless of whether one recognises It. 
99 
Thus, behind historical 
relativities there lies an essential truth which we can presumably grasp. 
Scheler tries to make his position clearer through a graphic analogy 
when he states that 'just as Einstein has to locate the absolute objects 
a 
of nature, the object of theoretical physics, behind the changing deter- 
mination of mass and measurement of bodies in terms of their form, 
scope and time, so we locate the value order and truth behind the chang- 
Ing historical perspectivism' . 
100 
Scheler's solution to the relativist 
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problem lies in rejecting 'a cheap absolutism' and substituting a 
'genuine absolutism'. Here, too, it is clear that Scheler's notion of 
history is that of a fortuitous flow of events, without actors but with 
perspectives. 
Having examined the major axioms of a sociology of knowledge, Scheler 
goes on to investigate the major types of knowledge under three aspects - 
their identification, their social origin and their forms of movement. 
Scheler takes the major types of knowledge to be the 'absolutely 
constant natural world-view' , 'the relatively natural world-view' and 
the 'relatively artificial' or the "educated" world-view' . In his 
earlier essay on 'Weltanschauungslehre' (1921)., Scheler appeared to 
take the absolutely natural world-view as being derived from genuine and 
living traditions. By genuine traditional contents of thought he meant 
'only that content of a tradition which obviously survives as contemporary 
but which to its bearers is completely unconscious and unrecognised 
as a tradition' . 
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There, too, he saw such a world-view to be des- 
criptively delineated by philosophy and, from a historical-sociological 
standpoint, he saw such a world-view as being 'unchangeably "constant"' . 
In Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, however, this concept is 
taken to be a limited concept - limited in its usefu l ness., not in its 
actual usage - that is taken by epistemologists to be the basis for all 
knowledge, 'to be the minimum constant found at any time and any place 
where "men" happen to live'. It possesses, Scheler argues, the same 
weakness as that philosophical notion of the state of nature that figures 
so prominently in such 'typical ideologies' as those of Hobbes, Rousseau 
and Marx. Therefore the 'traditional concept of an absolutely constant 
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natural world-view must be completely rejected by the sociology of know- 
ledge I. 
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Instead, the sociology of knowledge takes as its basis the notion of the 
'relatively natural world-view' that arises in the following manner: 
'To the relatively natural world-view of a group, 
subject (originally to unity of common descent) 
belongs everything that is accepted as "given" 
without question in that group, as well as every 
object, and content of meaning in the structural 
forms of that "given" without special spontaneous 
acts, which is generally held and felt to be some- 
thing that cannot and need not be justified. But 
it is precisely this view which can be fundamentally 
different for different groups, or for one group in 
different stages of its development. 1103 
There exists, therefore, a plurality of relatively natural world-views the 
diversity of which 'extends into the categorial structure of the given 
itself' . This diversity, however, is -'to be explained neither historic- 
ally, nor psychologically nor sociologically. Only a study of racial in- 
heritance that extends to psychic inheritance' can form the starting 
-' point for such an investigation. Similarly, when it comes to explain- 
ing the changes in relatively natural world-views, Scheler argues that 
they are 'natural growths'which advance only 'in very great temporal 
dimensions' and 'can probably be changed in a more than superficial 
sense only through racial mixing and possibly the mixing of language and 
culture. At any rate they belong to the lowest centres of the automatic- 
ally functioning "group soul" - and not at all to the group "mind". 1104 
I 
Scheler thus makes perfectly clear that it is his real factors which, at 
every stage, determine the types of knowledge that he subjects to analysis- 
in this case the diversity and transformation of the relatively natural world. 
views are both to be explained largely in terms of biological factors. In 
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a different formulation of the problem of accounting for the changes in 
the relatively natural world-views, Scheler suggests that such an explan- 
ation will only be forthcoming 'if the sociology of knowledge establishes 
the closest relationship with developmental pyschology and uses for its 
own purposes the parallel co-ordination of stages of development already 
discovered in that field. ' 105 The examples 
f'parallel 
co-ordination' 
which Scheler views as already empirically established, illustrates not 
only his frequent and doubtful recourse to seemingly empirical studies but 
also the deep-seated nature of his elite-masses dichotomy To cite but 
three of the examples of parallel co-ordination for which he provides no 
evidence, but which were presumably to have been substantiated in his 
Philosophical Anthropology (which, in fact, never appeared): 
'8 between the behaviour of masses and that of 
children; ... 
11 between the psychic life of children and that 
of women ("constitutional" infantilism of 
the female psycho-physical organism) ... 
12 between the mentality and education condition 
of the lower classes and the educational con- 
dition of the elites of two, three or more 
generations earlier ("stratification theory of 
knowledge and class structure). 1 106 
From such 'empirical' evidence, it is clear that, in many respects, the 
masses behave like children, women react like children and the masses are 
mentally at least two generations behind the elite. The masses, women 
and children are all, apparently, encapsulated within the lowest centre 
' of the group soul. Nonetheless, they are at least worthy of investigation 
I 
by the sociology of knowledge since it is concerned not merely with 'truth 
but also the sociology of social delusion, of superstition, of the sociologic- 
ally conditioned errors and forms of deception'. 
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It is only the completely abstract extraction of this concept of the re- 
latively natural world-view from its context that enables Schutz or 
Berger and Luckmann to see the notion as a fundamental one for the est- 
ablishment of a sociology of knowledge or for Werner Stark to write, 
'Scheler's whole theory, which seems to us the most satisfactory 
approach to the basic problem of the sociology of knowledge that has yet 
beery tried, is summed up in one crowning concept - the concept of the 
"relatively natural"(i. e. normal) world-view'. 
107 This is all the more 
remarkable in view of the fact that in his discussion of the relatively 
natural world-view, Scheler seldom expands upon its 'sociological', 
dimensions but rather concentrates on its deep-seated roots in biological 
and psychological factors. But then, in part, this is precisely what 
constitutes his 'real' sociology. 
The third major type of knowledge, which itself rests upon the 'great 
solidity' of the relatively natural world-views, is that of the 'relatively 
artificial or "educated" world-views'. 
108 
orld views' . 
108 It is some of these relatively 
artificial world-views which form the major part of Scheler's subsequent 
examination of concrete material problems in the sociology of knowledge. 
When Scheler assembles these relatively artificial world-views according 
to their degree of 'artificiality, he seems to be doing so on the basis of a 
hierarchy of proximity to the group soul. That hierarchy is arranged as 
follows: 
i 
1 myth and legend 
2 natural folk language 
.3 religious knowledge 
4 mystic knowledge 
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5 philosophical-metaphysical knowledge 
6 positive knowledge (including Geisteswissenschaften) 
7 technical knowledge. 
Each of these forms of knowledge develops its own special language 
(except the mystical) and its own distincitive style in the formulation of 
its knowledge. One problem associated with this hierarchy has been 
stated by Schi Ipp who asks: 
if Scheler insists on such a sharp distinction 
between "group soul" and "group mind" and 
also insists that the relatively natural 
Weltanschauungen "belong to the lowest 
centres of the automatically working group 
soul and not at alI to the group mind", one 
cannot help wondering just where in his 
"Division of the Higher Forms of Knowledge" 
the "group soul" ceases to function and the 
activity of. the "group mind" belongs' . 
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That is, what Schilpp points to here is yet another indication of the 
powerlessness of the mind; on this occasion, the group mind. 
The arbitrariness of the hierarchical arrangement of these forms of 
knowledge and the problem raised by Schiipp are by no means resolved by 
Scheler's discussion of the origin of such types of knowledge, which 
forms the final aspect of Scheler's treatment of the formal problems in 
the sociology of knowledge. In fact, on Scheler's own admission, the 
'chief types of knowledge' are the religious, metaphysical and positive 
scientific. In all these instances 'the striving for knowledge ... grows 
out of an inborn drive-impulse [Triebimpuls], which man has in common 
with the higher vertebrates, especially the apes I , 
110 
Thus, we see, 
once more, that the highest forms of knowledge are in fact rooted - at 
least as far as our search for that knowledge is concerned - in the real 
factors, in the biological-psychological drives. 
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Scheler argues that there are three basic drives or emotions responsible 
for our striving after the three highest forms of knowledge: 
There is the urge 'first of the whole group 
and only secondarily of the individual, to 
"rescue", to "serve", their existence, 
fate and welfare and to get in touch with 111 
a reality seen as "overpowering and holy"' . 
This is 'the source of the search of 
religious knowledge. 
2 There is also 'the more intentional sense 
of wonder ... This act of wonder and 
the feelings that accompany it are the 
abiding source of all searching for metaphysical 
knowledge' 
. 
3 Finally, there is 'the striving for power 
and domination over nature, over men 
and events of society, over psychic 
and organic processes' . This is 
the source of our search for positive 
knowledge, and the source of 'all 
forms of technology' . 
112 
Scheler is particularly concerned with the third of these drives since it 
has important implications for philosophy and for positivism. Firstly, 
Scheler argues that it is neither pure reason nor sense experience that 
is the source of the positive sciences but rather 'that completely 
biological - and in no way rational or "intellectual" - drive for domination 
and power' 
113 
which determines both intellectual and practical behaviour 
in this sphere., Any attempt to ground these sciences by any other 
means would thus appear to be worthless. Secondly, it follows from 
,. 
Scheler's elevation of these three forms of knowledge to some kind of 
equal status that 'the positivism of Comte and Spencer - which is not 
Ia philosophy but merely a specific West European ideology of late western 
Industrialism - acknowledged only the third of the roots of man's desire 
for knowledge, without hoever clearly perceiving its biological origin'. 
114 
One might add that, nonetheless, Scheler does still adhere to three basic 
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types of knowledge even though he does not view their effectiveness in 
terms of a historical sequence. Yet even his attempt to give equal 
weight to the three types of knowledge is only partially genuine since it 
is clear that, for Scheler, the scientific is the dominant form in con- 
temporary society. What Scheler wishes to do is to challenge its 
hegemony and reassert the importance of the metaphysical and religious 
forms. 
S cheler concludes by arguing that an understanding of the roots of these 
three types of knowledge is essential in order to be able to go on to. 
examine: 
the different ideal typical forms of leadership 
in these three areas of knowledge ... 
2 the different sources and method of their 
acquisition of knowledge ... 
3 the different forms of movement of their 
deve I opment 
4 the different basic social forms in which 
the acquisition and conservation of 
knowledge is presented 
5 their different functions in human society 
6 their different sociological origin in 
classes, occupations strata .... ' 
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It is clear from this list of areas of research that follow on from an examin- 
ation of these 'roots' of the three types of knowledge that the study of 
, -the drives responsible for these types of knowledge in fact precedes a 
'sociological' examination of their origin, that is, that the biological, 
psychological and emotional should be examined before taking up a 
sociological investigation. This implies that amongst the 'real factors' 
which shape the cultural sphere, the sociological by no means play a 
primary role. 
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It remains to be seen whether, in his treatment of the material, sub- 
stantive problems in the sociology of knowledge, Scheler does advance 
a 'sociology' of knowledge. Scheler examines the central feature of 
the three major types of knowledge - religion, metaphysics and science - 
and the social bases for changes in these forms. He asserts once more 
the autonomy of these types, and this is particularly true of religious 
knowledge. However, since we shall be dealing with Scheler's 
examination of one of these types of knowledge in some detail - namely, 
positive science - we shall pass on to Scheler's examination of the 
relationship between social stratification, social classes and group know- 
ledge and, on a more general level, the relationship between the sociol- 
ogy of knowledge and the critiques of ideaology. 
0 
Such an examination is important since one of the central problematics 
in the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge is precisely its 
relationship to the critique of ideology. This is most obvious in the case 
of Mannheim but, as Barth suggests, 'it is remarkable that the discussion 
of ideology and ideological consciousness in Germany was not provoked 
earlier in connection with Max Scheler's work, Die Wissensformen und 
die Geselischaft'. 116 One reason may be that the discussion of ideal- 
ogy was only introduced into that volume in 1925 (Scheler's preface is 
dated November, 1925) and then only as an insertion of eight pages into 
the already existing 1924 manuscript that had formed'the introduction to 
Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. As such, this discussion 
of ideology did not have the central place in Scheler's work that it did, 
for example, in Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie. Nonetheless, there 
are some points of similarity in Mannheim's treatment of ideology when 
A 
compared with that of Scheler. Further, although it is true that the 
discussion of ideology did not play a central role in Scheler's work, he 
had already alluded to this problem in his 'Weltanschauungslehre' article 
in 1921 and in his discussion of the sociology of culture that first appeared 
in 1924. 
It is clear from many remarks in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft 
and elsewhere that the emergence of the proletariat as a class with its own 
political parties and world-view (Scl3Ier views Marxism exclusively in 
terms of a world-view) constitutes a throat to Scheler's conception of the 
value-order of the world and to his assertion - though in fact only an 
assertion - of the key role of elites. The economic and political emerg- 
ence of the lower classes and their role in the development of 'political 
and social "democracies"' brings about, Scheler argues, a retreat from 
'the aristocratic-metaphysical spirit', and increasing 'dogmatisation' 
of religion and an accelerating progress in the 'positive scientific and 
technical spirit'. 
117 As we shall see, Scheler links the emergence of 
science with the emergence of new social groups who generate mere 
ideologies that legitimate their activities. Thus, for Scheler, 'scientific 
rationalism and intellectualism (which views all technology merely as 
the application of pure theory) just as much as the proletarian manual- 
worker 
pragmatism is false -.. both of them represent ideologies of 
interests: the former of the liberal bourgeoisie, the latter of the prole- 
tariat'. 
11$ 
Already it is apparent that what Scheler presumably opposes 
to ideology is some non-class specific set of Ideas, perhaps related to 
the salvation of man, or perhaps some notion of 'genuine' science. 
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Scheler adopts a position in which the legitimation and justification of 
124 
sciences can be ideological but not the contents of the sciences themselves. 
In his earlier essay on 'Wei tanschauungslehre', Scheler, opposing the 
notion of a 'new proletarian science', argues that 'there are bourgeois 
and proletarian "ideologies" (i. e. constructions of history and programmes 
of action directed by hidden and preconscious class interests); but there 
exists only "the sciences", which have nothing in the least to do with 
such "ideologies" 1 . 
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If Scheler assumed that he could dispense so 
readily with the problem of ideologies in this earlier work, then this is no 
longer true of his discussion in Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft 
since, as was mentioned above, Scheler added a section on classes and 
ideologies to the 1926 edition that was absent when the essay first 
appeared in 1924. 
Scheler attempts to show that the class relativism that emerges with 
attributing ideological determination to the thought of all classes can be 
overcome by the argument he has already advanced against philosophical 
relativism, namely, that it is only the selection and choice of categorial 
systems that is socially determined. Scheler states the relativist 
problem in relation to class ideologies as one which leads to its re- 
solution in a form of transcendence: 
I 
'If there were really no instance in the human 
mind that was capable of raising itself above 
all class ideologies, then all possibilities for 
true knowledge would be a delusion. All 
knowledge would then be ... merely a function 
of the outcome of class struggles. The form of 
logic and the form of cognition would also be 
merely a function of class situation itself or an 
option open to such a situation. On the other 
hand, it is certainly a readily ascertainable 
fact that class situation largely determines 
both the ethos and the mode of thought [Denkart . 'ý20 
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Scheler thus maintains that it is possible to rise above class ideologies 
and that the forms of logic and cognition are not a function of class 
situation. Yet he does concede the 'class related determinism of 
formal modes of thought' and provides a schema of such formal modes 
as they relate to upper and lower social classes that is worth citing in 
full. 
Lower Class 
1) Value prospectivism of conscious=ness 
of time 
2) Contemplation of becoming 
3) Mechanical view of world 
4) Realism (the world pre- 
dominantly as "resistance") 
5) Materialism 
6) Induction, empiricism 
7) Pragmatism 
8) Optimistic view of the future 
and pessimistic' view of the 
past 
9) A mode of thought that looks for 
contradictions of "dialectical" 
mode of thought 




Contemplation of being 
Teleological view of world 
Idealism (the world predominantly 
as the "realm of ideas") 
Spiritualism 
A priori knowledge, rationalism 
Intellectualism 
Pessimistic view of the future 
and optimistic view of the past 
("the good old times") 
The mode of thought that seeks 
identity 
Nativistic thought 1 121 
As the authors of Aspects of Sociology (Soziologische Exkurse) point 
out, 'this schema of lower and upper class ... is much too crude' 
and displays 'the absence of any historical consciousness' as well as 
being 'inadequate to the concreteness of social differentiation' and 
'to the formation of ideologies' . 
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One might add that the reason 
why Scheler's categories of social class are so crude is that for him 
social classes are not fundamental groups in society. In the light of 
the preceding discussion, it is apparent that Scheler more readily views 
society as composed of elites and masses. Further, the absence of a 
historical dimension applies not merely to this schema but to the whole 
of Scheler's outline of a sociology of culture and a sociology of know- 
ledge. The schema also reflects the impossibility of the emergence 
of the problem of false consciousness in Scheler's discussion of ideology 
and class determined modes of thought, not merely because the examin- 
ation of modes of thought is totally without reference to a social class's 
actual activity in society but because, -as the ninth formulation suggests, 
S cheler believes that, unlike Marx or Lukäcs, the lower class already 
possess a "'dialectical" ' mode of thought', that is, they are already 
in a state of true consciousness as far as their own position in society 
is concerned. Finally, Scheler has already made it clear that such in- 
clinations are unconscious -'these modes of thought can have no possible 
relationship to class consciousness of the kind that Marx or Lukäcs 
discuss. Nor is it the case that this schema is concerned with philoso- 
phical theories; rather it is concerned with 
'living modes of thought and forms of 
" viewing the world themselves in their 
functioning - not with reflexive know- 
ledge of these forms. These are class 
determined inclinations of an unconscious 
type to conceive the world predominantly 
in one or the other form. They are not 
class "prejudices", but rather they are 





laws of the formation of prejudices and 
specifically formal laws, which, as 
I aws of the predominant inclinations 
to form certain prejudices, are rooted 
solely in class situations - quite 
regardless of individuality, occupation 
and the mass of knowledge of men, 
as well as their race, nationality, etc. ' 
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These 'class determined inclination are, for Scheler, rooted in the 
classes themselves, not in social class relationships nor in their 
relationship to a particular form of society. In this sense they are 
subjectively determined by the nature of one's class position; they do 
not relate to activity but to views, conceptions, notions; they are un- 
conscious reactions to the world. 
Scheler suggests that if these 'formal laws' of the formation of 'pre- 
judices' were fully comprehended then this would form a constituent 
part of the sociology of knowledge: 
If they were fully known and their necessary 
deviation from class situation were under- 
stood, then they would actually constitute 
a new doctrine of the sociology of knowledge 
which, in analogy to Bacon's doctrine of 
the idols (doctrine of delusions) of external 
perception and my doctrine of idols of inner 
perception, I would like to designate as the 
"sociological doctrine of the idols" of 124 
thought, contemplation and judgment. ' 
in contrast to Bacon's doctrine, however, 'these sociologically de- 
termined idols are more than errors ... These idols are traditional 
9 
to the classes - they are absorbed, as it were, with the mother's milk. ' 
Yet again Scheler argues that such idols are peculiar to class situation 
without reference to the relationship which that class has with other 
classes. The idols are erron' us views that are automatically imbibed 
by social classes. 
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Despite the traditional and seemingly necessary nature of such idols and 
class conceptions, Scheler assumes that they can be overcome. He 
argues that the errors of the 'economistic theory of knowledge' emerge 
'when one equates these class conditioned 
systems of idols with the ontological and 
emergent forms of things, and, secondly, 
with the objective forms of thought, inter- 
pretation and evaluation and judges them 
by analogy with these categorial perspect- 
i ves of class interests; thirdly, when one 
takes them to be not merely "necessary" 
inclinations of thought and interpretative 
impulses - which is what they actually 
are - but also takes them to be causally 
necessary as well. ' 125 
Howrver, for Scheler these systems of idols are not necessarily and 
causally binding. Rather 'the class prejudices and also the formal laws 
of the formation of class prejudices are ... in principle transcendable 
for each individual member of a class. They. can - the more they are 
recognised by the sociological study of idols in their sociological law- 
fulness - be withdrawn from use by any person, whatever their class 
position. ' It is thus 'a practical-educational central value of a 
sociology of knowledge of classes' to reveal these idols and to make 
people aware of them. Although Scheler does not use the phrase, it 
is legitimate to suggest that what he has in mind here is the 'unmasking 
of ideologies' which plays a central role in some of Mannheim's accounts 
of ideology. Scheler, like Mannheim, seeks to show that the sociol- 
ogy of knowledge has a practical role to play in this respect but he fails 
4 to show how individuals can escape from these idols and leaves totally 
out of account any notion of social classes as a whole overcoming their 
illusions, as Lukäcs argues. Scheler had earlier argued in his essay 
on 'Weltanschauungslehre' - in many ways a discipline that is a fore- 
129 
runner of the sociology of knowledge - that the study of world-views is 
'a very important and rich discipline', one which could 
'serve to increase the understanding of our 
people and its sections; it can possess a 
high value for the contrasting learning to 
understand and coming to self-understand- 
ing of the families, classes and parties of 
our political fatherland that has largely 
disintegrated too much into irresponsible 
parties based on maxims and opinions. 
For the Volkshochschule, for example, 
the study of world views is, moreover, 126 the fundamental discipline [Grunddiziplin]. 
This practical educative role of the study of world views is certainly a 
forerunner of Scheler's subsequent claims for the sociology of know- 
ledge, and perhaps also for the practical intentions of Mannheim's 
claims for the sociology of knowledge as a Grundwissenschaft. 
It is very doubtful, then, if Scheler has any conception at all of a 
critique of ideology. 'Rather, he substitutes for that activity a doctrine 
of ideologies which remains undeveloped. This substitution has its 
deeper origins in Scheler's sociology of culture in that, as Lieber argues, 
Scheler's sociology of knowledge establishes the essential form of 
knowledge as an 
'element that is undisturbed by the historical- 
social process; in so doing, both the concept 
of false consciousness and that of truth lose 
their meaning. The bridge to a critique of 
ideology is broken, and the sociology of 
knowledge that results from this can only 
confirm even more the irrationality of the 
social process it has itself abandoned, 
especially as it grounds that process - 
in association with the historical-social 
explanation of the powerlessness of the 127 
mind - in the natural structures of drives. ' 
Indeed, Instead of a historical-social analysis of the process by which 
130 
ideologies develop out of systematic features of the nature of exploit- 
ation and domination in society, we are presented with an account of' 
ideologies that is deeply subjectivist. We might add here that it is 
not only the notion of ideology that is subjectivist in origin. It has 
already been shown that Scheler's concept of society is a merely 
residual one and therefore plays no central role in his sociology of know- 
ledge. If we were to attempt to integrate Scheler's doctrine of ideolo- 
gies into a theory of exploitation and domination in society, then we 
would be confronted with a further difficulty. This is that the designation 
of particular societies is in itself subjectivist in origin and is ultimately 
related to a theory of drives. We could not use the concept of a capital- 
ist society, for instance, because Scheler argues that 'the capitalist 
7 economy is based upon the will to unlimited acquisition (as an actus), 
and not upon acquisition (as an increasing ownership of objects). 
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Capitalism, too, is rooted in individual or collective drives. Similarly, 
ideologies cannot emerge out of such a form of society but must have 
their origin elsewhere. Ideologies are endemic to social classes and 
0 
have a basis that is hardly social; rather, they originate out of automatic- 
ally stimulated prejudices, however much they may be formulated in 
such a way as to hide this origin. Similarly, the process by which we 
can, as individuals, escape from ideologies is hardly touched upon by 
Scheler, except in the form of an assertion that the sociology of know- 
ledge, for example, can make people aware of them. Again, this act 
of being made aware is in no way related to human action but rather has 
a passive connotation. Scheler's ' Idolenlehre' or ' Ideologienlehre' 
remains a doctrine which views ideologies as emerging from within 
social groups in a quasi-automatic manner as drives or views or'in- 
clinations. 
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It has been suggested by Staude that 'the notion of ideology was crucial 
to Scheler's sociology of knowledge' and that Scheler's discussion of 
ideology is, in part, a response to Lukäcs' History and Class Con- 
sciousness. 
129 
We hope to have shown that the notion of ideology did 
not play a central role in Scheler's sociology of knowledge. It was 
only in 1926 that Scheler devoted more than a paragraph to its discussion 
in his works. Even then, the preceding discussion of his sociology of 
knowledge should have shown that Stheler's account of ideology is not 
only inserted into the wider context of a sociology of knowledge and cul- 
ture but also can only be understood as a continuation of themes already 
raised by Scheler in that wider sphere of a sociology of culture and of 
knowledge. Further, Scheler's discussion of ideology, unlike his 
central themes in the sociology of culture, did not permeate his other 
writings which are judged to lie outside the strictly sociological realm. 
This suggests that the depth of Scheler's preoccupation was hardly a 
great one. Nor is it at all obvious that Scheler is responding to Lukacs' 
work, not merely because he makes no reference to him but because his 
arguments betray either no understanding or no willingness to confront 
the problems which Lukäcs raised. 
IV 
Scheler's examination of the role of science and its relationship to the 
j social structure - which is the example we shall take of his own 
application of the sociology of knowledge - betrays its origins in his 
attempt to combat positivism as exemplified not only in Comte's law 
of three stages but also in Marx's presumed positivist account of the 
132 
role of science. Scheler's concern with science is a consistent theme 
in his sociology of knowledge. In his 1921 essay on the positivist 
philosophy of history, Scheler sought to challenge the status that positiv- 
ists such as Comte, Mill, Spencer, Mach and Avenarius had given to 
positive science and to restore the importance of religion and meta- 
physics as forms of knowledge. These three forms of knowledge, 
Scheler argued, 'rest on three different motives, three completely differ- 
ent groups of acts of the knowing mind, three different aims, three differ- 
ent personality types, and three different social groups. The historical 
forms of movement of these three mental forces are also basically 
different. ' 130 In this early article, Scheler also related science to the 
emergence of the working class and, as he later emphasized in subsequent 
works, to work activity. 
In Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Schaler provides a detailed 
account of some social aspects of positive science and in a long article 
entitled 'Erkenntnis und Arbeit' takes up the theme of pragmatism as a 
legitimation of science and work. The discussion of science in this 
volume relies heavily upon the paper which Scheler delivered to the 
fourth German Sociological Association meeting in 1924. Its title 
'Wissenschaft und soziale Struktur' suggests that, ostensibly, it is 
the place in which Scheler most specifically discussed the relationship 
between science and society-and, since it was one of the first discussions 
of this theme outside earlier Marxist discussion and since it sparked off 
a heated debate at that meeting, it is this paper that will form the centre 
of our discussion. 
133 
.F 
There is another reason why it is important to examine Scheler's account 
of the relationship between positive science and society - however much 
he repeats what he has already formulated in his sociology of culture 
and formal sociology of knowledge - and this is that scientific knowledge 
has had a very problematic position within the sociology of knowledge. 
Some writers have, at times, totally excluded science from consideration 
on the assumption that an examination of the relationship between scien- 
tific knowledge and society might call into question the truth claims of 
natural scientific theories. This exclusion of science also has its 
origins in Marxist and neo-Marxist writings in the assertion of a rigid 
science-ideology dichotomy which results, as Sohn-Rethel argues, in a 
materialist account of ideology and an idealist account of science. He 
asks: 'Is a Marxist then a materialist with regard to historical truths but 
an idealist with regard to natural truths? Is his thought split between a 
dialectical concept of truth in which time plays an important role, and 
an undialectical concept of truth of timeless observance? ' 
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This is 
a question that is not merely relevant for Lukäcs but also, and perhaps 
especially, for Mannheim. In Scheler's case, one can at least argue 
that he consistently deals with science as part of his investigation of 
the three major forms of knowledge. As we have already seen, Scheler 
too adopts a rigid separation between science and ideology even in his 
early contributions to the sociology of knowledge. 
However, Scheler does at least take up the theme of the relationship 
between science and the social structure in some detail in his 1924 
paper. This paper commences with a repetition of Scheler's arguments 
on the three forms of knowledge and their sources in different drives, 
impulses and emotions - 'the problem of the origin of types of know- 
ledge is a problem for the sociology of knowledge of the first rank' - 
and with an assertion that he is seeking ' Iaws of development and 
connection' between the cultural realm and social life. 
132 
He repeats 
here that the source of positive scientific research is the 'biological 
(and in no way rational or "intellectual") drive to domination and power' . 
In contrast to the positivists, Scheler also argues that, as a form of know- 
ledge, science stands 'in the innermost and creative connection' to 
metaphysics, though science is concerned with 'existential relativity' 
and metaphysics with the human totality and 'absolute values' . Science 
and metaphysics also differ in their social origin in that whereas meta- 
physics is the work of an educated upper strata, positive science has its 
origins in 'two social strata ... the one a strata of free contemplative 
people and the other a strata of people who have rationally gathered to- 
gather the experiences of work and craftsmanship' . 
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That is, science 
and 'the formal-mechanical principle, the explanation of nature' cannot 
emerge merely from contemplation but from those people 'who must 
move diverse things from place to place and whose activities of trans- 
port and work create increasinglnew experiences of the nature of bodies 
and forces. The economic work and transport communities of patrilineal 
expansive cultures ... are universally the primary sociological origin of 
positive science. ' 
134 By aruguing that positive science has its social 
origins in two social'groups - one philosophical and contemplative, the 
other concerned with work activity and practicalL- Scheler intends to 
show the onesidedness and erroneousness of both the 'Marxist inter- 
pretation of the relations between labour and science (Boltzmann, 




of authors who are said to hold a Marxistic interpretation, which only 
17 
betrays Scheler's use of negatively valued groups, such as Marxists, 
to incorporate whoever else he dislikes - and the purely intellectualist 
account that sees science as arising solely out of contemplation. 
Rather, in his view, science is 'the child of the marriage of philosophy 
and work experience . 
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The more fundamental distinction between marxistic accounts of the 
origin of science lies not merely in the social groups out of Mich science 
is said to emerge but in the nature of the relationship between science and 
i material factors. Scheler argues that 
'the forms of production techniques of 
human labour (in the technical sense) 
each form a parallel to the form of 
positive-scientific thought, without 
one being able to say that one of the 
formal worlds is the cause or inde- 
pendent variable of the other. The 
independent variable which determines 
both sequences of forms of knowledge 
and work techniques is that of the exist- 
ing drive structure of the highest leaders 
of society ... in the closest relationship 
with what I term "ethos", ... with the 
leading values and ideas upo_ n which the 
leaders of groups and, in and through 
them, the roups themselves are commonly 
directed. ' 
9136 
The introduction of the will and drive structure is, once more, Scheler's 
corrective to pragmatism and economism. This is expressed for Scheler 
l 
in 'one of the most important statements that the sociology of knowledge 
has to offer', namely, that 'the will to domination and control co- 
determines both the methods of thought and perspective and the goals of 
scientific thought -. and this means co-determination, as it were, behind 
135 
11, 
the backs of individuals' consciousness whose personal motives for 
136 
137 
research are thus completely irrelevant. Perhaps nowhere else 
in Scheler's sociology of knowledge is it apparent that his intention of 
creating an empirical discipline that searches for the laws - and these are 
11 
interpreted in the very same naive positivist manner as the groups who he 
opposes - governing forms of knowledge is fundamentally contradictory. 
On the one hand, Scheler continually and deliberately evades any causal 
explanations at the level of social entities and substitutes notions such 
as 'parallel', 'affinity', 'homology', etc. whose explanatory power is 
much weaker. On the other hand, every social form of knowledge is 
seen to be determined in a rigid manner not by these parallels, which 
exist at a social level, but by the structure of drives, of the will, of 
emotions, of biological impulses which are so deeply rooted in the ontology 
of human beings - one cannot even say their psyche since that too Is a 
physiological phenomenon for Scheler"- that this second, deeper level 
of determination is in no way open to investigation by a sociology of 
knowledge. 
In the light of this, it is not surprising that when Scheler comes to ex- 
amine the crucial, and today even more contemporary, issue of the 
'sociological -historical connection between technology and science' 
precisely the same dualism in his account of that relationship appears. 
Having reduced Marxism to a mechanistic account of the relationship 
between economic base and superstructure and having excluded al- 
4 
together any dialectical relationship whilst, to some extent, retaining 
the base-superstructure dichotomy, Scheler is compelled to argue that 
the relationship between the two is an interesting but weak one on the 
social level but strong and overdetermined at the biological, ahistorical 
N 
137 
level. He makes his position clear in the following statement when he 
says that 
'Marx speaks of the direct or at least 
determining causal dependency of not 
only positive science but also all 
intellectual products upon the economic 
relations of production; we only refer 
to positive science and even here only 
of a parallelism that has a third common 
higher cause, namely the hereditary 
drive structure of the leader, ultimately 
of a blood origin and a corresponding 
new ethos. ' 1,38 
What this means is that however interesting and insightful the parallels 
may be which Scheler produces, and however fruitful they might be in a 
social-historical context, we must always remember that their real 
at 
determination lies not at this socio-historical level but^a biological 
level. 
Scheler does attempt to show that the early origins of modem science 
do display close connections with technology and that this can, in part, 
be traced to the connections and ultimately the fusion of the two social 
groups responsible for'the emergence of science. More specifically, 
Schaler sets out to show that modern science originates in the emergent 
bourgeoisie's challenge to traditional religion during and after the 
Reformation, in the emergence of a nominalist form of thought, in the 
increased concentration upon worldly labour and occupations - already 
' 
state as a guarantee for, the freedom of science. 
documented by Weber - and upon the increased separation of church and 
Scheler also seeks to account for the emergence of modern science by 




'the pioneering activity of the 11 love of those who are knowledgable", the 
dilettantism prior to officials in scientific disciplines, the ft love of know- 
ledge .` 
139 
Y period Science in the earl modern is associated with a 
'new emotional relationship to animals and plants', with the emergence 
of new generations - 'according to the law of generations, thus according 
to a basically biological rhythm'. This dilettantism is 'unmethodical, 
turbulent' and vastly overestimates the value of any newly discovered 
area. The new theoretical world-view and the practical real world both 
have their origin in 'the new ethos and structure of drives' . The extent 
of this new ethos is manifested in the analogies of style when comparing 
art, philosophy and science. Scheler generalizes such new culturally 
. emergent phenomena 
into a quality of human history such that these new 
phenomena awaken and activate the 'sleeping forces of the soul' . How- 
ever, as well as referring to the importance of such constant phenomena 
In human history as a means of accounting for the emergence of modern 
science, Scheler pointo a second positive factor - the first having been 
the Reformation and its consequences - namely, the desire on the part 
of the emergent urban bourgeoisie to systematically dominate nature and 
to capitalise upon the kind of knowledge that would facilitate such dom- 
lnation. However, one consequence of the successful realisation of 
such an idea is to absolutize the world-view provided by positive science 
based on such motives into the sole image of the world. Scheler argues 
that such a tendency is not only prevalent in these sciences but in those 
interpretations of science such as positivism, pragmatism and Marxism 
which accept the hegemony of the scientific world view. Scheler views 
such accounts as being intrinisically deterministic. 
139 
It is against such standpoints that Scheler adopts the notion of parallel- 
ism and analogy. As well as arguing for the 'parallelism' of forms of 
knowledge and society, Scheler also asserts that the sociology of know- , 
ledge should investigate 'the series of analogies of meaning 
[Sinnents- 
prechungen] between the structure of modern science, on the one hand, 
and technology on the other, as well as between technology itself and 
the economy' . 
140 
Such analogies are not to be understood as providing 
from the outset an 'explanation of a causal type', though subsequently 
'a causal explanation can and must be, sought' .. Such analogies may 
be seen in the transition from feudalism to the modern period, in the 
t 
transition from a power drive over human beings to a new form of drive 
over'nature. That is, Scheler deliberately argues against concrete 
historical explanation and passes over to meanings and ultimately to the 
structure öf drives. This becomes apparent when Scheler clarifies the 
analogy between science and technology with the assertion that 
'it is not technical needs that determine 
the new science, nor the new science 
that determines technical progress but 
rather both the original transformation 
of the logical system of categories of 
the new science and the new simultan- 
eously emerging technical drive towards 
the domination of nature as grounded in 
the new type of bourgeois man and his 141 
new structure of drives and his new ethos' . 
Since both science and technology are the result of this 'single psycho- 
energetic process' they must complement and interact with one another. 
Scheler is not only at pains to undermine the pragmatist and Marxist 
interpretations which, he argues, seek to make science dependent upon 
technology but is also insistent that, in the last resort, they are both 
grounded in the same structure of drives. 
140 
In his analysis of the sociology of science, it is evident that not only 
is his 'powerlessness of the mind' thesis further confirmed but also - 
as we saw earlier in relation to his metaphysics - the unreality of the 
socio-historical structures in his base-superstructure model is apparent. 
The sociol-economic and historical structures do not themselves posses 
a concrete existence but are, rather, grounded in drives and impulses. 
In his discussion of the analogies of meaning between the economy and 
science, we learn again that 
'the capitalist economy is based upon the will 
towards unlimited acquisition (as an actus) and 
not upon acquisition (as an increasing ownership 
of objects). Modern science, too, administers 
neither a given stable possession of truth nor does 
it engage in research in order to find solutions to 
specific tasks that are determined by needs, but 142 
rather it is primarily a striving towards "methods". ' 
Modern science is thus 'a type of logical machinery. Scheler wishes to 
preserve science as one form of knowledge amongst others, even though that 
form is ultimately determined by biological drives. In a sense, I Scheler 
sees this as being preferable to the positivist interpretation which not only 
asserts the primacy of scientific knowledge over all other forms but also 
implies 'the tendency of science to sink into technicism 
[Technizismus]'. 
Rather, Scheler hopes that the sociology of knowledge will be able to demon- 
strate the need for a new 'cultural synthesis' of metaphysics and science, 
of the techniques of the soul and the techniques of domination. 
The response to Scheler's paper by his contemporaries was largely neg- 
I 
ative.. It has already been mentioned that Adler, the co-referent for 
Scheler's paper, questioned the sociological nature of Scheler's remarks 
141 
on the relationship between science and social structure as well as the 
interpretation of Marxism that Scheler criticised. Alfred Weber reiterated 
this question when he suggested that 'what he has offered us here is a 
"sociology" only in quotation marks. I believe it was a philosophy with 
a sociological prognostic. ' 
143 
Weber continues by arguing that Scheler's 
discussion 'commenced from a triple division of knowledge. This 
division, Comte Is three divisions, which you accept, and have transposed 
onto another level, is, as far as I can see, an a priori of your whole pro- 
cedure. I want to ask you whether this is an unconditional law or only a 
division for specific intellectual purposes? ' Dunkmann also questioned 
the basis for Scheler's sociology of knowledge but on different grounds. 
He asked 'how is sociology as a science possible if all science is depend- 
ent upon sociology? From where does sociology take its standard as a 
science, if all other sciences ... depend upon the social structure, that 
is, are sociologically determined? ' 
144 
Meusel criticized Scheler and 
Adler for not addressing themselves sufficiently to the question of the 
actual relationship between science and social structure. That part of 
the discussion which was given over to discussion of Scheler's paper 
suggested a high degree of dissatisfaction with the sociological nature 
of Scheler's paper. This dissatisfaction was reflected more widely in 
the reception of Scheler's sociology of knowledge as a whole. 
/,. 
It can be stated in Scheler's favour that he did at least take up the issue 
0 
of the relationship between science and social structure and that cannot 
be said for many other contributors to the sociology of knowledge in this 
period. However, the manner in which Scheler treats this relationship 
and the way in which he conceived of both knowledge and social structure 
142 
reflects SchelerTs metaphysical preoccupations rather than his sociological 
intentions. Positive science as one 'form' of knowledge amongst others 
is seen to rest, in vital respects, upon the drive structure of pioneers in 
science. Scheler's analysis is not, in a sense, sensitive to the nature 
of the object that he investigates. The object becomes subservient to 
his wider metaphysical intentions, such as the restoration of metaphysics 
itself or, at least, as Scheler conceives it. On a social-political level, 
Scheler is intent on preserving elites at the apex of society and views them 
as the prime creators of cultural innovation. It is not surprising, therefore, 
to learn that Scheler - unlike, say, Merton - saw no necessary connection 
between science and democracy; indeed, he argued that the socio-political 
regime most favourable to science would be 'an enlightened aristocracy 
and monarchy ' 
.; 45perhaps the regime which Scheler conceived as being 
the most favourable in all respects. Thus, at almost every stage of his 
analysis, Scheler incorporates his object of investigation into a set of 
preconceptions which provide little room - in the last resort - for the in- 
dependent development of potentially interesting 'parallels' and 'analogies 
of meaning' . These preconceptions also rule out the possibility of 
Scheler examining such issues as science in relation to the productive 




Scheler conceived of his sociology of knowledge as a discipline that could 
permanently combat what he took to be the erroneous tendencies in social, 
political and philosophical theory - positivism, Marxism, historicism and 
143 
relativism. At various stages of his attempt to ground this new discipline, 
those phenomena which he opposes in fact shape, to a considerable extent, 
the nature of Scheler's project. As Alfred Weber argued, the positivist 
law of three stages does animate Scheler's sociology of knowledge even 
a 
though the categories are discussed atedifferent level. The interpretation 
of a crude Marxism which Scheler ascribes to does, at various points, 
provide Scheler with a base-superstructure model in which both the base 
and superstructure take on new dimensions and in which the relationship 
between the two is fundamentally altered. 
At a more strictly methodological level, Scheler hardly takes seriously his 
attempt to establish an explanatory model for the sociology of knowledge. 
Scheler's resort to supposed empirical evidence is erratic and often based 
on a desire to support his metaphysics. On the other hand, Scheler's 
rigid adherence to his metaphysical position with all its. contradictions, 
prevents him from estäblishing empirically analysable relationships 
between knowledge and society. This is not to suggest that a causal 
analytic model is the only appropriate -one for the sociology of knowledge 
but since Scheler at times appears to assume that he is establishing such 
a sociology of knowledge it is at least legitimate to question whether he 
is capable of doing so. 
146 The same problem arises for the presumed 
'phenomenological foundation for the sociology of knowledge which 
Scheler is presumed to have provided. Not only is Scheler a most un- 
If 
orthodox'phenomenologist but it is true to say his metaphysical position 
seriously prevents him from establishing a consistent phenomenological 
approach. Therefore, as has been pointed out earlier, it is only with the 
11 
greatest difficulty and with he most spurious level of abstraction that one 
144 
can claim that Scheler did establish a phenomenological basis for the 
sociology of knowledge. Such a positive evaluation is provided by 
Alfred Schulz though his arguments are not convincing. 
147 -Scheler's 
categories can be extracted from their context and applied elsewhere but 
then the end result is no longer Scheler's own sociology of knowledge. 
It is, perhaps, this fusion of sociological and metaphysical intentions 
which led many of his contemporaries to question whether he had provided 
a sociology of knowledge. Contemporary reviewers were deeply sceptical 
on this point. Hintze, in the most detailed contemporary review of 
Scheler's sociology of knowledge, questioned whether the crucial med- 
iating societal categories between the ontologically grounded dualism in 
his sociology of culture had been established by Scheler. 
148 Eleuther- 
opulos, reviewing Die Wissensformen-und die Gesellschaft, suggests 
that 'in fact a very large part of this contribution really has nothing to do 
with the "sociology of knowledge". ' 
149 
Müller-Freinfels, in a brief 
but positive review, also states that the work is 'without a doubt not 
a "sociology" in the specific scientific sense' and suggests that the 
volume marks Scheler's deep separation from Husserl and phenomenology. 
150 
The most thoroughgoing and perceptive examination of Scheler's sociology 
of knowledge - or at least of a section of it - is provided by Mannheim in 
his essay 'The Problem of a Sociology of Knowledge' published in 1925 
and therefore written with reference to Scheler's introduction to Versuche 
zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. 
151 As an indication of Scheler's 
lack of influence upon the development of the sociology of knowledge in 
Germany, it is worth noting that Mannheim's critique is the only detailed 
one to appear from within that tradition if we except Adler's reply to 
145 
Scheler's paper on science and social structure. Mannheim is the only 
contemporary critic who points to Scheler's Use of a schematic pheno- 
menology to justify Catholicism and 'Catholic concepts of "timeless- 
ness", "eternity", with new arguments'. Mannheim's major criticism 
of Scheler's position - and the preceding discussion would seem to con- 
firm it - is that his sociology of knowledge is rooted in a static dualism 
in which the determining factor, the base, is a 'supra-temporal, unchang- 
ing entity' . 
152 
In Mannheim's terrns)Scheler's sociology of knowledge 
cannot be dynamic since it commences with the absolute as its starting 
point. But perhaps his critique as a whole must be seen in the light of 
Mannheim's intention to counterpose the, for him, 'superior historicist 
position to Scheler's version of phenomenology. However, there are, 
as we shall see, many points of similarity in the positions adopted by 
Scheler and Mannheim in their construction of sociology of knowledge. 
It is perhaps not difficult to see why Scheler's sociology of knowledge 
was not taken up by other sociologists and developed in other directions. 
Firstly, it is impossible to extract Scheler's sociology of knowledge 
from his metaphysics and few sociologists have been at all convinced by 
Scheler's metaphysical position. Secondly, it is clear that Scheler 
himself seems only to have taken up the sociology of knowledge for a 
brief period of time, namely from 1921 to 1926 and then to have moved 
on to the development of a philosophical anthropology. His writings 
1' 
after 1926 - however brief they may have been, since Scheler died in 
1928 - do not betray a continuing interest in the sociology of knowledge. 
153 
Thirdly, those writers who might have seemed to find Scheler's sociology 
of knowledge appealing - and this is perhaps especially true of pheno- 
146 
menologists - did not take up aspects of Scheler's work until much 
later. The central notion of 'the relatively natural world-view' which 
has been taken up by Schutz as the world-taken-for-granted and been 
widened into the basic for a sociology of knowledge concerned with every- 
day knowledge by Berger and Luckmann was only developed much later 
in the post Second World War period. This is also true of Stark's attempt 
to construct a sociology of knowledge on the basis, at least in part, of 
Scheler's work. Schilpp's largely positive review of Scheler's sociology 
of knowledge in the United States in 1927 did not lead to any development 
of Scheler's ideas in American sociology. The next review of his work 
in 1942 by Becker and Dahlke was also positive to the extent that they 
concluded that 'we may regard Max Scheler as among the greatest ex- 
ponents of that substantive sociology of knowledge which is slowly winn- 
ing its way'. 
154 
ay' . 
154 However, it would be inaccurate to describe Scheler's 
sociology as 'substantive' in any meaningful sense and perhaps the authors 
were guilty of special pleading. 
This not to suggest that there was no development at all arising out of 
Scheler's. sociology of knowledge. The one positive exception was, 
in fact, the volume which Scheler himself assembled and published in 
1924 as Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens. As well as Scheler's 
11 " long introduction, the volume included articles divided into two areas in 
It 
much the same way as Scheler's own introduction had been, though with 
a different emphasis. In the first section were articles by, amongst 
others, Jerusalem, von Wiese and Honigsheim, dealing with the 'formal 
sociology of knowledge and epistemology' I. The second section com- 





'historical types of scientific co-operation' by Landsberg, Honigsheim, 
Plessner and others. It consisted largely of an examination of various 
types of thought (e. g. Honigsheim on the 'sociology of realistic and 
nominalistic thought') or on institutions concerned with intellectual 
activity (e. g. Plessner's 'Towards a sociology of modem research and 
its organisation in German universities'). In part, it might be said to 
comprise attempts to incorporate Geistesgeschichte within Wissens- 
soziologie. But, once again, this did not prove to be the start of a 
cumulative process for Scheler's version of a sociology of knowledge. 
Indeed the whole debate surrounding the sociology of knowledge ceased 
to centre around the issues which were central to Scheler's sociology of 
knowledge but shifted in the direction which Scheler had already briefly 
inaugurated, namely the study of ideology and Its relationship to the 
sociology of knowledge. The focus of attention at least from 1928 onwards - 
the year of the discussion surrounding Mannheim's paper on ! Competit- 
-ion as a Cultural Phenomenon' at the Sixth German Sociological 
Association Congress - lay in the direction of Mannheim's treatment of 
ideologies. 
It has already been suggested that a central aspect of Scheler's social 
theory is to account for the sense of alienation in malern society, as 
experienced especially by its elite. At the centre of this notion of 
alienation is the concept of the alienated mind and its powerlessness. 
Though, for example, Lenk's critique of Scheler is set largely within 
the context of this 'powerlessness of the mind' thesis, 
155 it is im- 
portant to remember that it is Scheler's own concept and not merely 
148 
some latter-day judgment upon his work. It was commented upon by 
some of his contemporaries. For instance, Siegfried Marck in a 
discussion largely taken up with Mannheim's sociology of knowledge156 
also criticises Scheler's version, particularly with reference to the 
powerlessness of the mind. There, Marck argues that in Scheler's work 
'the whole realm of the substantive study 
of value and the ontological metaphysics 
that is built upon it is divorced from any 
from any existential relativisation. Mat- 
erial values and their rank order as well 
as the ontological reality in which they 
are grounded are independent in their 
strict givenness (Sosein) from the 
transformations of existence (Dasein) 
According to the interpretation of 
Scheler's later philosophy, the mind is 
indeed powerless over against real trans- 
formations. It requires sublimated power 
factors in order to have an indirect i n- 
fl uence upon real events. 1 157 
a 
In other words, Marck is pointing to the significance of the powerlessness 
of the mind thesis for the preservation of essential values. But this 
powerlessness of the mind also has implication for human subjects them- 
selves. As Marck goes on to suggest, the mind 
'is also independent of these real events - 
as the realm of pure essentiality it is de- 
tached from existential determination. 
What-is typical of this sphere of Scheler's 
"mind" is his interpretation of it beyond 
the opposition of subject and object. To 
him the mind means a purely ontic struct- 
ure, Its apriori nature has nothing to. do 
with the formative human subject but 
rather rests upon the substance itself. 
... the whole world of historically con- 
ditioned qualities and purposes are re- 
lativised by him in contrast with the world 
of pure values itself. ' 158 
This dualism can only lead to the absence of any notion of interaction, 
of dialectic between mind and society. Ikact it is a manifestation of 
149 
one of the many dualisrns that permeates Scheler's philosophy : 
absolute/relative, essential/existential, ideal factors/real factors, 
superstructure/base, mind/life, elites/masses, etc. It is if the dynamic 
of intellectual activity and society are 'frozen and solidified in an attempt 
to preserve what Scheler takes to be the essential human values. But 
the price paid for this preservation is the absence of human actors, 
the absence of a dialectic between engagement and reflection, between 
knowledge and society. 
Lenk in fact suggests, with some justification, that Scheler's theory 
of history is permeated with an uneasy resignation before the permanent 
fall of higher values. It is a form of capitulation to alienation and is 
exemplified in the powerlessness of the mind thesis. In this thesis 
'thought has already alienated itself to 
such an extent that it can no longer re- 
cognise reification as being produced 
by human beings,. as socially necessary 
illusion but has hypostatized it into the 
essence of things themselves. ' 159 
The implications for a sociology of knowledge are that, since its cate- 
gories are derived from an ahistorical anthropology, it cannot itself 
analyse this alienation, it can only reflect it. For an attempt to 
analyse reification in a very different context we must turn to Lukäcs' 
,, early writings and especially 
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It is in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein that Lukacs presented a num- 
ber of problems that were central to the sociology of knowledge in Germany. 
However, that work is itself hardly a contribution to the sociology of know- 
ledge defined as an academic discipline and existing within the tradition of 
German sociology. Indeed, it is possible to extrapolate from it an impli- 
cit, incisive critique of the attempt to develop a sociology of knowledge 
within the framework of writers like Scheler and Mannheim. This critique 
remains implicit both in the sense that Lukäcs did not explicitly set out 
to provide a critique of the sociology of knowledge and because, when the 
work appeared in 1923, ' no substantive contributions to the sociology of 
knowledge had appeared. 
Lukatcs' study predates any major contribution to the sociology of knowledge 
in Germany. 1 Scheler's collection of contributions to the sociology of 
knowledge and his detailed outline of a framework for a sociology of know- 
ledge. Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens, appeared in 1924.2 
Mannheim's first essay to be substantially and specifically concerned with 
the sociology of knowledge, 'The Problems of a'Sociology of Knowledge', 
appeared in 1925.3 Many of the essays which make up Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein in fact predate any contribution to the sociology of know- 
ledge in Germany. 
0 
However, in order to demonstrate the Importance of Geschichte und Klassen- 
bewusstsein for the sociology of knowledge in Germany we need to show that 
It is either, to some extent, part of the German traditions of sociology and 
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philosophy or at least a reception of those traditions. We also need to 
show that the themes and problems it raises have relevance for the themes 
and central problematic of the sociology of knowledge in Germany. Further- 
more, it is necessary to show how Lukacs' work influenced the develop- 
ment of this tradition in Germany. This does not mean, however, that we 
have to demonstrate that Lukäcs' mode of presentation of the problems 
facing a sociology of knowledge was identical with that of later contributors 
nor does it mean that we have to subscribe to the view that Lukäcs himself 
solved all these problems successfully. Indeed; if we examine subse- 
quent contributions to the sociology of knowledge, we find thatjwith the 
exception of Mannheim, Lukacst work played a subterranean role within 
this discipline. 
In what sense, then, can we say that Lukäcs' Geschichte und Klassen- 
bewusstsein is part of, or a critique of, the German tradition in sociology 
and philosophy. Although Lukäcs himself saw the work as an attempt 'to 
understand the essence of Marx's method and to apply it correctly' and in 
particular to restore the importance of a historical dialectical interpretation 
of Marx's work that had disappeared in the revisionism and orthodoxy of the 
Second International, the actual content of LukäcsI work utilizes many ele- 
' ments of contemporary German sociology and philosophy. In particular, 
the work of Max Weber is central to Lukäcs' analysis of capitalist society 
and, to some extent, so are some of his methodological concepts. Weyem- 
bergh4 has pointed to the general relevance of Weber's sociology to Lukacs, 
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work and Maretsky5 has shown how much Weber's notion of capitalism and 
rationality is central to that of Lukäcs. Similarly, Fetscher6 has shown 
how Weber's methodological 'concept of "objective possibility" plays a 
central role in Lukäcs' theory of class consciousness' . In more general 
terms, Arato has argued that Lukäcs sought 'to reconstruct the critique of 
political economy in terms of a critique of total society, i. e. the critique 
of sociology, 
7. 
We hope to show that Lukäcs' understanding of the process 
of reification owes something at least to Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes. 
8 
Some aspects of this relationship between Si mme l and Lukäcs has been 
sketched out by Arato. 
9 
It is clearly possible to demonstrate Lukacs' central role, in the revival of 
a dialectical interpretation of Hegel and a restoration of the importance of 
Hegel Is dialectic for an understanding of Marx's work. 
10 
It is also apparent 
that the central chapter of his work tReification and the Consciousness of 
the Proletariat' is, in 1 ts critique of 'the antinomies of bourgeois thought', 
largely concerned with a critique of Kant. It is less often pointed out, 
however, in what way contemporary German philosophers influenced Lukäcs' 
work at certain points. This is true not only of Emil Lask, who is crucial 
for Lukacs' critique of Kant, but also true of the neo-Kantians and exp- 
ecially Heinrich Rickert who - despite Lukäcs' apparent abandonment of 
neo-Kantianism - Is important for the manner in which Lukäcs both des- 
tribes and separates the natural and the human sciences. 
If 
All this, of course, is to suggest that Lukäcs' work cannot merely be in- 
terpreted as a brilliant reinterpretation and reconstruction of Marx's work in 
abstraction. Indeed Lukacs himself many times acknowledged the signifi- 
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cance of strands of contemporary German sociology and philosophy for his in- 
creased interest in Marx. Lukacs later saw these influences as largely, 
thought not entirely, negative and many interpreters have suggested that 
Lukäcs' work is a critique of these sociological and philosophical trad- 
itions. However much that may be true, it may also be the case that many 
elements of those traditions were retained even in the very process of their 
critique. Lukäcs himself suggested in the Preface to the new edition of 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein in 1967 that his study of Marx commen- 
ced around 1908 and that 'it was Marx the "sociologist" that attracted me - 
and I saw him through spectacles tinged by Simmel and Max Weber. I 
resumed my studies during World War I, but, this time I was led to do so 
by my general philosophical interests and under the influence of Hegel 
rather than any contemporary thinkers. 
11 
Elsewhere, Lukäcs specifi- 
cally testifies to the importance of Simmel for his understanding of Marx, 
at least during his early acquaintance with his works. In a Hungarian intro- 
duction to some of his selected writings published in 1968, Lukäcs writes: 
'A properly scholarly use of my knowledge of Marx was greatly Influenced 
by the philosophy and sociology of Simmel, who was experimenting with 
the fitting in of certain aspects of Marxism into the German Geisteswissen- 
schaft Cent which [were] then in 
[their] early stages' 
12 
In a later preface 
to another collection of writings published in Budapest in 1970 and again 
commenting on his early interest in German philosophy, Lukacs states that 
'it Is hardly surprising that ... my starting 
" point could only be Kant. Nor can it be sur- 
prising that when I looked for the perspectives, 
foundations and methods of application of 
'philosophie generalisation, I found a theoretical 
guide in the German philosopher Simmel, not 
the least of reasons being that this approach 
brought me closer to Marx in certain respects, 
though in a distorted way' . 
13 
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Lukäcs in many ways viewed his relationship to some figures in German 
sociology in a positive manner as when he says that he does 'not at all regret 
today that I took my first lessons in social science from Simmel and Max 
Weber and not from Kautsky. I don't know whether one cannot even say 
today that this was a fortunate circumstance for my own development' . 
14 
Lukacs argues for the positive influence of Simmel even though in Die 
Zerstörung der Vernunft, he was extremely critical of Simmel Is attempt to 
'deepen historical materialism' , on the grounds that this 
'deepening of 
historical materialism in fact exists in the subsumption of its results under 
a Lebensphilosophie framework, that in this case appears as the insoluble 
opposition between subjectivity and cultural forms, between soul and mind. 
5 This opposition is, according to Simmel, the peculiar tragedy of culture' 
Again in the Hungarian 'Preface' referred to above, Lukäcs recalls his 
meeting with Ernst Bloch: 'The experience of meeting Bloch (1910) con- 
vinced me that philosophy in the classical sense was nevertheless possible'. 
16 
This classical sense of philosophy was perhaps revived for Lukäcs by his 
Intensive study of Hegel to which he alludes in his 1962 preface to The Theory 
of the Novel -- completed in the winter of 1914-15- by which time he 'had 
become a Hegelian' " 
17 
Indeed, Luk6cs claims that this work 'was the 
first work belonging to the Geisteswissenschaften school in which the findings 
of Hegelian philosophy were concretely applied to aesthethic problems', 
even though 'the author ... was not an exclusive or orthodox Hegelian' . 
18 
i 
In Luka6cs' aesthetic writings in this period one should also recall the im- 
portance of Max Weber's methodological writings and especially his notion 
of ideal types. As Hanak argues, works such as The Theory of the Novel 
'would be inconceivable without the influence of Max Weber. Weber's 
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"ideal types" permeate Lukäcs' aesthetic thought' . 
19 
Kettler and Markus 
have both pointed to the centrality of culture and cultural renewal in Lukäcs' 
early writings up to and including the period of his transition to Marxism. 
Markus, for example, argues that 'since the beginnings of his development 
as a thinker, the question of culture meant for Lukäcs the question of the 
possibility of a life free from alienation'. 
20 
The analysis of alienation 
that Lukacs utilized was not that of Marx but of the Lebensphilosophie trad- 
ition, and especially Simmel. This analysis already contained a critique 
of bourgeois culture but was itself caught up in other contradictions. Lukdcs' 
'road to Marx' lay in increasingly distancing himself from this Lebens- 
philosophie., Markus argues that this direction of Lukacs' work brought 
him closer to Kant: 
'The last major systematic work from the pre- 
Marxist period, the Asthetik of 1916-18, 
exhibits clearly and decisively a Kantian 
character - in the spirit of a very distinctive, 
extremely dualistic interpretation of Kant. 
This brought Lukdcs himself to the point at 
which, in the first chapter of this work, he 
explicitly concerned himself with the conn- 
ection between his viewpoint as a whole and 
that of Rickert and Lask. ' 
21 
It is this late work - comprising four complete chapters and one incomplete - 
that Lukacs was considering for submission as a Habilitationschrift in 
Heidelberg as late as May 1918, with Rickert and Maier as assessors. 
22 
This did not in fact take place but it does testify to the centrality of Lukäcs' 
philosophical concerns in Germany as late as May 1918. 
.r 
This very brief outline of LükäcsI connections with important strands of 
German sociology and philosophy - some of which will be taken up in detail 
later in this chapter - is not meant to suggest that there exists some break, 
f1 
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some rupture in Lukacs' work which enables us to speak of a young and a 
mature Lukafcs, a non-Marxist and a Marxist Lukcs. As Breines agrues, 
'while Lukäcs' turn to Marxism in 1918-19 
stands as a watershed of his career, the 
pre-Marxist phase that preceded it is in- 
extricably linked to the Marxism that 
followed. It can also be argued ... 
that the whole matter can be looked at 
in the other direction, which reveals that 
Lukäcs' Marxism is organically bound 
up with the pre-Marxist phase of his work. '23 
Indeed, we might go further and suggest that this continuation of his earlier 
concerns and modes of formulation of problems gives Lukäcs' Geschichte 
und Klassenbewusstsein, in part, its distinctive character and in its fusion 
of these concerns with an attempt to understand and interpret Marx presents 
him with the difficulties that are evident in his analysis. 
The second misunderstanding of the previous brief outline of Lukäcs' conn- 
ections with German sociology and philosophy is the thesis that Lukäcs' 
work owes its origins solely to these German traditions and that the Hungar- 
! an context is irrelevant. Whilst the intention has been to suggest that 
Lukaa"cs' work is, in important respects, grounded in these traditions, it 
should not be forgotten that the context of this assimilation was not merely 
study in Berlin under Simmel or with Weber, Rickert and Lask In Heidelberg 
but also the cultural milieu in Budapest in the pre. -and First World War 
period. This context has been particularly well illuminated by Kettler's 
study which shows not merely Lukdcs' concerns in Budapest but also - and 
4 
this is important for a succeeding chapter - his relationship with Mannheim 
in Budapest intellectual circles. 
24 
Kettler not only Illustrates the contin- 
uity of Lukäcs' concern with culture - in 1919 during the Hungarian Revol- 
ution, LukErcs could still argue that 'politics is merely a means, culture is 
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the goal 1. and that the political standpoint . 
tmay only be a filter but not 
the sole source'25 - but he also shows that there does not exist a complete 
radical break with the past when Lukäcs entered the Communist Party in 
December 1918. One should also add that specifically Hungarian in- 
fluences were important to Lukäcs, especially his relationship with Ady, 
Szabo and Baläzs. 
26 
The second problem associated with arguing that Geschichte und Klassen- 
bewusstsein is important for the German tradition in the sociology of know- 
ledge is how to demonstrate that the themes and problems that it raises 
are relevant for those examined by the sociology of knowledge. Some 
commentators would indeed reduce the whole discussion of ideology which 
is at the centre of Lukäcs' work to the role of an historical antecedent to 
the sociology of knowledge. Werner Stark, for example, argues that 
the doctrine of ideology is no more than an 
historical antecedent of the sociology of 
knowledge; its centre of Interest lies in a 
different level of mental life; it is also 
[different in its nature because it is a 
psychological rather than a sociolgical 
discipline; the sooner the traditional 
connection of the two studies is severed 
the better it will be for both of them. ' 
21 
Aron's judgment is more negative - though he does credit Lukäcs with 
being 'more profound than most other Marxists' - when he argues that 
'Marxism considered as a sociology of knowledge is perhaps naively dog- 
rnatic in its outright condemnation of bourgeois ideology and its justjfi- 
f 
cation of proletarian ideas. '28 We might add here that neither Stark nor 
Aron would appear to have understood the nature of Lukäcs I work - the 
critique of ideology is not a psychological activity, nor is it concerned with 
moral 'condemnation' and moral 'justification' of 'ideas' . If we can - 
criticize the level of understanding of Marx's work, for example, that is 
I 
to be found in the writers on the sociology of knowledge in Germany in the 
Weimar Republic then such criticism must also be levelled at many later 
commentators who at least have had the chance of access to a whole range 
of Marx's writings that were unavailable to earlier writers. 
We might restate this problem in a different manner. Why is it that 
central figures in the sociology of knowledge such as Mannheim felt com- 
pelted to confront LukIcs' work - or at least their interpretation of it? 
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One answer might be that the sociology of knowledge itself grows out of the 
critique of ideology. This is certainly the assumption that lies behind 
Mannheim's account of the transition from the study of ideology to the sociol- 
ogy of knowledge, from an engaged critique to a neutral academic discipline, 
from an evaluative to a non-evaluative concept of ideology. Scheler, as 
we have seen, seems to make. great use of a very wide base-superstructure 
dichotomy which, though he did not derive it from Lukäcs, he certainly 
advanced as a counter to a mechanistic interpretation of historical material- 
ism. But it is doubtful whether it is possible to argue that the sociology 
of knowledge grew out of the critique of ideology. As Lenk correctly re- 
marks, it is only the most complete misunderstanding of Marx's theory that 
could have led contemporaries to argue that Mannheim's sociology of know- 
ledge was 'Marx's theory in the garb of bourgeois science'. 
29 
Thus, 
it is neither accurate to state that the critique of ideology does or should have 
nothing to do with the sociology of knowledge nor that the latter simply grew 
out of the former. In Lukäcs' case, there is considerable doubt as to 
whether his orientation to the problems raised in the sociology of knowledge 
was taken up in the positive sense of developing that tradition. Lieber argues 
... '. 
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that Lukacs' work, apart from its reception by Marxist writers, hardly 
had any effect upon the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany. 
suggests that if 
'one examines . .. the controversies surrounding 
the sociology of knowledge in the nineteen twen- 
ti es as to its relation to Lukäcs and its capacity 
to make his contributions to the problem of reified 
consciousness and class consciousness fruitful 
for the discussion of the problem of ideology, then 
one must state that such a confrontation with LukScs 
was reduced to a few references, mostly only in foot- 
notes. This means that Lukacs' work was hardly of 
importance for the discussion of the sociology of 
knowledge. The understanding of Marxism remained 
fixed in what was taken to be, and what had gained 
influence as, mostly in the vulgar Marxist garb, 
the historical-materialistic or Marxist "world-view". X30 
He 
Part of this 'world-view' was, of course, the vulgar Marxist base-super- 
structure relationship interpreted in an extremely mechanistic manner. 
Lieber's view, however, is not unchallenged. It is certainly true that 
references to Lukäcs' work by contributors to the sociology of knowledge 
remain few and often only in footnotes. However, it has been argued by 
Huaco that Mannheim's discussion of ideology has affinities to that pre- 
sented by Lukäcs. 
31 
Huaco states that 'it is fairly easy for anyone to 
verify that, at least at a formal level, the argument presented by Mannheim 
cs'. 
32 
is almost a mirror image of the earlier argument developed by Lukä01 
Kettler, in a more detailed article suggested that Lukäcs' Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein was 'a work of decisive importance for Mannheim's 
I development ... 
for its influential argument that the cultural "solution" 
of the moral philosophic problems presupposes a social frame of reference 
and action, and for its provision of such a framework' . 
33 
Kettler, referr- 
ing to an unpublished essay by Mannheim, 'Eino soziologische Theorie der 
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Kultur und ihrer Erkennbarkeit', suggests that 'it represents Mannheim's 
effort to meet the challenge of Lukäcs' History and Class Consciousness and 
concludes that 'after 1923, and at least until 1930, Mannheim no longer 
claimed a confident superiority to Marxism. ' 
34 
Even though Mannheim's 
references to Lukäcs may only be in note form they are usually positive as 
when in his 'Historismus' article published in 1924 he refers to the attempts 
to construct a rational dialectic and states that 'the most profound and 
significant of all these attempts is probably that of George Lukagcs' . 
35 
These unpublished works of Mannheim and his relationship to Lukäcs will 
be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. 
We may conclude, therefore, that whilst Lukacs' work did not necessarily 
provide the 'paradigm' for other discussions of the problem of ideology 
and whilst his work was often only referenced by writers on the sociology of 
knowledga we can say that, at. least in Mannheim's case, Lukäcs' position 
was one which had to be seriously confronted, even though not on the terms 
or in the framework established by Lukäcs. We would also concur with 
Lieber's view that almost all the writers on the sociology of knowledge who 
confronted the Marxist critique of ideology did not in fact confront Marx's 
work but a crude version of mechanistic materialism which Lukäcs himself 
was at pains to attack. 
36 
0 
Yet In order to show that the themes and problems raised by Lukäcs' account 
of class consciousness, reification and the critique of ideology are relevant 
for the sociology of knowledge, it is clearly necessary to develop Lukäcs' 
own position. LukIcs' own intentions were not to develop a sociology of 
knowledge but to reconstruct Marx's dialectical method of understanding 
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society. Even though the present study is concerned with the develop- 
ment of the socidogy of knowledge and, in this instance, with Lukäcs' 
relationship to it, it must not be forgotten that Lukäcs' work stands in its 
own right as a Marxist attempt to reconstruct the dialectical method and, 
together with Korsch's Marxismum und Philosophie, to combat the, very 
same vulgar Marxism that was the focus of attention in the sociology of 
knowledge. Lukäcs' work stands, again with Korsch's work, as a de- 
tailed attempt to extend the critique of-ideology to Marxism itself. 
37 
Arato 
argues that whereas Marx's central concern was. the critique of political 
economy, Lukäcs' was, , 
'the critique of sociology, i. e. the critique of 
the totality of capitalist society and the self- 
critique of Marxism. The critique of sociol- 
ogy attempted to take the double form of 
Anerkennung (recognition) and Aufhebung 
(overcoming) 
... The self-critique of Marx- 
ism was a more difficult task for Lukafcs, and 
the incompleteness of this self-critique is a 
clue to many of the theoretical failures of 
History and Class Consciousness. 1 38 
Arato seems to imply that the critique of sociology was more successful 
than the self-critique of Marxism. Yet it can be argued that Lukacs did 
not 'overcome' that tradition which was the object of his critique but re- 
mained within many of its basic assumptions. For this reason alone, 
Lukäcs' relationship to German sociology is an ambiguous one. 
A further consequence of examining Lukäcst work within the terms of his 
own concerns is to reveal, perhaps, the sharp differences that exist be- 
tween the critique of ideology and the sociology of knowledge. Writers 
within the Frankfurt School tradition, for example, have always drawn a 
sharp dividing line between the critique of ideology and the sociology of 
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knowledge and have, perhaps for this reason, never examined Lukäcs' 
work in the light of the sociology of knowledge but rather, have drawn a 
demarcation line between the two. Thus, for instance, Kurt Lenk - who 
owes much to the Frankfurt School tradition - in his investigation of the 
reception of Marx's critique of ideology within the sociology of knowledge 
in Germany makes scant reference to Lukäcs, presumably on the grounds 
that he does not belong to this tradition. 
39 
Whilst this is true, it remains 
interesting to compare Lukadcs' reception of Marx's critique of ideology 
with that of writers in the sociology of knowledge tradition. Such an in- 
vestigation would also reveal the divergencies and affinities between Lukýcs' 
position and that of the Frankfurt - School, though this is not our central 
concern here. Furthermore, Lukafcs' work provided perhaps the most im- 
portent basis, together with that of Korsch and perhaps Lewalter, for a 
critique of the German tradition in the sociology of knowledge and for an 
understanding of the most developed Marxist critique of ideology. It is 
interesting to examine how far Lukäcs' work was applied in this direction, 
not by Lukcs himself, but by other writers who confronted the sociology of 
knowledge and especially the account of ideology provided by sociologists 
sudh as Scheler and Mannheim. In this context, and on one level at 
least, what is at issue is whether interpreters are correct in attempting to 
i 
show Luka5cs! - importance as an influence of Mannheim, in order perhaps 
to provide a more Marxist interpretation of Mannheim's work, or whether they 
are justified in distancing Luk(cs from Mannheim, from the German sociol- 
ogy of knowledge tradition and from German sociology as such in order to 
establish a sharp demarcation between Lukdcs' critique of ideology and 
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter case, it is all too easy 
to lose sight of the fact that even though in no sense does Lukäcs intend to 
l; I 
111 
develop a sociology of knowledge, his treatment of the nature of the social 
determination of thought, the process of reification, the development of 
class consciousness nonetheless deals with issues that are central to the 
sociology of knowledge. In so far as Luka9cs' Geschichte und Klassen- 
bewusstsein presents the major attempt in the early part of this century to 
develop Marx's critique of ideology and since most writers on the sociology 
of knowledge were at some time necessarily concerned with the issues raised 
by such a critique, we may concur with Lenk that 'the central theme of the 
sociology of knowledge, the determination of respective relations between 
mental formations and social structures, was inconceivable without Marx's 
critique of ideology' . 
40 
This is not to suggest - and this was emphasized 
earlier - that the sociology of knowledge grew out of Marx's critique of 
ideology or was an extension of it. Rather, the sociology of knowledge 
had other roots which make its interpretation of the relationship between 
mental forms and social structure distinctive. 
41 
Nonetheless, some of 
the themes which that discipline took up, however differently they were 
treated, were also present in Marx's critique of ideology and in Lukäcs' ex- 
tension of that critique. In the strict sense, it is only Lukäcs' critique 
of ideology that is inconceivable without that of Marx. The sociology of 
knowledge, when it dealt with similar issues, was primarily concerned with 
opposing a vulgar Marxist position to which writers in that tradition them- 
selves sometimes adhered. 
4 
In the simplest terms, then, what were the themes which Lukäcs developed 
that are relevant for the sociology of knowledge? At the centre of Lukäcs' 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein lies the problem of how it Is that we are 
able to grasp, to know and to understand social reality. For Lukäcs, social 
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reality is not some objectively given body of facts to which forms of thought 
may be related but rather is itself mediated by forms of consciousness. 
That is, the immediate apprehension of social reality in no way implies 
the apprehension of some 'true' reality but, on the contrary, usually im- 
plies false consciousness, an illusory apprehension of that reality. Stated 
simply, then, Lukäcs' problem is how to examine this reified reality and 
this false consciousness and how to overcome it. This necessarily leads 
Lukäcs to examine the process of the generation of ideologies, false con- 
sciousness, class consciousness and reification. It leads him to an 
attempt to delineate that process which we already know from Marx's 
I 
writings to be the critique of ideology, but not merely a critique of ideology 
as a mode of apprehension of the world and its relationship to human en- 
gagement in the world but a critique of that reality which ideology purports 
to comprehend. In Marx's work, for instance, the critique of political 
economy is not merely a critique of the theories of political economists 
but, at the same time, a critique of that reality which their theories purport 
to explain. In Lukäcs' work, then, we must investigate what it is that 
he criticises and what is the nature of the reality that is subjected to cri- 
tique. In other words, is Luka00 cs' notion of capitalism and his conception 
of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat identical with those of Marx? Does 
philosophy and sociology play the same role in Lukäcs' critique of ideology 
that political economy plays in Marx's critique? 
9 
In the course of his critique of bourgeois ideology, Lukäcs confronts the 
problem of how social classes perceive social reality. Specifically, 
Lukäcs examines how social reality manifests itself in the class conscious- 
ness of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In the course of such an in- 
f. I' l 
. 11 vestigation, Lukäcs discusses how we may study class consciousness and 
through which central relationships in these groups is social reality grasped. 
and transmitted. If the immediate identity of the subject and object of 
consciousness is rejected, as is the case in Lukäcs' work, then the criti- 
quo of ideology must examine how limitations and illusions emerge in 
various modes of grasping social reality. Do specific modes and methods 
of apprehending social reality provide objective knowledge of society? For 
Lukäcs this involves an examination of the origins and relationship between 
alienation, reification and ideology. The task of any critique of ideology, 
however, must always be directed towards not merely an account of how 
that ideology comes about but how human beings are able to be emancipated 
from such ideology. For Lukäcs this can only take place within the con- 
text of conscious, political activity. 
I 
If the above sketch, in a crude, form, represents some of the central issues 
that Lukacs' examination of the critique of ideology deals with, then we 
may add that similar themes are dealt with, in a very different manner, by 
writers in the sociology of knowledge, especially where that discipline con- 
corns itself with an examination of ideology. Yet other writers did not 
conceive this diccussion within such an explicitly political dimension as 
did Lukäcs, although, as an examination of Scheler's and Mannheim's 
writings reveals, the political dimension is not totally absent from their 
work either. What is distinctive about Lukäcs' work is the mode of con- 
ceptusiising the problems which he faces. The notions and configurations 
of such concepts as alienation, reification, objective possibility in relat- 
ion to class consciousness, the subject-object dialectic, and the relation- 




a central part of any discussion of Lukäcs' critique of ideology. However, 
in the light of the preceding remarks on Lukäcs relationship to some German 
traditions in sociology and philosophy, we must first examine the role that 
such conceptions play in Lukäcs' work prior to the publication of Geschichte 
und Klassenbewusstsein in 1923. Such a study will enable us to invest- 
igate how far Lukäcs' major work in this period represents a break with 
his earlier writings and to draw out the implications of this continuity or 
break for an understanding of Geschichte und Kiassenbewu'sstsein. 
Our study of Lukäcs' work, therefore, proceeds in the following manner. 
Lukäcs' early writings are examined in order to examine some of the assum- 
ptions that have already been made with regard to his relationship to certain 
strands of German sociology and philosophy and to throw some light upon 
how far such traditions are still important in Lukäcs' major work of this 
period. Secondly, since Lukäcs ascribes to Geschichte und Klassenbewusst- 
sein a central methodological role, some of the methodological problems 
that he raises for a critique of ideology will be investigated. Lukäcs' do- 
lineation of the notion of class consciousness must be studied in detail in 
the light of his use of the concept of objective possiblity. Further, an im- 
portant section of the present investigation must be a critical examination 
of Lukacs' notion of reification, its origins and its areas of application. The 
manner in which Lukäcs poses the problem of how to overcome reification 
must also be a central concern. Finally, the reception of Lukäcs' Geschi- 
chte und Klassenbewusstsein within the sociology of knowledge is examined. 
1'I 
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t has al ready been pointed out that Lukacs' early work was concerned with 
the problem of culture largely within the context of a contemporary frame- 
work of Lebensphilosophie. Further, we have already seen that Scheler 
conceived his sociology of knowledge within the context of a wider, and 
more significant in Scheler's eyes, sociology of culture. In Mannheim's 
case, it can also be shown that his central early concerns were with the 
understanding of cultural expressions and with the search for modes of cul- 
tural renewal that he shared, in part, with Lukäcs. 
42 
However, such 
apparent affinities between the three writers arise out of an abstract exam- 
ination of the notion of 'culture' and hides important differences between 
them. It is necessary to examine Lukäcs' early work not only in order to 
define such differences but - and more importantly - because these early 
writings have a direct bearing upon. an understanding and interpretation of 
Lukäcs' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. One may read this major 
work as a Marxist study of ideology and then use that understanding in 
order to retrace the Marxist standpoint inherent in Lukäcs' earlier writings 
on the problems of culture. Or, one may read his early writings in order 
to show that the non-Marxist elements are retained in Lukäcs' later work, 
especially Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. In the former case, we 
see Lukäcs pressing beyond the interpretations of,. say, Weber and Simmel, 
whilst in the latter case, the basic flaws in Lukäcs' major work in this 
0 period are traced back to Lebensphilosophie and Simmel. The former In- 






latter of Coletti 
46 
and Steadman-Jones. 
47 For both positions, however, 
the understanding of Lukäcs' early writings is central to their subsequent 
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overall interpretation of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. 
There are, of course, other pitfalls associated with readings of the 'early' 
and the 'later' Lukäcs. As a recent article on the relevance of Lukäcs 
early work for an understanding of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein 
states it, 
'there is a tendency to view Lukacs' relation- 
ship to his neo-Kantian past either in terms 
of a complete break or in terms of a contin- 
uance of a "romantic Marxism" throughout 
his life. Beth fail to appreciate the specific 
contribution which Lukäcs makes the former 
by neglecting the way in which his later posi- 
tion is a refinement of an already critical 
attitude towards bourgeois society ..., 
the latter by devouring both Lukäcs and neo- 
Kantianism under the ready-made terms 
i "romanticism" or "historicism" and by drown - 
ing the specific theoretical achievements of 
both in a sea of superficial parallels. ' 48 
Such interpretations can only be avoided if one undertakes a careful study 
of Lukäcs' earlier writings and Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Fortun- 
ately, this work of reinterpretation has recently been undertaken from a 
number of different directions, 
49 
but all of them take account of the early 
works of Lukäcs', some of which have only recently been published. 
50 
These 
are referred to in the examination of Lukäcs' early writings that follows. 
As Kammler argues, we may discern three intentions in Lukäcs' writings 
on aesthetics and his early Marxist writings on culture. Lukäcs' early 
work is orientated towards 'a historical-sociological analysis especially 
' of literary forms and problemst. 
51 
This sociological analysis is most 
evident in the essay 'Zur Soziologie des modernen Dramas' which, though 
published in 1914 in German, was Lukäcs' own translation of a study in 
Hungarian that had been completed in the winter of 1908-9.52 This orien- 
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tation can be seen, more briefly, in a review of a volume in a series 
edited by Alfred Weber. In this review, entitled 'Zum Wesen und zur 
Methode der Kultursoziologie'., Lukacs discusses some aspects of a sociol- 
ogy of culture. 
53 
It is also apparent in an early article on the methodology 
of the study of Literature, now recently translated into German. 
54 
The most 
concrete and applied version of this sociological -historical -intention is The 
55 
Theory of the Novel, written in 1914-15 and published in book form in 1920. 
A second fundamental intention in Lul a6cs' early writings is the development 
of the 'basic structures of a philosophy of art with the intention of securing 
a philosophy of life, a world view'. 
56 
This interest is manifested in The 
Soul and its Forms 
5 
in Lukäcs' then unpublished Heidelberg writings on 
aesthetics 
58 
and in the important article 'Die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in 
der Aesthetik' published in 1918.59 The third i nterest,. and. one which cannot 
be separated from these other two orientations,, is Lukäcs' concern for a cul- 
tural renewal in bourgeois society. This problem is at the centre of the 
1917-18 discussion in the 'Szellemkek' group in Budapest. of which Lukäcs 
was a member,. These discussions and their relationship to the work of 
Lukäcs and. Mannheim are discussed in Kettler's Marxismus und Kultur 
60 
and in Kammler's study referred to above. 
61 
This interest Is continued in 
Lukacs' carly Marxist writings and is typified by his article 'Alts Kultur und 
neue Kultur' published In 1920.62 It is these three intentions or interests 
that will be examined in order to throw Iight upon th development of Lukäcs' 
thought and its central categories. 
I 
At the very start of his essay on modern drama, Lukäcs recognises that 
'all that is sociological in the dramatic form only determines the possibility 
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of the realisation of the aesthetic value but not this value itself. How 
value and value realisation are connected and how far historical-sociological 
phenomena are important for the structure of value itself' 
63 
Lukäcs hopes 
to consider in other works. This neo-Kantian and Lebensphilosophie separ- 
ation of the social-historical sphere from the sphere of spiritual ideal values 
is characteristic of Lukäcs' early works and reflects the persistent influence 
of writers like Simmel and the neo-Kantian tradition. This influence is 
apparent throughout this essay. Lukacs takes modern drama to be a 'symbol 
of the whole of bourgeois culture' and its crisis:. 'every drama is bourgeois 
because the forms of culture in modern life are bourgois and because the 
forms of every expression of Ii fe are today determined by these cultural forms ' 
64 
This crisis lies in the powerlessness of the individual and his values against 
the pure facticity of what exists. Kammler, in this context, points to a 
0 
certain affinity with Scheler's view that the 'ideal factors' are fundamentally 
powerless against the 'real factors' once this dualism accepts no possibility 
of mediation. 
65 
With reference to this power of the existent, Lukäcs argues 
that it is 'not only that every idea and every theory is powerless when con- 
. fronted with its power [that of 'the existent, of naked existence' D. F. : 
I 
rather, they immediately come under the domination of this unformulatable 
law ... from the moment when 
they are expressed' "66 This separation 
and alienation of ideas and values when confronted with the existent, this 
separation of man and history, theory and practice, is embodied for Lukäcs 
in the dominant values in bourgeois culture - Individualism and historicism. 
These values reflect this dualism, the one by emphasizing an individualism 
that cannot be realised, the other by emphasizing the unreal i zabi li ty of in- 
dividualism. More concretely expressed, this crisis, this 'problem of life' 
arises out of the relationship between the individual and his culture and the 
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economic structure of a capitalist society. In a remarkable passage, 
L. ukäcs highlights the way in which individualism has become a 'problem of 
life'. This problematic Iies in forms of alienation: 
'This new life' of modern capitalism has made 
everything "uniform" - clothing, transport, "the 
diverse forms of activity" 'viewed from the 
workers' standpoint' have become 'increasingly 
similar (bureaucracy, industrial machine labour); 
education, the experiences of childhood become 
i ncreasingly similar (the influence and ever in- 
creasing importance of the metropolis) etc. ' 
67 
Lukadcs, like Si mme l, also refers to the uniformity of the soldier's occu- 
pation compared with earlier times. Along with this uniformity, and 
parallel to it, is the 'objectification of life' [Versachlichung des Lebens: 
'From the standpoint of the individual, the 
essence of the modern division of labour is 
perhaps that it makes work independent of 
the always irrational, thus only qualitatively 
determi nablecapacities of the worker and 
places it under objective, goal-oriented 
criteria that lie outside his personality and 
have no relationship to it. The major econ- 
omic tendency of capitalism is this same 
objectification of production, its separation 
from the personality of the producers. By 
means of the capitalist economy, an objective 
abstraction - capital - becomes the real 
producer even though it hardly stands in an 
organic connection to the personality of those 
who happen to own it; indeed, it becomes 
increasingly superfluous whether the owners 68 
are persons at alI (joint stock companies). 
This loss of relationship between the individual and his activity also applies 
to modern scientific methods which become 'increasingly objective and im- 
personal 1. This applies to work as a whole which 'takes on a specific, 
It 
objective life over against the individual character of the human being, so 
that he is forced to express himself in some form other than in what he does 
69 
A further consequence is that the relationship between people becomes in- 
creasingly impersonal. Commenting on part of the passage quoted above, 
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Breines writes that 'the links between Lukacs' standpoint here and the 
theory of alienation developed by Marx ... are striking'. 
70 
at is, 
in fact, more striking is that the whole of this passage can be drawn from 
sections of Simmel's Philosophy of Money, 
71 
a book which is deeply 
critical of Marx and one whose political economy probably has its origins 
not in Marx but in writers like Schmoller, on the one hand, and marginal 
utility theory, on the other. 
72 
Thus, one should not be surprised, as Breines 
is, that Lukäcs 'saw absolutely no revolutionary prospects in the objecti- 
fication of labour in capitalist society' . If there is an anticipation of 
Lukäcs' 
later Marxism in these passages on modern drama, then this anticipation 
derives from Simmel who, as has been pointed out several times, did not 
have a detailed knowledge of Marx when compared with some of his con- 
temporaries such as Ttiinnes. 
73 
Such passages do, however, testify to 
the profound influence which Simmel's*Philosophy of Money, with its theory 
of reification and alienation has upon Lukäcs. Simmel's Influence Is also 
manifested in Lukäcs' treatment of forms of life and cultural forms. As 
Kammier comments, "'life" and "form" solidify in the formal typology of 
two "groups of forms"'. The concept of form derived from Simmel is one 
which rules out the historical dimension and reduces the social historical 
process to an ontological level. 
74 
The second intention that is manifested in Lukäcs' early writings - the 
search for a new world-view, a philosophy of life - is closely connected with 
a 
the themes raised in the discussion of modern drama. In other writings in 
the same period, Lukacs seeks to show how the ideal spheres of values, the 
realm of the essential, can be identified in the work of art. Such value and 
such essentiality cannot, as we have seen, arise out of the act of material 
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production. Nor can they arise out of the reified, uniform life of modern 
society. That life is for Lukäcs, as for Simmel, fragmentary. 
75 
For 
Lukäcs, in 'The Metaphysics of Tragedy', 
'Ii fe 'is an anarchy of Ii ght and dark : nothing 
is ever completely fulfilled in life, nothing 
ever quite ends; new confusing voices always 
mingle with the chorus of those that have 
been heard before. Everything flows, every- 
thing merges into another thing, and the mix- 
ture is uncontrolled and impure; everything is 
destroyed, everything is smashed, nothing 
ever flowers into real life. ' 76 
The problem, then, is how 'true Ii fe' and structures of meaning can emerge 
out of this chaos. LukäcsI answer is in terms of the (form! of a work of 
art: 'Form is the highest judge of life ..., Form is the only pure re- 
velation of pure experience, but just for that reason it will always stubborn- 
ly refuse to be imposed on anything that is oppressive or unclear' . 
77 This 
pure manifestation of life-experience, of"Erlebnisse, is also the bearer of 
values: 'Form is the highest judge of life. Form-giving is a judging force, 
an ethic; there is a value-judgment in everything that has been given form. 
Every kind of form-giving, every literary form, is a step in the hierarchy 
of life-possibilities'. 
78 
This metaphysic of forms is conceived of. as 
lying quite outside historical social reality. Its basis lies in a 'Kantian- 
ism that has been reworked by Lebensphilosophie'. Form and ideal values 
can only be realised over against and in opposition to an objective reality; 
79 
they remain, as Kammler argues, an 'abstraction of the subject from reality'. 
Such a position led Lukäcs to expouse various forms of mysticism in the 
J 
period around 1912. - 
But, as Kammler argues, Lukäcs' way out of this mysticism and, in part, 
his retreat from Lebensphilosophie lay In his study of Hegel, a stLidy that, on 
1 62 
a more concrete level, produced The Theory of the Novel and, at the abstract 
level, 'Die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in der Aesthetik'. In The Theory of 
the Novel, this enabled Lukaacs to develop a historical perspective and, at 
least in terms of this historical philosophical conception, to relate forms 
dialectically to history. The notion of form also moves further away from 
that developed by Si mme l and from its relationship to the metaphysics of 
Lebensphilosophie towards a methodologically more secure development of 
Weber's concept of ideal type. 
In The Theory of the Novel, the themes that Lukäcs raised in his early work 
again appear but with a heightened degree of concretion. Lukäcs contrasts 
the epic and the novel as two representative forms of very different societies. 
Whereas the epic is able to conceive of the individual and society as a total- 
ity, this is no longer possible in the novel in an age of total alienation. In- 
stead, the novel is an expression of 'the transcendental homelessness of 
man'. Again the conception of the tragic separations of the individual and 
society comes to the fore but now in a more historical form. In modern 
society it is no longer possible to posit an immediate totality of the Indivi- 
dual and society. Alienation takes on the form of alienation from nature as 
a result of man being alienated from second nature, that is the society he 
has created. Thus, 'estrangement from nature (the first nature) ... is 
only a projection of man's experience of his self-made environment as a 
prison instead of as a parental home' . 
80 
This second nature is 
i 
'the world of convention, a world from whose 
all-embracing power only the innermost 
. recesses of the soul are exempt, a world 
which is present everywhere in a multi- 
plicity of forms too complex for understand- 
Ing ... it Is a second nature, and, like 
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first nature, it is determinable only as the 
embodiment of recognised but senseless 
necessities and therefore it is incompre- 81 
hensible, unknowable in its real substance. ' 
This conceptualisation- of a first and second nature is derived from Hegel 
but, as Kammler points out, the function of these concepts is altered by 
Lukäcs. Kammler argues that 
'for Hegel, the "second nature" of societal 
forms is not, as is the first nature a con- 
ceptiess necessity estranged from meaning 
but rather it is ultimately realised reason, 
objective spirit. Lukäcs certainly revises 
the Hegelian reconciliation. of subject and 
object, man and society, but he does not 
yet connect it with Marx's transformation 
of the problem into one of the social praxis 
of human beings. ' 82 
One should add that, in a sense, Lukäcs' revision of Hegel Is notions is in 
the direction of a return to a Kantian conception of the unknowable thing-in- 
itself - itself the subject of a detailed critique in the chapter on reification 
in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. One should also add that the prob- 
lem of alienation as conceived by Lukäcs is not yet the remarkable social 
conception of estrangement rooted in labour that is found in Hegel Is 
Phenomenology of Mind in his discussion of the master-slave dialectic and 
the unhappy consciousness. The typology of novel forms which constitutes 
the second part of The Theory of the Novel not only recalls the Weberian use 
of ideal types - and of alI Lukäcs' work, Weber saw this as the embodiment 
of what could be achieved by the human sciences - but in its basis in diverse 
world-views it also recalls the abstract typology of world views that Dilthey 
l 
uses to characterise diverse metaphysical positions. Lukäcs himself later 
characterised the work as being a product of his 'youthful enthusiasm for the 
work of Dilthey, Simmel and Max Weber'. 
83 
But Lukäcs does certainly 
point to the introduction of the Hegelian notion of totality and 'the historic- 
84 
isation of aesthetic categories' . 
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It is in Lukäcs' later essay 'Die Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in der Aesthetik', 
however, that the notion of totality comes to the fore. This article, Lukäcs 
states in a note to its title, 'presupposes a phenomenology of creative and 
receptive behaviour' but the notion of phenomenology it uses 'should be 
understood more in the sense of that of Hegel rather than Husserl' . 
85 
Lukäcs 
here constructs an aesthetic model in which the artist shapes and creates 
an autonomous world microcosm with its own laws and the work of art 
generates a harmony of subject and object, form and content. The eternal 
shaping of the unending creative process of the artist reaches its highest 
manifestations in the subject-object relationship. In the -strict sense, that 
is, in the sense in which in a subject-object relationship neither pole is 
negated, a subject-object relationship only exists in the aesthetic sphere: 
the aesthetic subject merely stands, in the strict sense of this sphere, 
over against an object, the work of art: the subject himself is, in the same 
strict sense, a pure and immediately experiencing subject'. 
86 
Only the work 
of art is adequate to this subject and the work of art is 'a microcosm' ; It 
possesses a 'cosmic character' ; it is 'a totality that is autonomous, com- 
plete and self-sufficient' . 
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One important implication of this article is 
that this microcosm, this totality that is the work of art is only possible for 
a subject that is also a totality. However ahistorical and abstract this con- 
ception may be, it constitutes an important aesthetic model that Lukäcs trans- 
f 
poses into the political sphere in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein when 
he socks to identify the identical subject and object of history, the identity 
of which secures autonomy for its standpoint. In this earlier work, it is 
the artist and the work of art that constitute a totality. 
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The affinities with Hegel Is conception of totality are well illustrated by 
Pascal's characterisation of Hegel Is notion of totality in his Aesthetik. 
There, 
'Hegel distinguishes art from science, from 
rational understanding, by saying that art 
does not analyse, but grasps reality "in its 
living existence in the particular"; art dwells 
"in the substantial entity" that analysis has 
not broken. up. This complex entity of the 
work of art he calls a "Totalität", an essential 
feature of which is its completedness) so that 
he repeatedly speaks of it as a "total and free 
whole", with the "independence", or self- 
-sufficiency, that characterises the work of art. 
And Hegel relates this self-sufficient totality 
of the work of art to a basic ontological charact- 
eristic of man, his "interest and need to be a 
real individual totality and living independent 
being ... " Totality appears in Hegel (as in 
Lukäcs) both as the fulfilment of life and as 
the essential characteristic of art. ' 88 
For Lukäcs, in his later work the identical-subject-object of history is no 
longer the artist or the work of art but the proletariat and later, as Ludz argues, 
the partisan. 
89 
In his later work, Lukacs also provides an account-of why 
this totality has been lost. Here, too, there is a remarkable affinity with 
Simmel who has often been criticised for aestheticising social reality. 
90 
In 
Lukäcs' work of this period, however, it is the aesthetics of Hegel rather 
than those of Si mme I that receive increasing attention. It may we II be that 
Lukäcs himself is not exempt from similar criticism since the centrality of 
his aesthetic model in his earlier writings is carried over into the political 
sphere. 
i 
Having briefly examined the first two of Lukäcs' aesthetic intentions in his 
early work - the sociological analysis of literary problems and the search 
for a philosophy of life through aesthetics - we may now turn to the third 
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motif in Lukacs' work, that of the problem of cultural renewal, which will 
bring us to the period prior to the formulation of the major chapters of 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. This motif relates to Lukäcs' position 
in Hungary after his final return to Budapest in 1917. The nature of Lukäcs' 
participation in the 'Free School for the Geisteswissenschaften', and in 
the 'Szellemkek', along with Mannheim and others, is open to some debate. 
Looking back upon that group many decades later, Lukäcs said that 'the basic 
binding element amongst the participants was an opposition to capitalism in 
the name of idealist philosophy. What held the group together was this 
opposition to positivism' . 
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Lukäcs also suggests that the discussions 
were 
'no 
longer important to him: 
'Towards the end of the war a group gathered 
around Bela Baläzs and myself which soon 
grew into the "Free School der Geisteswissen- 
schaften". My earlier work no doubt played 
a certain role in its formation. It became 
important later thanks to the role played abroad 
by some of its members (Karl Mannheim, 
Arnold Hauser, Frigyes Antal, Käroly Tolnay); 
its influence In Hungary is often overestimated 
today for the same reason. It did not really 
mean anything important to me since it was 
essentially linked to a way of thinking and act- 
ing that I had already got over. ' 92 
The persistence of themes from Lukäcs' earlier commitments to the Leben 
sphilophie tradition and, as Kammler points out, the continued importance 
of his distinction between the sociological and historical philosophical per- 
spectives for his early Marxist work suggests, however, that he had not 
'got over' the topics of these discussions. In another sense, however, 
f 
Lukäcs was changing course in the period 1916-18 since this signalised his 
renewed interest in Marx's work, ' but this time it was a Marx seen through 
Hegel Is glasses and no longer through those of Simmel ... I sought, 
basically on a Hegelian foundation, to synthesise Hegel and Marx in a 
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"philosophy of history"'. 
93 
This change of course was further signalised 
by Lukäcs' entry into the Hungarian Communist Party in December 1918. 
In his early essays on Marxism, Lukäcs retains the distinction that was 
already apparent in his early writings on aesthetics, namely the separation 
of sociology from a historical philosophical standpoint. This distinction is 
apparent from a passage from Lukäcs' early Marxist essay 'Bolshevism as 
a moral problem' which originally appeared only in Hungarian. 
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In that 
article, the problem of the relationship between theory and practice comes 
to the fore but within the context of this earlier distinction. Thus, Lukäcs 
writes: 
'Unfortunately, Marx's philosophy of history 
has seldom been consciously separated from 
his sociology and thus many people have not 
noticed that the two cardinal elements - namely, 
the class struggle and the socialist social order- 
do not emerge out of the same concept formation, 
even though they are still closely connected with 
one another. The first element represents the 
fundamental assertion of Marx's sociology: 
society has always existed and so too has its 
driving force; ... The second element re- 
presents the utopian posttQlte of Marx's phil- 
osophy of history: the moral purpose for a 
coming world order. ' 
This separation of sociology from the philosophy of history in Marx's work, 
a separation of theory and practice, is resolved, for LukScs, by the taking 
up of a revolutionary ethics that is related both to the revolutionary class 
and the concrete individual. The proletariat must press beyond the sociolo- 
I gically determined facticity towards the generation of a genuine freedom in 
society. Lukäcs sees a structural identity between the purposive action of 
'the historical subject - the revolutionary proletariat - and that of the ethical 
subject - the moral individual 1, but this identity remains a purely formal and 
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abstract identity. This abstract identity between the moral and historical 
or political spheres is supported by the maintenance of the ideal of 'class- 
ical harmony' that Lukäcs retains from his aesthetics. In the same article 
LukScs asks: 'Is it possible to achieve the good through bad means, freedom 
through repression; can a new world order come into existence if the means 
of its generation are only distinguished in a technical sense from the means 
of the old system that have been rightly exposed and condemned' . 
96 In 
quoting this passage, Kammler argues that 'the ethical question is immed- 
lately transformed into a political one', that is, the aesthetic judgment is 
97 
transferred into the political realm without any mediation whatsoever. 
X 
This very same separation between sociology and a philosophy of history is 
retained in a slightly later work, 'Tactics and Ethics'98 in which the cen- 
trality of the moral dimension is again asserted and in which Lukäcs dis- 
cusses 'the decisive criterion of socialist tactics: the philosophy of history. 
The fact of the class struggle is nothing other than a sociological description 
and an elevation of events Into laws which are effective in social reality; the 
meanin of the class struggle of the proletariat, however, goes beyond this 
fact' . 
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In this work, and later, the gulf between these two spheres is 
resolved by the notion of 'objective possibility' in relation to class con- 
sciousness. This notion of objective possibility is applied by Lukäcs both 
to individual and collective action. However, in the context of the dual 
spheres outlined above, the first prerequisite for this objective possibility 
I 
'is the formation of class consciousness. In 
order for correct action to become an authentic, 
correct regulator, class consciousness must 
raise itself above the level of the merely given; 
It, must remember its world-historical mission 
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and its sense of responsibility. For the 
class interest, the attainment of which 
makes up the content of class-conscious 
action, coincides neither with the sum of 
the personal interests of the individuals 
belonging to the class nor with the immed- 
iate short-term interest of the class as a 
collective entity. 1 100 
It is this class consciousness which goes beyond the sociologically existent 
whilst taking it into account and unifying it with the historical phi l soph ic al 
standpoint. Already in this early work, Lukäcs anticipates some of the cen- 
tral notions and arguments in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein as well as 
taking up notions of objective possibility and the formation of ideal type con- 
structions derived from Weber and placing them in a political context. One 
of Luk&cs'later intentions is to combat the dismissal of philosophy and esp- 
ecially of the philosophy of history from Marxism, a dismissal which leads 
to a mechanistic and scientistic conception of Marxism. In 'Tactics and 
Ethics', Lukäcs is already arguing against the naive belief in a scientific 
Marxism that has already predicted historical inevitabilities. Rather, for 
Lukäcs, 'science, knowledge, can indicate only possibilities - and it is 
only in the realm of the possible that moral , responsible action, truly human 
action, is itself possible' . 
101 Indeed, Kammier argues that, for Lukäcs, 
the concept of objective possibility is 'the decisive instrument for the med- 
Tation of a philosophy of history and theory of society relevant for praxis on 
the one hand, and individual praxis on the other'. 
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Kammlergoes on to 
suggest that despite the affinity between some of Lukäcs' formulations and 
" his earlier works., 'Tactics and Ethics' represents a decisive break with 
the past since 'Lukäcs not only unambiguously asserts the priority of the 
historical philosophical perspective, but also - even though at first only 
programmatically - for the first time relates the determination of the direction 
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of praxis to the "material" of his philosophy of history, concrete society' . 
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This same transitional character of the retention of earlier formulations and 
their reworking within a new context is also apparent in Lukäcs' early Marx- 
ist discussion of the problem of culture. In an article entitled 'Alte 
Kultur und Neue Kultur' published in Kommunismus in 1920,104 it Is 
possible to see how far Lukäcs has moved from a 'sociological' to a 'Marx- 
ist' account of culture. Earlier, in a review article, 'Zum Wesen und zur 
Methode der Kultursoziologie' published in 1915,105 in which, incidentally, 
Lukäcs praised TZ51nnes' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft and Simmel's 
Philosophie des Geldes as isolated examples of a sociology of culture, 
Lukäcs criticized several aspects of the attempt by Alfred Weber and others 
to ground a sociology of culture. What he did not criticize, however, and 
what is significant in this specifically Marxist account of culture, is Alfred 
Weber's distinction between culture and civilization as a basic for the dis- 
cession of the social determination of culture. Lukäcs still speaks here of 
'the concept of culture (in contrast to civilization) 1106 and argues that it 
'comprises numerous valuable products and capacities that can be dis- 
pensed with in reference to the immediate maintenance of life'. In this 
sense, culture is the product of an economic surplus; of an independence 
from the basic necessities of life. It is also an internal phenomenon. 
Lukacs argues that 'just as culture is the inner domination of human beings 
over their environment, so civilization means its external domination over 
a 
their environment' . 
107 This external domination is manifested primarily 
in the economy. Not only under capitalism is everyone, including the dom- 
inant class, subordinate to the productive process but capitalism Itself 
implies 'the domination of the economy' . This insufficient determination 
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of capitalism is evident in Lukäcs' presentation of the process of alienation 
under capitalism which he sees merely as being based on the relationship 
of the producer to his product. The analysis of the exp^priation of labour 
power and the whole dimension of exploitation is missing in LukäcsI account 
of the alienation process. The alienation of the producer from his product 
in the form of commodity production is contrasted with an earlier harmon- 
ious relationship between culture, ideology and society in the same manner 
as Lukgcs previously contrasted the novel as a disjointed art form with the 
earlier harmony of art and society that produced the epic as a literary form. 
l_uk6cs even takes as his example of the consequences of market production, 
the phenomenon of fashion that is found, not 1n Marx, but inSi mme I's 
Philosophie des Geldes and in'his Soziologie. Echoes of Simmel's sociol- 
ogical analysis of capitalism are also found elsewhere in this article. Lukäcs 
here advances the argument that is later central to his conception of a 
critique of ideology in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, namely that the 
bourgeoisie necessarily creates a disjunction or contradiction between its 
ideology - that of individual freedom - and 'the system of production, of 
society' which necessarily cannot grant freedom to the working class. At 
the level of cultural phenomena this contradiction expresses itself as a 
contradiction between their form and their content, in a manner similar to 
that analysed - at a somewhat more abstract level - by Simrnel in Philo- 
sophie des Geldes. The culture-civilization dichotomy which also informs 
the form-content distinction also forces Lukäcs to accept a concept of the 
r 
capitalist production process that necessarily leads to culture and technical 
Industrial production ýs simple oppositions. Ultimately, then, ' Lukdcs 
believes that by destroying 'the autonomy of the economy' through 'the 
socialist organisation of the economy', the form of alienation which he has 
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outlined will be transcended. This abstract standpoint which is totally 
without reference to the process of exploitation and which is based upon a 
hypostatisation of 'the economy 9has another important consequence for 
'the new culture'. The culture-civilization dichotomy and the hypostati- 
sation of the economy combine to produce a further dualism between the 
sociological analysis of the framework with which culture is created and 
the creative individual. Lukäcs argues with reference to a socialist society 
that 'culture is the form of the idea of the human essence-of man. Culture 
will therefore be created by men not by circumstances. Such a transform- 
ation of society thus forms only the boundaries, only the possibility for free 
self-creativity, for the spontaneous creative force of men' . 
108 We thus 
return once more to the distinction between sociological determinations 
and the philosophy of history. The new society will realise what classical 
idealism was unable to bring about 'for the idea of man as an independent 
goal, the basic idea of the new culture, is the legacy of the classical ideal- 
ism of the nineteenth century' . 
109 It would appear that Lukäcs' notion of 
'the new culture' in fact recreates the problem of the relationship between 
. theory and praxis rather than solves it. It also assumes a specifically 
Hegelian reinterpretation of Marx's theory in which an autonomous, and no 
longer 'unhappy', consciousness will generate 'the new culture'. The 
weakness of this 'messianic utopianism' - as Lukäcs was later to refer 
to his work in this period-lies, as Kammler persuasively argues, in the 
fact that 
a 
'Lukäcs, on the basis of the one-sided 
emanation from theory, is not able to 
mediate between the theoretically pos- 
tulated necessity of the revolutionary 
process and actual revolutionary praxis. 
His theory cannot suffice to realise his 
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implicit claim, the practical realisation 
of the unity of theory and praxis through 
the existing concretisation of theory because 
it all too inclusively subsumes the construct- 
ive idea of the substratum of theory, the 
historical society and the constituted specific 
forms of social praxis. 1 110 
This failure led Lukäcs, ultimately, into the examination of the problems of 
the organisation of social and political praxis that forms the final chapter 
of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. 
The preceding analysis of three central intentions in Lukäcs' early work 
and his transitional works has suggested that, not only does Lukäcs retain 
a body of interpretations of cultural phenomena that can be derived from 
German sociology and philosophy but that the maintenance of these in- 
tellectual configuarations has important implications for Lukäcs' later work, 
and especially for Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. There can be no 
question of a radical break in Lukäcs I work from German sociology and 
philosophy to a consistently Marxist standpoint. This should, however, 
I 
not be interpreted as implying that Lukäcs' work underwent little change. 
indeed, as Lukäcs himself pointed out; one important change In these early 
writings was from an interpretation of Marx based on Simmel to one based 
upon Hegel, though even here it would appear that it is Hegel Is Aesthetics 
rather than his Phenomenology of Mind that is significant for these earlier 
writings. It can, at least, be seen that many of the concepts and formu- 
lations generated in this period do receive a new treatment in the context 
of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. 
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In Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Lukäcs leaves the reader in no 
doubt that his central aim is a methodological one. The central task of 
that work is 'to understand the essence of Marx's method and to apply it 
correctly'. The focus of this methodological intention is not seen in isolat- 
ion from theoretical and practical activity but is rather a critical reflection 
upon it. Nor does it lead to scientific hypotheses or axioms to be tested 
in the empirical realm but rather it leads to a greater understanding. This 
hermeneutic intention is directed towards 
... an interpretation, an exposition of Marx's 
theory as Marx understood it ... our underlying 
premise here is the belief that in Marx's theory 
and method, the true method by which to under- 
stand society and history has finally been dis- 
covered. This method is historical through and 
through. It is self-evident, therefore, that it 
must be constantly applied to itself. .. this 
entails taking up a substantive position with 
regard to the urgent problems of the present; 
for according to this. view of Marxist method 
its pre-eminent aim is knowledge of the present. fill 
This immanent understanding of Marx's method is faced with a number of 
problems. The reconstruction of Marx's method must reveal an under- 
standing of that methodology that is not fully present in Marx's writings. 
This is due to the relative paucity of Marx's own remarks on methodology 
and to the restrictions imposed on Lukäcs' reconstruction by what was 
0 
actually available to him at the time of writing. This included the intro- 
duction to the Grundrisse" as well as the Theories of Surplus Value but did 
f 
not include the Paris Manuscripts. 
112 
More significantly, the reconstruct- 
Ion of Marx's method must confront the existing interpretations of Marx's 
work, especially by the Marxist 'orthodoxy' of the Second International. 
This could only lead Lukäcs in the direction of a self-critique of Marxism 
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itself, that is, in the direction of applying, that method to itself. The 
very assertion that 'orthodoxy refers exclusively to method' forms part of 
that self-critique of Marxism which is directed against these mechanistic 
interpretations of Marx's work that saw Marx's work as a completed set of 
theorems which could be applied abstractly and externally to an existing 
social reality. That is, Lukäcs is concerned with restoring the dialectical 
relationship between Marxist theory and practice, a concern which led him 
to re-examine Marx's relationship with Hegel. 
One important aspect of the restoration of the dialectical relationship between 
theory and practice is the examination of the specific mediations of a theore- 
tical perspective and a praxis-related orientation to society. The notion 
of mediation is central to Lukäcs' account since, following Hegel, he 
never accepts either the concept of pure immediacy or that or pure contem- 
piation but faces the problem which arises when the actual mediation of 
theory and practice is examined. When a dialectical relationship between 
the two ceases to exist, then one must fall back upon theory, upon a philo- 
sophy of history or upon practice, upon the historical organisation of the 
political party or upon spontaneous action. For Lukäcs, consciousness 
is crucial to the outcome of revolutionary activity, both in the sense that he 
assumes that revolutionary success depends upon the ideological ripeness 
of the proletariat and that the decisive barriers to revolution are of an 
ideological nature. 
I 
At a more concrete level, an elucidation of the mediations in human activity 
challenges a mechanistic base-superstructure model of society. This is 
evident in LukäcsI treatment of the economy within historical materialism. 
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As Meszaros agrees, 
'-the assertion about the importance of econ- 
omics becomes meaningful only if one is 
able to grasp the manifold specific mediations 
in the. most varied fields of human activity, 
which are not simply "built upon" an "econ- 
omic reality" but also actively structure the 
latter through the immensely complex and 113 
relatively autonomous structure of their own. ' 
The neglect of 'concrete mediations' leads to those mechanistic versions 
of Marxism that were and remain common at various levels of orthodoxy. 
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However, the historical nature of Marx's method implies that the theory of 
capitalist society cannot merely be applied in an external manner to its 
object since the theory and the method are a part of that historical process 
that is constituted by a capitalist society. Thus, the historical Interpre- 
tations of a theory which is practically orientated (in this case, Marxism) 
have had practical consequences that Lukäcs wishes to criticize in terms of 
their appropriateness for a theory of the present, for 'knowledge of the 
present'. When confronted with these conflicting traditions, Lukäcs argues 
that the dialectician must assume. 
' not that he is faced with a conf Ii ct between 
different scientific methods, but that he Is 
In the presence of a social phenomenon and 
that by conceiving it is as a socio-historical 
phenomenon he can at once refute it and 
transcend It dialectically. ' 115 
The historical nature of this dialectical method implies that the method must 
be applied to itself and that it must also include an explication of a philo- 
I 
sophy of history. The practical intention present in this method and in 
this theory of society implies that the type of hermeneutical understanding 
advanced by Lukäcs cannot be contemplative or passive with respect to 
practical problems but, rather, it must presuppose engagement in society. 
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Only through some mode of engagement in society is such a theory real i s- 
able. This is also true of a critique of ideology which ceases to be merely 
a 'theory' of ideology but is instead intended as a 'critique' of ideology. 
That is, the problem of the mediation of theory and practice, of (to use 
Apel Is notions) reflection and engagement116 is one. which must be solved 
by any thoroughgoing 'critique' of ideology. 
Lukäcs suggests that the very nature of Marx's theory - the 'materialist 
dialectic' - 'must be fully grasped before we venture upon a discussion of 
the dialectical method itself'. For Lukäcs, this involves a rejection of the 
traditional distinction between theory and method and, instead, an attempt to 
analyse how theory is realised, that is, the relationship between theory and 
practice. All theories stand in some relationship to practice, though most 
neither make explicit the nature of that relationship., nor do they locate them- 
selves in or indicate their relations to practice and therby introduce the 
possibility of practice interacting with theory. Lukäcs, however, points 
to three 'crucial determinants of dialectics' which make it clear that this 
method necessarily addresses itself to this relationship. These are 'the 
interaction of subject and object, the unity of theory and practice, the 
historical transformation of the categories as the basis of their transformat- 
ion in thought '. 
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Yet such a materialistic dialectic must be reconstruct- 
ed since methodological understanding has usually reduced theory either to 
the subject (as contemplation) or to the object (as determined by the facts). 
I 
In the earlier version of 'What Is Orthodox Marxism? ' written in 1918, 
Lukäcs contrasts two dominant responses to the problem of Marxist orthodoxy. 
41 
The first response is to treat orthodoxy as a matter of rigid adherence to the 
letter of Marx's. writings and so 'like the medieval Schoolmen ... to 
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approach the truth by constant justification of their bible' 
111he 
second 
response is to view Marxism as superceded by empirical facts. Adherence 
to this second position would commit one to studying facts impartially from 
some apparently neutral scientific standpoint. This restricted understanding 
results in ultimate recourse to 'true' believers or 'true' facts; it can never 
lead to an understanding of the dialectical method. 
The contemplative stance was introduced into the underständing of Marx's 
method by Engels in Anti-Dühring for whom dialectics is 
'an unbroken transcendence of oppositions, 
their sublation in one another. In consequence, 
a one-sided and rigid causality must be replaced 
by interaction. But he (Engels) does not even 
mention the most vital interaction, namely the 
dialectical relation between subject and object 
in the historical process. 
Lukäcs argues that such an interpretati6n of dialectics renders it contem- 
plative and therefore undiaiectical since it fails to highlight the crucial 
difference between a metaphysical approach to an object which remains 
contemplative and a dialectical method whose central problem is to 'trans- 
form reality' . Where the historical nature of the categories in a theory' 
are obscured, ) 'dialectics itself must necessarily appear as a superfluous 
appendage, as a mere ornament of Marxist "sociology" or "economics')1.120 
Where such a view is accepted, then it appears as if this dialectical 
method is a positive hindrance to the attainment of the pure scientific nature 
i 
of Marxism which is based on an impartial examination of the facts. The 
contemplative approach to Marx's theory would thus take the view that the 
theory could be 'accepted or rejected in accordance with the prevailing state 
of science without any modification at all to one's basic attitudes to the 





approach just as much as the positivistic approach rests upon the separation 
of the subject from the object and both abstract the subject and his theories 
from the historical process. 
Lukäcs' critique of the positivistic interpretation of Marx's method is 
directed against the 'vulgar materialists' of the Second International, who 
sought to free Marx's method from a philosophy of history and, more espec- 
tally, from Hegel. A dialectical conception of the relationship between, 
subject and object, theory and practice, was replaced by the affirmation of 
the primacy of facts. The naive appeal to the facts can be countered with 
arguments found not only in Hegel 's Phenomenology of Mind but also in 
Weber's methodological writings. Hence, along with Weber, Lukäcs argues 
that the simple enumeration of facts 'already implies an "interpretation". 
Already at this stage, the facts have been comprehended by a theory, a 
method; they have been wrenched from the life-context in which they were 
originally based and inserted into the context of a theory. ' 
122 in this 
sense, they have become abstract. However, a more sophisticated version 
of this standpoint would concede the importance of theory and its relation- 
ship to facts but would interpret that relationship as being one which is 
identical to that current in the natural sciences, namely through a method 
which 'distils "pure" facts through observationary abstraction, experiment, 
etc., and locates them in their relevant contexts'. But for Lukäcs, this 
I 
generation of facts which rests upon the natural scientific model is based 
upon an objectivistic iI lusion since 
arise pwhen 
a aphenomenooat T fe is placed 
(in reality or in thought) into an environ- 
ment in which their causal regularities can 
be inspected without the interference of 
Y 
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other phenomena. This process is reinforced 
by reducing the phenomena to their purely 
quantitive essence, to their expression in 
numbers and numerical relations. Opportunit- 
ists always fail to recognize that it is in the 
natureof capitalism to process phenomena 
in this way. ' 123 
Lukäcs here implies, firstly, that these pure facts only emerge out of an 
artificial research situation - artificial in the sense that it is abstracted 
from the life-process itself; secondly, that the 'purity' of such facts is 
enhanced by their translation and reduction to a particular complex of non- 
linguistic signs - and hence they appear even more abstract; finally, that 
such facts only appear in this abstract form in a society which itself re- 
duces all relationships to the level of abstraction. 
Lukäcs thus rules out the possibility of a positivist critique of Ideology that 
counters social illusions with a naive appeal to the facts. More signifi- 
cantly, from a methodological standpoint, Lukäcs argues that the nature 
of the 'data' produced from certain scientific methods arises out of the 
capitalist productive process which itself is grounded in an abstraction 
process. These abstractions are, in turn, reproduced at a theoretical level. 
Lukäcs describes this process as follows: 
'The fetishistic character of economic forms, 
the reification of all human relations, the 
constant expansion and extension of the 
division of labour which subjects the process 
of production to an abstract-rational analysis, 
without regard to the human possibilities and 
abilities of the immediate producers, all these 
things transform the phenomena of society and 
with them the manner of their perception. In 
this way arise the 'isolated' facts, isolated 
. complexes of 
facts, specialist disciplines 
(economics, law, etc .) which already in 
their immediate forms of appearance seem to 
have done much to pave the way for such scien- 
tific methods. ' 124 
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This is the reason for the apparent affinity between that type of society and 
its theoretical objectifications, both at the level of atomistic facticity and 
at the level of a failure to provide the basis for a complete understanding-of 
the nature of that facticity. What is omitted in such scientific methods - 
and necessarily omitted, according to Lukäcs - is a recognition of the 
'historical character' of the facts which form the basis for this objectivistic 
methodology. ` The recognition of the historical nature of these facts 
challenges their immediacy and leads us to examine the mediations that 
exist between the knowing subject and his object. Such facts 
'are, as the product of historical development, 
not only conceived in a continuous process of 
change, but they are - precisely in the structure 
of their objectivity - the product of a determinate 
historical epoch: 
_ 
namely capitalism. Thus, 
when 'science' maintains that the manner in 
which they are immediately given is an adequate 
foundation of scientific conceptualization and 
that their actual form is the appropriate start- 
ing point for scientific concept formation, it 
thereby takes its stand simply and dogmatically 
on the basis of capitalist society. It uncritically 
takes Its nature, its objective structure and its 
law-like nature as the unalterable foundation of 
"science". ' 125 
The acceptance of the immediacy of such facts 'obscures the historical, 
transitory nature of capitalist society'. This illusion can, at the method- 
ological level, only be overcome through 'the simultaneous recognition and 
transcendence of immediate appearances' which, for Lukacs, takes place 
when we simultaneously understand both the apparent form which phenomena 
take and the movement to the ' inner core' of the phenomena. Only in this 
a 
way can the illusion be dispelled of 'confusing the intellectual reproduction 
of reality with the actual structure of reality itself'. 
There remains another important limitation in the scientific standpoint that 
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asserts the primacy of facts, namely its failure to recognise the real nature 
of the contradictions that lie in its subject matter. This limitation is not 
only significant for Lukacs' argument here but it also illuminates the basis 
for Lukäcs I separation of natural and social sciences, nature and society as 
well as his restricted understanding of the natural sciences. This method- 
ology of the natural sciences 
'recognizes no contradictions or antagonisms 
in its subject matter. If, despite this, con- 
tradictions do spring up between particular 
theories then this is only a sign that the level 
of knowledge achieved up to now is still not 
complete. 
Theories which appear to contradict one another 
must find their limits in these contradictions; 
they must, therefore, be transformed and sub- 
sumed under more general themes in which the 
contradictions will finally disappear. However, 
in the case of social reality, these contradictions 
are not a sign of the still incomplete scientific 
apprehension of reality; on the contrary, they 
belong inseparably to the nature of reality itself, 
to the nature of capitalist society. In the know- 
ledge of the whole they wil I not be transcended 
and thereby cease to be contradictions. Quite 
the contrary, they will be conceived as necessary 
contradictions, as the antagonistic fundament of 
this system of production. ' 126 
This passage is only intelligible in the light of Lukäcs' critique of Engels' 
extension of dialectics to nature where, Lukäcs argues 'the crucial deter- 
minants of dialectics ... are absent from our knowledge of nature'. In 
contrast, Lukafcs argued that 'nature is a social category' but, as many of 
his critics pointed out, for Marx it is not merely a social category but 
possesses a material quasi-independent existence. 
127 
In the Iight of the 
passage just quoted, we can see that Lukäcs not only treats unproblematic- 
ally the natural scientific method when applied to its own sphere but also 
seems to adhere to a positivistic understanding of the natural sciences. 
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Lukacs presupposes a scientific 'method' that is followed in the natural 
sciences as if there exists no conflict within the sciences. The unproblem- 
atic conception of the natural sciences frees them from the problem of 
ideology, at least at the level at which Lukäcs discusses it in this context. 
The natural scientific ideal only becomes problematic when applied to the 
social realm since 'the cognitive ideal of the natural sciences when applied 
to nature, merely serves the progress of science, yet when directed towards 
social development, it appears as the ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie. 1128 
This uncritical notion of natural science leads to the separation between an 
idealist account of the natural sciences and a materialist account of the social 
sciences. In Lukacs' case, this distinction testifies to his continued ad- 
herence of the neo-Kantian, and especially Rickert's, separation of natu- 
ral and social scientific methodology. 
129 In its radical versions, this 
separation results in the avoidance of a confrontation with the positivistic 
self-understanding of science rather than a critique of that interpretation of 
science. 
However, within the realm of the social sciences, the failure to come to 
terms with contradictions has important implications for the possibility of 
a critical theory of society. Lukäcs argues that bourgeois social science 
confronts the problem of contradictions in two ways. Either, when faced 
with contradictions in the systems of production and social relations or in 
the categories used to conceptualize these systems, an attempt is made to 
l 
show, as in the case of periodic economic crises, that such contradictions 
are purely surface phenomena that do not affect the productive system itself 
or, on a more abstract level, an attempt is made to reduce crucial contra- 
dictions endemic to this s`tystem to eternal contradictions, as in the 
Ji 
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reduction of the antagonisms present in the struggle between classes to an 
instance of the eternal conflict between individual and society. Both 
modes of coming to terms with contradictions fail to understand history 
'as a unified process' even though attempts are made to construct a unified 
notion of history 
'in the form of abstract sociological con- 
ceptualizations of history of the type of 
Comte and Spencer, whose inner contra- 
dictions have been convincingly exposed 
by modern bourge i os historians, most in- 
cisively by Rickert, and on the other hand, 
in the form of the demand for a "philosophy 
of history" whose relation to historical 
reality turns out to be a methodological 
insoluble problem. ' 130 
Lukäcs here poses not only the central problem of his earlier writings - how 
to bring together a sociological account of historical reality with a philo- 
sophy of history 
131 
- but also the problem with which he is faced In 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein: to explain how the concretely existing, 
historically. contingent proletariat is the bearer of the historical process as 
a whole. At a more abstract level, Lukacs seeks to show how the immediate 
realm of knowledge and illusion becomes intelligible within the context of the 
" historical process as a whole. In order to develop both these concerns, 
Lukäcs has recourse to the category of totality which is central to his critique 
of ideology. 
The concept of totality not only lies at the heart of Lukäcs' critique of ideol- 
' ogy but may also be seen to form a crucial aspect of his attempt to provide 
a historical hermeneutics as well as being essential to his reinstatement 
of the importance of Hegel in a dialectics for Marxism. 
132 
The under- 
standing of any social phenomenon can only take place through an under- 
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standing of its relationship to the totality in which it is found. As Lukacs 
put it 'the intelIigibilityýErkennbarkeit of objects develops in proportion 
as we grasp their function in the determinate totality in which they move 1.133 
However, this should not be understood as implying merely that the parts are 
related to the whole as found, for instance,, in a mechanistic account of the 
relation between the elements and the whole. That is, the relationship 
which Lukäcs posits is not some kind of causal interaction of 'unchanging 
entities or 
'the reciprocal influencing of otherwise unchanging 
objects. It does indeed go further in its relation 
to the whole is the determination which determines 
the form of objectification of every object of cog- 
nition. Every essential transformation which is 
relevant for knowledge expresses itself as a trans- 
formation in the relation to the whole and thereby 
as a transformation of the form of objectification 
itself. ' 134 
This changing relationship of parts to the whole is historical through and 
through. ' The changes in this relationship determines the form of objecti- 
fication which the individual mement takes on in our apprehension of it. 
Lukäcs therefore argues that the notion of totality is not merely some naive 
statement to the effect that parts are related to the whole. Nor is it to be 
understood as implying a mere interaction tWechselwirkung] of parts and 
whole, as found, for example, in Simmel's work. Thirdly, Lukäcs argues 
that this notion of totality is not abstract but concrete and that this dis- 
tinguishes its use by Marx in contrast to Hegel. Whereas Hegel conceived 
J 
of theory as the self-understanding of reality, this reality ultimately re- 
mained embedded in philosophy as absolute spirit. Thus, Hegel aimed at 
'knowledge about an essentially alien material' rather than an understanding 
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of the nature of 'the production and reproduction of real Iife'. But this 
is not to suggest that Lukäcs completely rejected Hegel Is notion of theory 
and totality. Rather, as Kammler argues 'Lukäcs is here concerned with 
the structure of Hegel Is concept of reality: true reality - distinguished from 
existence, appearance Realität and the existent - was, for Hegel, the 
existence of the idea as the "unity of concept and objectivity" I . 
135 In 
a similar vein, Lukäcs asserts that 'concrete totality is therefore the true 
category of reality'. Lukacs argues that Marx's advance over Hegel lay in 
taking 'the historical tendency in Hegel to its logical extreme: he radically 
transformed all the phenomena both of society and of socialized man into 
historical problems'. 
136 This fundamentally historical totality has im- 
portant implications for the subject and object of knowledge. A thorough= 
going historical understanding of societal totality cannot exclude its own 
understanding from the movement of this totality. It must be capable of 
understanding why its mode of apprehension and comprehension of reality 
must be historical. This mode of comprehension, this recognition of 
society as reality is possible 
'only under capitalism, in bourgeois society. 
But the class which carried out this revolution 
did so without consciousness of its function ... 
t was necessary for the proletariat to be born 
for social reality to be fully conscious. The 
reason for this is that the discovery of the class 
outlook of the proletariat provided a vantage 137 
," point 
from which to survey the whole of society. 
Here Lukäcs states for the first time in this work the important thesis which, 
.f 
when amplified, enables him to justify the necessity of historical material- 
ism as the sole source of knowledge of that totality of society. This problem 
of the relation between the emergence of the proletariat and the emergence 
of historical materialism has formed a consistent source of crisis in Marxism, 
especially where a coincidence between the two has been rendered proble- 
matic. Yet for Lukis at this point in time, the relationship is not a 
problematical one and the problems of the self-understanding of historical 
materialism and that of the proletariat are seen to be soluble and to be 
inextricably bound up with one another. 
. What is significant for Lukäcs' critique of ideology is that 
it is the 'class 
outlook' of the proletariat that makes possible a conception of the whole 
society. . Marx's analysis of the capitalist system of production as a whole 
was not based upon the 'class outlook' of the proletariat but upon the 
critique of political economy. Lukäcs decisively shifts the problem of 
achieving a. survey of 'the whole of society' away from a concrete totality 
towards the problem of class consciousness. Furthermore, it seems to be 
the case in Lukäcs I analysis that the proletariat takes on a. necessarily 
abstract existence since it is incorporated into a subject-object dialectic as 
a category rather than as a concrete historical class. There is, throughout 
Lukäcs', analysis in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, that tension which 
was apparent in his earlier work between concrete sociological analysis and 
a philosophy of., history. The concrete analysis is often subordinated to a 
i 
philosophy of history which renders concrete social groups abstract. This 
may be seen in Lukäcs' notion of totality which oscillates between these 
two levels. On the one hand, the notion of totality that is presupposed in 
a comprehensive understanding of reality (that is, an understanding which 




First, historical materialism became a formal 
objective possibility only because economic 
factors created the proletariat, because economic 
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factors created the proletariat, because the 
proletariat did emerbe (i e. at a particular 
stach of historical development) and because 
the subject and object of the knowledge of 
social reality were transformed. Second, 
this formal possiblity became a real one only 138 
in the course of the evolution of the proletariat. 7 
Such a standpoint should lead to a concrete analysis of how the evolution 
of the proletariat Is related to the emergence of historical materialism. But 
this does not occur in Lukäcs' work. Instead, Lukäcs seems to restore to 
the notion of totality the absolute claims for it that are found in some of 
Hegel Is writings. The concept of totality acquires an independent existence 
as when Lukäcs argues that 
'The category of totality ... determines not 
only the object of knowledge, but also the 
subject ... The totality of an object can 
only be posited if the positing subject is its- 139 
elf, it must conceive of the object as a totality. ' 
A level of abstraction is reached in Lukäcst analysis in which it is cate- 
gories themselves which determine the concrete and not vice-versa. Yet 
Lukäcs does recognise the dialectical relationship between theory and reality 
to the extent thät he sees the realization of the formal possibility of 
historical materialism as only being possible through that theory itself. 
That is, as soon as the dialectical relationship between the subject and ob- 
ject of cognition and action is abandoned, there emerges an unbridgable gap 
between emirical existence and theory, such that the theory is unable to 
explain how it can be realized through Its activity. This occurs 
'as soon as you decide to remain on the "natural" 
ground of existence, of the empirical in its stark, 
naked brutality, you creat a gulf between the subject 
of an action and the milieux of the facts in which the 
action unfolds so that they stand opposed to each 
other as harsh, irreconcilable principles. ' 140 
This inexplicable gap widens where facts are explained in terms of the auto- 
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matic workings of laws in a mechanistic manner. In that case, the med- 
iatory role of consciousness, of a historical materialist hermeneutics, 
disappears. A mechanistic Marxism is also one which cannot conceive of 
the subject of the totality -a class or a party - dialectically. It is a version 
of Marxism which has ceased to be revolutionary since 
'The category of totality, the all-pervasive 
supremacy of the whole over the parts is the 
essence of the method which Nook over 
from Hegel and brilliantly transformed into 
the foundations of a wholly new science ... 
Proletarian science is revolutionary not just 
by virtue of its revolutionary ideas which it 
opposes to bourgeois society, but above all 
because of its method. The primacy of the 
category of totality is the bearer of the princi- 
ple of revolution in science. ' 11 
Only an understanding directed towards the totality can overcome the em- 
pirical historical immediacy of capitalist society and though many barriers 
stand in the way of that understanding, it can only be achieved by a subject 
that is the identical subject-object of the historical process. 
The notion of totality that is central to Lukäcs' critique of concrete immediacy 
in capitalist society and central to his critique of ideology is not, however, 
merely a detached tool of analysis but is directed towards conscious activity. 
One of the neglected features of any critique of ideology is that it presupposes 
a theory of action and an intention towards not merely enlightenment, i. e. 
making us aware of ideology, but also towards emancipation, i. e. the des- 
truction of the ideology. This feature is also present in Lukäcs' account of 
totality: 
'The facts no longer appear strange when they 
are comprehended in their coherent reality, 
In the relation of all partial aspects to their 
Inherent, but hitherto unelucidated roots in 
the whole; we then perceive the tendencies 
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which strive towards the centre of reality, 
to what we are wont to call the ultimate 
goal. This ultimate goal is not an abstract 
ideal opposed to the process, but an aspect 
of truth and reality. It is the concrete mean- 
ing of each stage reached and an integral part 
of the concrete moment. Because of this, to 
comprehend it is to recognise the direction 
taken (unconsciously) by events and tendencies 
towards the totality. It is to know the direction 
that determines concretely the correct course of 
action at any given moment - in terms of the 
i nterest of the total process, viz, the emanci- 
pation of the proletariat. ' 142 
Without knowledge of 'events and tendencies' in relation to the soc i o- 
historical totality, conscious transformative action is not possible. 
What i 
,s missing 
in Lukäcs' notion of totality is the level of concreteness 
which, as we shall see, prevents him from conceiving of the subject of his 
theory - the proletariat - in anything but abstract terms. M4szäros argues 
that the concepts of totality and mediation are closely interrelated in Lukäcs' 
work but goes on to suggest that his analysis 'cannot go beyond the Iimitat- 
ions imposed on Lukäcs by the lack of a greater concreteness in his conception 
of "mediation" 1.143 
However, for all their defects, Lukäcs' methodological reflections did 
decisively challenge accepted theories of reality and ideology. The restorat- 
ion of a dialectical relationship between the subject of cognition and the object 
of knowledge, however abstractly it was stated, enabled Lukäcs to overcome 
the limitations of the Cartesian dualism and, at least in principle, Kant's 
separation of the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds. The restoration of a 
dialectical theory of knowledge in Marxism also had important implications 
for a theory and critique of ideology. Lukäcs' positing of a dialectical 
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relationship between subject and object and the assertion of a concrete 
totality as the 'true reality', his restoration of the importance of conscious- 
ness in human activity and the, as yet, undeveloped notion of praxis enabled 
him to challenge the mechanistic Marxism of the Second International. 
Although Lukäcs did not refer in these early methodological remarks to Lenin's 
theory of reflection either as[Abbildungstheorie]or as&iederspiegelungstheoriee, 
they nonetheless formed the basis, and were read as such by his contem- 
poraries, for a critique of a naive theory of reflection in the theory of ideology 
and a simple base-superstructure dichotomy that was not only prevalent in the 
Marxism of the Second International but which formed the basis for many 
attempts to develop a sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany. 
Thus, the philosophical and methodological foundations for a dialectical critique 
of ideology not only run counter to orthodox Marxism but also constitute a 
challenge to the caricatures of the Marxist position - most often in the form 
of an undialectical base superstructure dichotomy and a naive theory of reflect- 
ion - that were prevalent in the sociology of knowledge in Germany. Few 
writers on the sociology of knowledge were able to come to-terrrms with a 
radical critique of ideology that was rooted in a dialectical theory of knowledge 
derived from Hegel and Marx. This cannot be because Lukäcs did not deal 
with issues central to the sociology of knowledge. Indeed, in some respects, 
Lukäcs' methodological reflections on the understanding of social phenomena 
form the beginnings of a materialist and critical hermeneutics, a theory of in- 
a 
terpretation that has been absent not only in orthodox Marxist attempt at a 
critique of ideology but also from the sociology of knowledge itself. 
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IV 
As the title of Lukäcs' major work in this period indicates, one of his central 
concerns was the. elucidation of the notion of class consciousness. This is 
carried out at a number of levels that are not always clearly distinguished. 
For example, class consciousness is important for Lukäcs since it is one of 
the crucial phenomena in which the category of totality is embodied. As such, 
it is part of the subject-object dialectic that has already been alluded to and 
part of Lukacs' Hegelian philosophy of history. At another level, class con- 
sciousness is significant for Lukäcs since it is embodied in a particular in- 
stitutional and organisational form, the analysis of which constitutes the 
later chapters of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Thus, Lukacs argues 
that 'the form taken by the class consciousness of the proletariat is the Party' . 
144 
More specifically, Lukäcs sets out to locate class consciousness within the 
class structure of capitalist society. But, as we shall see, this class con- 
sciousness is not an immediate empirical phenomenon but one that must be 
imputed to particular classes. 
In order to understand these various levels of analysis of class consciousness 
we must relate them both to the actual context within which Lukäcs was 
developing his theory (this is provided in Kammler's and especially Grunpfen- 
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berg's recent accounts ) and to the continuing centrality of certain themes 
in his work which persist in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (again this 
1 is provided in KammlerIs account but is supplemented by that of Apitzsch146). 
We have already seen that in his pre-Marxist writings, Lukäcs had already 
developed a subject-object dialectic in the realm of aesthetics (one which 
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relied heavily on Lask as well as Hegel 
147) 
which continued to be important 
in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, albeit on a different level and within 
a different context. 
148 Similarly, Kammler has pointed to the hiatus in 
Lukacs' earlier writings between a philosophy of history and a sociology of 
culture which attempts to be concrete. We may also bear in mind the cen- 
trality in Lukäcs' 'Heidelberg aesthetics' of the problem of timelessness and 
historicity, a problem which, in a different form, becomes acute in Geschichte 
und Klassenbewusstsein. 
149 
In short, it is impossible to-examine Lukäcs' 
central arguments in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein without being aware 
that not only are many of these essays reformulations of earlier pieces but 
that certain central themes from Lukäcs' earlier work persist in this volume. 
However, the polemical nature of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein should 
also suggest that the actual historical context of these essays must be taken 
into account for a complete understanding of their meaning. That is to say, 
these essays were not intended as academic articles for learned journals but 
represented Lukäcs' own political interventions in the post-First World War 
period in Hungarian and German politics. As Kammler argues, the central 
political themes of Lukäcs' work in the early 1920s are that the fate of the 
revolution depended upon the ideological maturity of the working class and 
that the central concern should be with the decisive barriers in the way of the 
formation of a revolutionary ideology. The crucial concepts of class con- 
I 
sciousness and objective possibility had already appeared in Taktika Is 
et hika in 1919150. Both concepts are raised early in this work but with 
reference to individual human action. Lukäcs here argues that 
4 
'morally correct action is related fundamentally 
to the correct perception of the given historico- 
philosophical situation, which is in turn only 
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feasible through the efforts of every individual 
to make this self-consciousness conscious for 
himself. The first unavoidable prerequisite 
for this is the formation of class consciousness. 
In order for correct action to become an authentic, 
correct regulator, class consciousness must raise 
itself above the level of the merely given; it 
must remember its world-historical mission and 
its sense of responsibility. For the class inter- 
est, the attainment of which makes up the content 
of class-conscious action, coincides neither with 
the sum of the personal interests of the individuals 
belonging to the class nor with the immediate short- 
term interests of the class as a collective entity. ' 
In this passage, the difference between the conceptual form of the philoso- 
phical-historical dimension of class consciousness and actual empirical form 
does not appear unbridgable. At the same time, it is worth noting that Lu: dcs 
is already loth to identify class interests- at least as being co-terminous with 
the concrete empirical interests of a social class. 
But after 1920, that is, after the failure of the 1918/19 revolutions in Hungary 
and Germany, LukScs' essays no longer constitute a utopian anticipation of 
the revolution. Rather they are increasingly concerned with the gap between 
the notion of a revolutionary class consciousness capable of grasping society 
as a totality and the actual level of working class consciousness. This is 
made evident where earlier essays are reworked for their publication in 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, for example, in the essay on 'Class 
Consciousness' already published in 1920. Grunenberg in fact specifically 
relates the change in Lukäcs' position to his hopes for and the failure of the 
" March offensive in Germany in 1921. Henceforth, she argues, 'Lukäcs took 
up the "ideological crisis of the proletariat as the fundamental problem and, 
in contrast, placed the analysis of objective factors in the background 1.152 
Lukäcs henceforth sought 'to confront the daily struggles of the working class 
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with the idea of the pure class struggle'. Lukäcs' interpretation of the 
defeats of the revolutionary movement in this period was not in terms of the 
uneven power struggles between the bourgeoisie and the working,; class but 'was 
exclusively the result of a false consciousness on the part of the working 
class and a falsely applied tactics on the part of the VKPDI-153 
Hence, in the reworked article on class consciousness, 'Lukäcs had em- 
phasised the crucial role of class consciousness in the decisive phase of the 
struggle for power. Yet, at the same time, he had characterised the actual 
empirical consciousness of the working class as completely incapable of 
taking over this role' _ 
154 
it is not surprising then that 'at the centre of 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein there stands therefore not the everyday 
consciousness of the worker from the standpoint of its revolutionary trans- 
formation but a theoretical, historico-philosophical clarification of the 
question: what might revolutionary consciousness look like? '155 Within 
such a context we are able to see why Lukäcs does not take up empirical 
class consciousness as the starting point of his analysis and why, in its place 
or rather in complete contrast, imptited d-class consciousness and the notion of 
objective possibility play a central role in his theory of class consciousness. 
Once more in Lukäcs' writings we are confronted, as Kammler suggests, with 
'the danger of an unmediated dualism of speculative concept and socially 
156 
related factors, of idea and reality' . 
Lukäcs argues against the 'belief that the concrete can be located in the 
empirical individual of history ("individual" here can refer to an individual 
man, class or people) and in his empirically given (and hence psychological 
or mass psychological) consciousness' since for him concrete analysis means 
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'th relation to society as a whole'. 
157 
This rejection of any psychological 
Is in keeping with Lukäcs' critique of psychology which he outlined else- 
where. In an attack on Freud's mass psychology, Lukäcs argued that 
'all previous psychology, Freudian included, suffers 
from the systemic weakness that it starts out 
from artificially isolated - through the capital- 
ist mode of production and society - solitary 
human beings. It treats their qualities - also 
produced by capitalism - as unchangable 
qualities that are actually "natural necessities" 
for human beings (. .. 
) In this manner, 
psychology turns the nature of things upon its 
head. It attempts to explain a human being's 
social relationships in terms of their in- 
dividual consciousness (or unconsciousness) 
instead of exploring the social foundations of 
their separated existence from the totality and 
the associated problem of their relationship to 
fellow human beings .1 
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This rejection of any psychological analysis of class consciousness is of 
course associated with a rejection of any analysis of class consciousness at 
the level of empirical immediacy. However, the two arguments are not 
identical since Reich's analysis of class consciousness and some of the work 
of the Frankfurt School in the 1930s . would suggest 
that a social psychological 
approach need not remain confined to the level of empirical immediacy. None- 
theless, it does remain true that most attempts at an empirical analysis of 
class consciousness have either concentrated on immediate levels of aware- 
ness of class (consciousness of class) or have been compelled to reduce class 
consciousness to some empirical indices such as trade union membership and 
participation. Lukacs' equation of any attempt to examine class conscious- 
I 
ness at the level of its immediate existence (leaving aside, for the moment, 
the question of whether it is necessary to remain at this level) with opportun- 
ism only serves to heighten the need for a non-immediate notion of class- 
consciousness. On the basis of the arguments so far advanced, the philo- 
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sophical-historical rejection of an analysis at the level of immediacy, a 
methodological rejection of a social psychological account of class con- 
sciousness and a political identification of 'the actual, psychological state 
tht 
of consciousness offproletariat' with opportunism, leaves Lukäcs with no 
alternative but to argue for a sharp differentiation of the empirical conscious- 
ness of the proletariat from true class consciousness. 
However, this non-empirical notion of class consciousness is also pre- 
dicated upon an abstract notion of the proletariat as the identical subject- 
object of the historical process. LukScs had already argued that only a 
historical subject which is itself a totality is capable of apprehending history 
and society as a totality. This central category of totality is also 'the 
bearer of the revolutionary principle in science I and, as such, Luk6cs argues 
that it is the crucial category which Marx took over from Hegel. Hence 
Marx's theory of society and history enables those who understand it to corn- 
prehend society as a totality. It is clear that, . at any particular point in 
time, the majority of the working class are not amongst this group who under- 
stand Marx's theory. As we shall see from Lukd'cs' analysis of the process 
of reification, the illusions created by the commodity structure of a capitalist 
society are ail-parvasive., affecting the bourgeoisie and the proletariat alike. 
Therefore, it must be shown how the proletariat is able to break out of this 
reified world-view and how it is possible for it to develop a true class con- 
sciousness. At any point in time this class consciousness (which at times 
I 
seems to be coterminous not merely with a comprehension of MarxIs theory 
of society but actually identical with it) can only be imputed to the working 
class. The nature of the working class's position in the production process 
(at a philosophical-historical level, almost identical with the position of 
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the slave in Hegel Is master-slave dialectic) guarantees that the develop- 
ment of such a class consciousness is, at least, objectively possible. 
Luk4cs' philosophical-historical standpoint is clearly indebted to Hegel in 
several ways. We have already seen that the category of totality, though 
having its origins in Simmel's philosophy, as Rucker has pointed out with 
reference to Lukdcs' early writings, 
159 
was transformed by Lukdcs into a 
Hegelian notion of methodological significance, since Lukäcs argued that 
this category was at the very roots of the methodology which Marx took 
over from Hegel. At the epistemological level, Lukäcs also sought to make 
concrete Hegel Is concept of reality: as Kammler puts it, 'the true reality - 
in contrast to Dasein, Realität and Existenz - was for Hegel the existence of 
the idea as the "unity of the concept and objectivity"' . 
160 At the level of 
a philosophy of history, the subject-object dialectic which Lukäcs had already 
developed in relation to aesthetics becomes, in Geschichte und Klassen- 
bewusstsein, a Hegelian dialectical philosophy of history. This has im- 
portant consequences for Lukäcs' interpretation of Marx. Fetscher rightly 
suggests that, according to Lukäcs' interpretation, 'Marx's supercession of 
Hegel results not from a materialist critique (in Feuerbach's sense) but ... 
makes it possible for Marx to show that in the proletariat actually lies the 
real subject-object of history, the "we" whose actions history actually is' ; 
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For Lukäcs, then, the notion of the proletariat is very close to that of the 
slave in Hegel Is master-slave dialectic. This is reinforced by the central 
role which Lukacs ascribes to the process by which the proletariat comes to 
full consciousness of its position just as the slave, for Hegel, must achieve 
full recognition of his position. Similarly slave-consciousness for Hegel, 
as with empirical proletarian consciousness for Lukacs, remains trapped at 
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the level of immediacy. There is even some support for the view that 
Lukäcs at times would subscribe to Hegel 's belief in this context that 
Anerkennung is Aufhebung, that 'recognition' is 'transcendence'. Be that 
as it may, what is central here is that this Hegelian philosophy of history 
serves to reinforce Lukäcs' lack of concern with - and even faith in - actual 
working class consciousness. As Grunenberg argues 'empirical conscious- 
ness is viewed by him as form of expression, as a flat reflection of reified 
social relationships' . 
162 
Instead, Lukäcs utilizes and develops a notion of class consciousness that 
can be imputed to a social class, one which 
'consists in the fact of the appropriate and 
ratonal reactions "imputed" [zugerechnet] 
to a particular typical position in the pro- 
cess of production. This consciousness 
i s, therefore, neither the sum nor the 
average of what is thought or felt by the 
single individuals who make up the class. ' 
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The first part of this definition is, in fact, with its emphasis on the 'appro- 
priate', the 'rational' and the 'typical' a completely Weberfan formulation 
of class consciousness. 
164 
Lukäcs argues that it is possible to infer 'the 
thoughts and feelings which men would have in a particular situation if they 
were able to assess both it and the interests arising from it in their impact 
on immediate action and on the whole structure of society' . 
165 
This in- 
ference is made possible 'by relating consciousness to the whole of society'. 
What Lukacs does not point out in this connection is that since this relation 
a 
between consciousness and the whole of society does not exist, our know- 
ledge of the existence of this 'true' class consciousness can only be est- 
eblished ex post. 
166 
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Nonetheless, Lukäcs does go on to point out the difficulties involved in the 
use of this notion of objective possibility. We need to know whether the 
distance between this class consciousness and the empirically given is the 
same for all classes in society and to examine 'the practical significance 
of these different possible relations between the objective economic totality, 
the imputed class consciousness and the real, psychological thoughts of men 
about their I ives 1 . 
167 Later in the same article, Lukäcs also makes clear 
that there are probably different levels of empirical consciousness within 
the working class which need to be examined. Yet, as he suggests, 'the 
stratification of the problems and economic interests within the proletariat 
is, unfortunately, almost wholly unexplored, but research would undoubtedly 
lead to discoveries of the very first importance' "168 Thus, Lukäcs is at 
least aware of some of the problems involved in his use of a dualistic 
notion of consciousness. 
With regard to this notion of 'objective possibility', Lukäcs suggests that we 
must examine 'how far is it in fact possible to discern the whole economy of 
a society from inside it? ' The notion must enable us to both transcend in- 
dividual immediate awareness whilst at the same time recognising the extent 
to which this awareness is constrained by 'the economic structure of society'. 
By arguing that concrete analysis is knowledge of society as a totality, by 
Imputing to social classes a class consciousness that is based upon that 
knowledge as an objective possibility, Lukäcs is able to introduce his version 
f 
of the notion of false consciousness. Indeed, it is only on the basis of 
positing the concept of objective possibility that Lukäcs is able to develop a 
theory of false consciousness. Immediate consciousness appears 
'as something which is subjectively justified 
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in the social and historical situation ... 
At the same time, objectively, it bypasses 
the essence of the evolution of society and 
fails to pinpoint it and express it adequately. 
That is to say, objectively, it appears as a 
'false consciousness'. On the other hand, 
we may see the same consciousness as some- 
thing which fails subjectively to reach its 
self-appointed goals, while furthering and 
realising the objective aims of society of 
which it is ignorant and which it did not choose. 
169 
It is quite clear from this passage that we can only recognise false conscious- 
noss if we are aware of the objective possibility of a class position in re- 
lation to the whole of society. Only by positing this 'objective possibility' 
is it possible to ascribe 'falsity' to consciousness. 
It is also apparent that Lukäcs uses the notion of class consciousness in 
two ways - as 'true' class consciousness and as 'false' class consciousness. 
The transition from false to true consciousness is made possible by utilizing 
the notion of 'objective possibility'. This false consciousness is, in the 
last resort, determined by the economic structure of society -a determination 
of which one is not aware since 
'class consciousness implies a class-conditioned 
unconsciousness of ones own socio-historical and 
economic condition. This condition is given as a 
definite structural relation, a definite formal nexus 
which appears to govern the whole of Iife. The 
"falseness", the illusion implicit in this situation 
is in no sense arbitrary; it is simply the intellect- 
ual reflex of the objective economic structure. ' 
1: T0 
Hence, until it is possible to recognise these determinations in the economic 
f 
structure, false consciousness will be a permanent state. Lukäcs gives as 
an example of a common illusion that the price of labour power is in fact 
the price of labour and then goes on to suggest that 'it requires the most 
painstaking historical analysis to use the category of objective possibility 
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so as to isolate the conditions in which this illusion can be exposed and a 
real connection with the totality established I. 
171 What Lukäcs is implicitly 
suggesting here is that Marx in fact used this notion of objective possibility. 
Even granting that this were true = and there is no evidence that the notion 
stems from Marx - this would still suggest that false consciousness is 
removed by ex-post analysis which,, in all probability, would not be under- 
taken by the subjects of that analysis but would appear from a source external 
to them. 
Since these concepts of objective possibility and imputed class conscious- 
ness are of central importance to Lukäcs' theory of class consciousness it 
is worthwhile investigating their origins. Lukäcs' attempt to bridge the 
gulf between a speculative concept and empirical immediacy almost certain- 
ly has its roots in Max Weber's methodology though, as we shall see, Lukäcs' 
use of 'objective possibility' and 'imputation' Zurechnun differs from 
that of Weber in several important respects. Weber himself points out that 
he took the concept from 'the works of the outstanding physiologist v. Kries'172 
and from the legal writings and critique of Radbruch. 
173 
Weber's reason 
for taking up this concept and developing its usage in social science method- 
ology is stated by Fetscher in the following manner: 'Max Weber introduced 
the concept of objective possibility into the methodology of the social sciences 
in order to gain a criterion for the standard of the choice of historically re- 
levant facts out of the vast, heterogeneous continuum of reality' " 
174 
Weber 
argues that the social scientist seeks such facts as have a causal effect. 
The historian, for example, makes use of a thought experiment (Gedanken- 
experiment) when he takes over the thought process from the legal context 
of apportioning blame for certain events. Weber suggests that when one 
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asks 'under what circumstances can one assert that someone, through their 
action has "brought about" 
C'verursachtTj 
a definite external consequence' 
then this 'is purely a question of causality - and is clearly of the same 
logical structure as the historical question of causality' . 
175 Weber takes 
this mode of procedure as being applicable to individual action, whether of 
the historical individual or of the private person. The social scientist must 
impute objectively possible consequences of action from the myriad of 
possible factors. This involves the act of selection which is itself based 
upon our cognitive interests. Hence., Weber argues, 'the possibility of a 
selection from amongst the infinity of determinants is determined first of 
al I by the nature of our historical interest . 
176 
This concept of objective 
possibility must commence from a rational reconstruction of alternative 
developmental possibilities, but can also take account of irrationality since 
rationality is only a tendency within the necessarily heterogeneous continuum 
of reality and can never be complete. 
177 
However, Fetscher argues that there are two crucial limitations in the use 
of the notion of objective possibility in Weber's work, both of which Lukäcs, 
in turn, seeks to overcome. The first is that the rational calculating individual 
is the sole basis of objective possibilities. Fetscher argues that Weber fails 
to examine the historical development of such a bourgeois individual. One 
might add that this individual remains a crucial ideal-typical construct in 
the social sciences and especially in political economy. Secondly, Fetscher 
argues that for Weber the actions of collectivities are either left out of 
account or are reduced to instances of individual action: 'community action 
and social action are merely specific forms of the action of individuals' . 
178 
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Certainly, Weber was strictly opposed to collective notions and he sought 
'to put an end to the use of collective concepts, a use which still haunts 
us. In other words: even sociology can only start from the action of one or 
a few or many individuals, i. e. pursue a strictly "individualistic" method' . 
179 
Lukäcs is one of the first writers within the Marxist tradition to both apply 
Weber's notions of objective possibility and imputation in a new direction 
and to attempt to solve the weaknesses of the concepts as outlined by Fet- 
scher. Lukäcs acknowledges that the notion of imputation is borrowed from 
Weber and that the notion of the ideal type occurs in Marxism, for example, 
as 'the very important category of the "economic personal' 1. However, he 
suggeststhat he cannot at present take up 'the relation of historical material- 
ism to comparable trends in bourgeois thought (such as Max Weber's ideal 
types)'. 
180 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, Lukäcs, like Weber, is in- 
volved with theoretical constructs, with the construction of an adequate pro- 
letarian class consciousness just as Weber is concerned with the construct- 
ion of ideal types of rational action. However, Lukäcs relates the concrete 
class situation and 'objective' class interest to the objective structures of 
capitalist society as a totality. It is clear that for Weber the notion of 
society as a totality plays no role whatsoever in his use of the theory of 
objective possibility. Similarly, Lukäcs gives a historical dimension to 
the notion of objective possibility. A social class as an acting subject of 
a 
history not only construes the past but also the future objective possibilities. 
Thus, as Fetscher argues, Lukäcs' use of objective possibility extends far 
beyond that of Weber when he 
' 1. not only construes past but also future "objective 
possibilities" of class action and 
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2. seeks to demonstrate that political action on 
the basis of adequate proletarian class con- 
sciousness as the only conceivable way to 
overcome the antagonistic contradictions in 
the capitalist mode of production. The 
concept of "objective possibility" thereby 
takes on a radically different character and 
gains, as it were, an ontological and norm- 
ative dignity. 1 181 
It should by now be clear that Lukäcs' notion of imputed class consciousness 
is certainly not that of a sum of individuals but is only the action of a social 
class as a totality. In all these respects it diverges sharply from Weber's 
use of the theory of objective possibility. 
Even within Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Lukäcs' treatment of the 
realisation of the objective possibility of proletarian class consciousness 
changes as the work progresses. In the original essay (1920) on class 
consc i ousness, the influence of Rosa Luxemburg is still much in evidence and 
the degree of autonomous development of class consciousness appears to be 
much greater than in the essay on reification (1922) where its effects are 
seen to be all pervasive. This would imply that the development of class 
consciousness must be stimulated from outside. Hence, we find that in 
the essay on organisational problems (1922), Lenin's theory cf organisation 
of the communist party comes to the fore. Fetscher, in fact argues that the 
party takes on the form of objective possibility of proletarian class conscious- 
ness and hence, in terms of our earlier comparison, replaces Weber's ration- 
al calculating personality, except that whereas Weber's rationality of the 
bourgeois individual is limited, for Lukäcs the party's perfect rationality is 
limited only by the objective historical process. 
182 
Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that Lukäcs' argument as to the 
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objective possibility of the development of true class consciousness on the 
part of the working class remains extremely abstract. Although not entirely 
unaware of all the concrete problems involved in the development of class 
consciousness- for instance, Lukäcs merely remarks as an aside that 
'status consciousness -a real historical factor - masks class conscious- 
ness; in fact it prevents it from appearing at al i' 
183 
- Arato Is comment on 
Lukäcs' theory of class consciousness is apposite when he remarks that 
'not having thoroughly analysed e. g. the stratifications of. the working class, 
the social reproduction of the worker in the family, and in schools, and the 
political legitimation of the capitalist system of domination, Lukäcs never 
faced most of the constraints that interfere with the possibilities of class 
184 
consciousness' . But this is not surprising in view of his reluctance 
to confront 'empirical' class consciousness. 
V 
If Max Scheler's sociology of knowledge and his treatment of a base- 
superstructure model of social determination of thought can be characterised 
as one of the 'powerlessness of the mind' (Scheler's own phrase) in which 
the sheer massivity of the psycho-biologico-social base overdetermines the 
superstructure, then it is possible to see Lukäcs' position as, in some ways, 
representing the opposite standpoint. Whereas many writers within the 
Marxist tradition have been concerned with clarifying the manner = both 
' mechanistically and dialectically - in which the superstructure of society 
has its roots in a material base, it has been claimed that Lukäcs takes up 
an opposing position. Apitzsch, for example, argues that Lukäcs is not 
concerned with an attempt '- as Gramsci expresses it - to comprehend the 
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"material structure of ideology", but rather one might formulate it con- 
versely, that he seeks to grasp the structuring function of ideology in the 
base process itself'. 
185 This Is most obvious in Lukacs'I treatment of 
reification. Indeed, as far as the analysis of capitalist society is concerned, 
Lukacs had earlier sought to avoid the conceptual schemata of base and super- 
structure, though this was sometimes only partly successful, as when he 
writes that, 
' Ideological factors do not merely "mask" 
economic Interests, they are not merely 
the banners and slogans: they are the parts, 
the components of which the real struggle is 
made. Of course, If historical materialism 
is deployed to discover the sociological mean- 
ij of these struggles, economic interests 
will doubtless be revealed as the decisive 
factors in any explanation. ' 186 
InIthe later discussion of reification, Lukäcs moves further away from a simple 
base-superstructure dichotomy, as when he argues that 
'thought and existence are not identical in the 
sense that they "correspond" to each other, or 
"reflect" each other, that they "run parallel" 
to each other or "coincide" with each other 
(all these expressions are only concealed forms 
of a rigid duality). Rather their identity lies 
in the fact that they are moments of one and 
the same real-historical dialectical process. ' 
187 
Apitzsch argues, however, that a version of the base-superstructure model is 
retained in Luk&cs' work in that 
'on the one side we have the "true structure of 
society ... in the independent rationalised 
and formal partial laws" which, however, rest 
upon an irrational interpretation of the total 
process; on the other side we have the logic 
of the praxis of proletariat, its "intention to- 
wards totality", whose substance is in no way 
immediately given to it but rather only in re- 188 lation to the reifications produced by the bourgeoisie. ' 
k- 
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Certainly, in the reification article, there is a subjective-objective dialecti- 
cal process which pushes Lukacs' analysis back in the direction of a base- 
superstructure model. 
However, to return to the original suggestion made by Apitzsch that Lukäcs 
is concerned with 'the structuring function of ideology in the base process 
itself', this can be seen most clearly in the central section of Geschichte 
und Klassenbewusstsein which takes up the process of reification and its 
consequences for the working class. It is an analysis which points towards 
a new version of the sociology of knowledge in its widest sense, insofar as 
It takes the medium of communication in capitalist societies to be that of 
commodity production and holds the commodity to be the universal category 
of the whole of social existence under capitalism. Yet, as we shall see, 
such an analysis was not developed within the context of the sociology of 
knowledge in Germany, despite the very substantial Iinks between Lukäcs' 
analysis of reification and some aspects of the work of Weber and Simmel. 
Lükacs' analysis does, once more, illustrate his continued reliance upon 
German sociology even when he assumes that he has distanced himself from it. 
Lukäcs argues that the problem of commodities appears as the central, 
structural problem of capitalist society in all its manifestations in life' . 
18.9 
Lukäcs takes the essence of the commodity structure to be 'that a relation 
between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a "phantom 
objectivity", an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing 





He assumes that his own analysis is based on 'the Pre - 
supposition of Marx's economic analysis' and that this analysis will provide 
229 
us with 'a clear insight into the ideological problems of capitalism and its 
decline'. Thus, from the very outset of his account of reification, Lukäcs 
makes a number of questionable assumptions. He had earlier assumed that 
reification was the central barrier to the development of proletarian conscious- 
ness and that 'the ideological crisis of the proletariat' was the crucial prob- 
(em to be faced: 'Only the consciousness of the proletariat can point to the 
way that leads out of the impasse of capitalism. As long as this conscious- 
ness is lacking, the crisis remains permanent'. 
191 
This. 'permanent' 
crisis is, in fact, reinforced in Lukäcs' own analysis by the all-embracing 
process of reification. How this comes about must be central to our analysis 
of Lukäcs' account of reification. Secondly, Lukäcs assumes that his" 
account of reification is predicted upon Marx's analysis. This raises two 
issues: whether in fact the theory of reification does rest-upon Marx's anaiy- 
sis of the commodity structure and whether, in merely predicating this 
analysis, Lukacs confines himself to an account of the 'phenomena' of capital- 
ism and not its 'essence' . 
As far as can be discovered, Marx himself uses the concept of reification 
(Verdinglichung) only once in his work at the very end of volume three of 
Kapital, though within this same context he does refer to objectification 
(Versachlichung). 192 In this passage, in which the concept is obscured in 
the existing translation, and part of which Lukäcs himself refers to (though 
not, strangely enough to this sole reference to reification), Marx refers to 
a 
'the mystification of the capitalist mode of production, the reification 
(Verdinglichung) of social relations' 
193 
and to 'the enchanted, perverted, 
topsy=turvey world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madame La Terre do 
their ghost-walking as social characters and at the same time as mere things'. 
194 
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All this is within the context of a critique of vulgar economy and a three 
factors of production account of the capitalist mode of production which 
Marx refers to as 'the trinity formula. It is perhaps ironic that Lukäcs 
should cite this passage in which Marx castigates vulgar economics' evasion 
of the relationship between the three kinds of revenue - wages, rent, inter- 
est - and their origin In the extraction of surplus value through exploitat- 
ion since Lukäcs himself consistently avoids the theory of surplus value and 
exploitation in his own analysis of capitalism. 
The concept of reification does appear in the work of Nietzsche and, more 
significantly, on several occasions in Georg Simmel's Philosophy of Money 
which, as Lukäcs himself subsequently acknowledge, had been highly in- 
fluential in relation to his earlier development. 
195 
Hence there must arise 
in any analysis of Lukäcs' discussion of the reification process the extent 
to which Simmel's own theory of reification finds echoes in Lukäcs' Marx- 
ist work. In this context, It is important to point out that reification does 
f 
not merely appear as a concept within Simmel's work but also as a theory 
of cultural alienation. Significantly, Lukäcs, like Simmel, makes no dis- 
Unction between reification and objectification. Thus, even at a preliminary 
glance, the question as to whether Lukäcs' account of reification 'presupposes' 
Marx's analysis has many other ramifications than a mere clarification- of the 
faithfulness' of Luk cs' account in relation to Marx would suggest. Lukäcs' 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein potentially offered the most forceful and 
original statement of a critique of ideology in the Marxist tradition. It has 
been clearly demonstrated by Lenk that the sociology of knowledge tradition 
44 
in Germany was seriously deficient both in its knowledge and understanding 




work Is particularly significant in this context since it provided a correct- 
ive and an alternative to the often vulgar Marxism of the Second Internation- 
al which was caricatured in the German sociological tradition as a whole. 
Lukacs' own understanding and presentation of a critique of ideology with- 
in the Marxist tradition is therefore worthy of careful Investigation. 
The extent to which Lukäcs' analysis of reification does differ in many 
respects from that of Marc must be placed within the context of LukäcsI 
analysis of capitalist society and its 'ideological problems'. For Lukäcs, 
the decisive determining factor in Social consciousness under capitalism 
was not the contradiction between labour and capital, between the relations 
and forces of production but the reified nature of the commodity structure. 
197 
The reification produced by commodity relations 
is seen by Lukäcs to be 
all-pervasive; Indeed capitalism itself seems to take on the character of a 
'hermetic totality of reification, in which the 
material forces of production combine with 
the capitalist relations of production into a 
negative homogeneity whereas Marx saw 
the decisive dynamics of capitalist society 
which ultimately necessarily were revolution- 
ary as being based upon this increasingly 
explosive contradiction between productive 
forces and the capitalist relations of production. '198 
We may question the automatic nature of this contradiction posited here but 
the central point which Karnmler makes is important, namely, that Lukäcs 
removcsthis dimension from his analysis of capitalism. 
4 
Recent studies by Maretsky, 
199 
Kammler200 and Grunenberg201 have 
argued that Lukäcs' analysis of capitalism is indeed almost consistently at 
variance with Marx's own. Grunenberg, for example, demonstrates that 
Lukäcs' account of the emergence of reification differs markedly from Marx's 
account of the development of capitalism in important respects. Lukäcs 
argues that reification emerges with the transition from simple to capitalist 
commodity production and implies a qualitative distinction between the two 
types of commodity production: 'The distinction between a society where 
this form 
[commodity 
form D. FF is dominant, permeating every expression 
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of life, and society where it only makes an episodic appearance is essentially 
in 
one of quality' . 
202 
Grunenberg argues thattLukacs' working out of this dis- 
Unction there lie two erroneous assessments of simple commodity product- 
ion. On the one hand, Lukacs romanticizes simple commodity production 
end speaks of 'an organic process within a community' . On the other, 
Lukäcs argues that only under capitalism does the mode of production 
determine social life whereas in pre-capitalist societies it was determined 
by 'state-legal forms' . 
203 
Neither view can be traced back to Marx. Once 
the commodity has become 'the universal category of society', 
'a man's own activity, his own labour becomes 
something objective and independent of him, 
something that controls him by virtue of an 
autonomy alien to man. There is both an 
objective and a subjective side to this phen- 
omenon. Objectively a world of objects 
and relations between things springs into 
being ... Subjectively ... a man's 
activity becomes estranged from himself, 
it turns into a commodity which, subject 
to the non-human objectivity of the natural 
laws of society, must go its own way inde- 
pendently of man just like any consumer article. '204 
Grunenberg rightly remarks on this passage that, whereas Marx speaks of 
the relationship of producers to the total societal labour and hence of the 
dual nature of the commodity of labour as labour and as labour power, 'Lukäcs 
explains the same problem in terms of the distancing of the worker from the 
product of his labour, as the confrontation of producer and product' . 
205 
In 
this respect, Lukäcs' analysis here remains at the level of 'the super- 
hL 
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ficialities of the phenomena of capitalist commodity production' 
206 
However, what Grunenberg fails to point out is the close relationship between 
this analysis in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and Lukäcs' earlier 
accounts of estrangement. Similarly, what is also omitted is the affinities 
which both these accounts possess with Simmel Is own theory of reification 
upon which Lukäcs had so heavily relied in his 'Sociology of Modern Drama'. 
207 
It is almost as' if Lukäcs retained Simmel Is theory of cultural reification and 
sought to give a justification for it, an explanation of it in terms of Marx's 
account of commodity fetishism - which is certainly a dimension that is absent 
from Simmel's theory of reification. Nonetheless, Simmel's theory of 
reification also rests upon the separation of the product from its producer and 
goes on to emphasize the ramifications of this process in the division of 
labour. This is precisely what Lukäcs does, except that his grounding of 
reification in the labour process is heavily indebted to Max Weber's analysis 
of rationalisation and the universalisation of rational calculation. And in 
terms of tracing antecedents here, we do not know enough about the extent to 
which Weber himself drew upon Simmel's work, though we do know that he 
was highly impressed by his Philosophy of Money. 
208 
This work does 
contain a remarkable analysis of the processes of reification, fragmentat- 
ion, atomisation, "objectification and standardisation brought about by the 
division of labour. Thus, when writers like Grunenberg comment on the 
S extent to which Lukäcs I account of reification deviates from that of Marx they 
may be pointing not merely to Lukäcs' misinterpretation of Marx and a con- 
siderable reliance upon Weber's work on rationalisation but also to Simmel's 
analysis of the consequences of the division of labour. For it is certainly 
not Weber but Simmel who devoted so much attention of the analysis of the 
234 
consequences of the division of labour. It is also Simmel, incidentally, 
who was the only writer, within the German sociological tradition in this 
period - with the exception of Sombart - to take up Marx's labour theory of 
value and, whatever the mistaken nature of his critique, subject it to criti- 
209 
cism. 
At a different level, Lukacs' description of the situation of the bourgeoisie 
trapped in the reified world which they created as a 'tragic' one clearly echoes 
not merely his own earlier writings-and perhaps his own situation - but also 
the tragic consciousness of Simmel. Simmel, too, sees the precarious 
position of the individual threatened by the processes of reification as pro- 
foundly tragic and is pessimistic and melancholic. At the level of everyday 
consciousness and with the universalisation of the reification process, Lukäcs' 
argument is also pessimistic. All social groups are trapped in this reified 
totality. This is, in fact, a constituent element of what Fehr has termed 
Lukäcs' 'romantic anti-capitalism' which was evident in his response to the 
First World War and which explains his relationship to other 'romantics' such 
as Paul Ernst. 
210 What saves Lukäcs from offering a totally pessimistic 
picture is his messianic postulation of an abstract proletariat (or an equally 
abstract party) as the potential identical-subject-object of history. That 
is, the pessimism which one could ascribe to-the empirical world is 
cancelled out by the ungrounded optimism of a messianic philosophy of 
4 
history. 
Lukäcs argues that it is only when the commodity is 'the universal category 
of society as a whole' does it 'become crucial for the subjugation of men's ! 'ý 
--- - 
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consciousness to the forms in which this reification finds expression and for 
their attempts to comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous 
effects and liberate themselves from servitude to the "second nature" so 
created' . 
211 
This 'subjugation' to 'the forms in which this reification finds 
expression' derives ultimately from the labour process. More specifically 
it derives from the progressive rationalisation of the division of labour. 
The transition to, machine industry exhibits 
'a continuous trend towards greater rational- 
isation, an increasingly intensified elimination 
of the qualitative, human-individual qualities 
of the worker. On the one hand, the labour 
process is progressively broken down into abstract, 
rational, specialised operations, so that the re- 
I of the worker to the product as a whole 
is broken and his work is reduced to a specific 
function that is mechanically repeated. On the 
other hand, socially necessary labour time, the 
basis for rational calculation, is converted, as 
mechanisation and rationalisation of the labour 
process from a merely empirically perceivable 
average labour time to an objectively calculable 
work-stint that confronts the worker as a fixed 
and autonomous objectivity. With the modern, 
"psychological" analysis of the work process 
(the Taylor system) this rational mechanisation 
is projected right into the worker's "soul" : 
even his psychological attributes are separated 
from his total personality and placed in opposition 
to it so as to facilitate their integration into 
specialised rational systems and their reduction 
to statistically viable concepts. ' 212 
The analysis of the progressive rationalisation of the division of labour within 
the factory and its progressive calculability is then extended, without further 
argument, to the functioning of the social division of labour as a whole. 
4 Again, as Grunenberg points out, Marx established a basic distinction be- 
tween the division of labour within the factory and within society as a whole 
in order to demonstrate the contradiction between the seemingly planned ;.. 
nature of the division of labour within the factory and its totally unplanned 
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nature in society as a whole, between the concentration of the means of 
production in the hands of capitalists and the fragmentation of these means 
as far as workers are concerned. 
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Lukäcs, in contrast, argues that the 
internal organisation of the factory contains 'in a concentrated form the 
whole structure of capitalist society 1.214 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Lukäcs' account of this process moves in a 
direction totally at variance to that of Marx. It is concerned with 'the 
principle at work here: the principle of rationalisation, based on what is and 
can be calculated I. 
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This Weberian grounding of the nature of capitalism 
moves further and further away from the capitalist process of accumulation, 
the theory of surplus value and exploitation. It thereby removes from the 
analysis of capitalism all those contradictions which Marx held to constitute 
the dynamic of capitalist societies. Instead, Lukäcs proceeds to examine 
two crucial changes brought about by rationalisation. Firstly, this increased 
calculability of the work process becomes 'the objective synthesis of 
rationalised special systems whose unity is determined by pure calculation'. 
Hence this results in the 'fragmentation of the object of production'. 
Secondly, the subject of production, the worker, too becomes fragmented; 
he becomes 'a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical system', a 
system which functions independently of him so that 'his activity becomes 
ontemplative' . 
216 This con- less and less active and more and more contemplative'. 
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I 
templative stance indtced by the workers' confrontation with the mechanical 
fixed laws of the machine process 'must likewise transform the basic cate- 
gories of man's immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space and time 





Confronted with this reification-, 'the personality can do no more than look 
on helplessly while its own existence is reduced to an isolated particle and 
fed into an alien system' . 
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But 'this isolation and fragmentation is only 
apparent'. It is merely 'the reflex in consciousness of the fact that the 
"natural laws" of capitalist production have been extended to cover every 
manifestation of Iife in society' . 
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This all-pervasive 'principle, of rational mechanisation and calculability' 
and its attendant reification leads Lukäcs into viewing the modern division 
of labour 'exclusively from the aspect of an increasingly more total inhuman- 
1ty! 
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and-provides his analysis with a fateful tragic conception of the 
possibilities-of overcoming this fate. The structural contradiction in capital- 
ist society cannot be overcome by means of any changes in that society's 
structure. " Lukäcs has provided us with an account of a one dimensional 
process of reification which has affinities not merely with Weber's but also 
with Simmel Is analyses. As Grunenberg argues, Iit Is apparent In Lukäcs' 
analysis of the division of labour, which he conceives solely as a "question 
of organisation", that for him his concern is not with a materialist analysis 
of the capitalist mode of production but rather with an earlier cultural- 
critical description'. 
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But Grunenberg goes on to ascribe this to Lukäcs' 
increasing reliance upon Weber's account of capitalism and his attempt to 
fuse this analysis with that of Marx. Certainly the discussion of rational 
calculation and, in part, the emphasis upon the organisation of work do rest 
upon Weber Is analysis of capitalism. But in several respects, Lukäcs' 
account of reification, especially in relation to the division of labour, could 
readily be derived from Simmel Is account in the Philosophy of Money. 
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It has already been suggested that Lukäcs' tragic conception of the fate of 
the bourgeoisie owes much to his own earlier writings and also to Simmel's 
own tragic vision. Of more relevance in the present context is Simmel's 
account of the consequences of the division of labour. In the last chapter 
of the Philosophy of Money, Simmel, like Lukäcs, views these consequences 
largely in terms of the relationship between the producer and his product. 
The extension of the division of labour 'is achieved at the expense of the 
individual producer' who is 'robbed of energy essential for the harmonious 
development of the self '. 
222 Similarly, the 'lack of vital congruence 
between the worker and his product ... makes it particularly easy for the 
product to become completely divorced from the worker', it acquires a 
'fragmentary character'- and becomes 'an objective achievement detached 
from the individual', something 'purely impersonal and autonomous'. 
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Furthermore, 'in addition to the means of work, actual work itself becomes 
separated from the worker. This is what is meant by saying that labour 
has become a commodity' and implies that as a commodity it has become 
'something objective in relation to the worker himself, something which not 
only is no longer him, but which he no' longer even has'. 
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It is worth 
noting in passing here that Lukäcs, like Simmel, does not distinguish 
between labour and labour power in this context. Finally, it, is worth pointing 
to Simmel's argument that the division of labour affects the products too 
such that 'the products of capitalist labour are objects with a definite in- 
dependent existence, possessing ehir own dynamic laws and alien to the very 
i 
Individuals who produce them '. 
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It hardly requires pointing out how close 
this kind of analysis of the division of labour is to that advanced by Lukäcs 
in his account of the development of reification. One might even go further 
here and suggest that the manner in which Lukäcs presents us with the con- 
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tradiction between a determined totality of reified existence and the necessity 
of generating 'true' consciousness outside this totality has some affinity 
between Simmel Is opposition between objective and subjective culture. - In 
both cases, one can only be pessimistic with regard to the objective struct- 
ures and optimistic (messianic) with regard to the possibilities for human 
consciousness. Of course, in Simmel's case, it is the autonomous in- 
dividual who must be preserved; for Lukäcs, it is revolutionary proletarian 
class consciousness and later the revolutionary party that is the motor for 
change'. ' -I 
The increasing reliance upon Max Weber's analysis of capitalism is also 
very much apparent. ' Lukäcs, like Weber, emphasises rational. calculability 
as a crucial feature of capitalism, indeed as the basic principle generating 
reification. Yet, as Grunenberg points out 'the principle of rational cal- 
culation'was ... for Weber, not only applicable to the developed capitalist 
mode of production but in his view determined the whole course of develop- 
ment since the middle ages'. 
226 Similarly, Maretsky has argued that the 
manner in which Lukacs takes over Weber's account of capitalism has im- 
portant consequences for his own analysis. Maretsky argues that Lukäcs 
takes over Weber's notion of the hierarchical organisation of the labour process 
without realising that its consequence is that 'tho opposition between pro- 
party and lack of property, capital and wage labour is therby no longer a 




Maretsky also claims, though with less justification, that the 
discrepancy between part and whole upon which Lukäcs places great emphasis 
is merely the other side of Weber's distinction between formal and substantive 
rationality. 
228 
He also concludes, like Kammier and Grunenbörg, that 
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LukS, cs' identification of the development of reification ensures that revol- 
utionary possibilities are absent within the capitalist mode of production and 
that hence a revolutionary proletarian consciousness has to be developed out- 
side this process. 
What are the consequences,, then for Lukäcs' theory of reification? There 
exists a contradiction between Lukäcs' avowed aim of understanding Marx's 
work and his actual analysis of capitalist society which diverges sharply from 
that of Marx. Thus, there is a hiatus between what Lukäcs assumes he is 
doing and what he actually does. This means that it becomes difficult to see 
Lukäcs' analysis of reification as an extension of Marx's critique of ideology, 
even though it may have been intended as such. Rather, a strong case can 
be made for saying that it is an extension of the critique of culture - already 
commenced by Lukäcs - that has its origins in the work of Weber. and Simmel 
no less than in that of Marx. Of course, LukäcsI critique is more radical 
and in many respects takes up Marxist position. Had it not done so, it 
would not: have proved such an irritating work for so many orthodox Marxists. 
At the other end of this spectrum, as it-were, and unlike Lenk, for example, 
/n 
who tends to draw a sharp demarcation line between the sociology of know- 
ledge in Germany (especially that of Scheler and Mannheim), It Is possible 
to argue for Lukäcs' theory of reification that not only does it share many 
elements in the German sociological tradition but also that the distance 
between the two is not necessarily as great as has been assumed. Certain- 
ly Lukäcs' theory of reification, though not taken up in the German sociology 
of knowledge tradition, was highly important for the development of the work 
of the early Frankfurt School, especially Horkheimer, Adorno and possibly 
Benjamin. Not surprisingly this tradition, too, claimed to be extending 
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Marx's critique of ideology and, since it developed, in part, at the same 
time as the sociology of knowledge always drew a sharp demarcation line 
betweeh critical theory and the sociology of knowledge. Be that as it 
may, its strong Hegelian impetus and its cultural critique owed much to 
Lukäcs' work. 
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In that cultural critique, Lukäcs' theory of reification 
proved to be a central motif, even retaining some of its political implicat- 
ions (whilst usually rejecting Lukäcs' optimism with regard to proletarian 
consciousness and the revolutionary party). 
But Lukäcs' theory of reification did not terminate with an analysis of the 
origins of reification in the division of labour and the universalisation of the 
principle of rational calculation. Lukäcs went on to show why two avenues 
to an escape from reification did not in fact exist - namely, science and 
philosophy. Unlike many subsequent and present-day theorists who seek to 
preserve at least one of these avenues by a sharp demarcation between science 
and ideology, Lukäcs saw science - and philosophy - as being trapped within 
the reified consciousness that had. permeated every other area of life. In 
the course of presenting this argument, Lukäcs provided a sustained critique 
of German philosophy. Part of this critique involved - probably unwittingly - 
a severe attack upon a position in the sociology of knowledge that was sub- 
saquently taken up by Mannheim. 
Even in removing science as a possible candidate for providing a view of 
f 
the totality, Lukäcs developed an argument that was later to be central to 
Mannheim's concerns, if only in relation to the social sciences. Lukacs 
argues that the increased specialisation that is attendant upon a more advanced 
division of labour ' leads to the destruction of every imacio of the whole' . 
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This is no less true of modern science since 
the more intricate a modern science becomes 
and the better it understands itself methodolog. i- 
cally, the more resolutely it will turn its back 
on the ontological problems of its own sphere of 
influence and eliminate them from the realm 
where it has achieved some insight. The more 
highly developed it becomes and the more 
scientific, the more it will become a formally 
closed system of partial laws. It will then find 
that the world lying beyond its confines, and in 
particular the material base which it is its task 
to understand, its own concrete underlying reality 
lies, methodologically and in principle, beyond 
its grasp. ' 230 
Not only is the position stated here the central problematic of the Frankfurt 
School's subsequent critique of positivism - lack of self reflection, a closed 
system of laws unrelated to actual reality, the absence of a grasp of the 
totality - but it is also a statement of Mannheim's avowed intention in provid- 
ing a sociology of knowledge that will form the basis for the social sciences. 
However, this is not the direction taken by Lukäcs here. Rather, Lukäcs 
goes on to argue that in the social sciences, and especially in bourgeois pol- 
itical economy, 'it is the very success with which the economy Is totally 
rationalised and transformed into an abstract and mathematically orientated 
system of formal "laws" that creates the methodological barrier to under- 
standing the phenomenon of crisis' . 
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Both modern economics and law 
are permeated by formal rationality so that, for example, law becomes merely 
! 'a formal calculus' and its substantive basis and the basis for its trans- 
formation is lost from view. Again it is worth noting how much Lukäcs 
I relies for his critique upon Weber and, in the case of law, Jellinek. 
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This same critique is extended to philosophy which has also succumbed to 
the formalised reifications of the special sciences. Lukäcs is aware that 
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there is a desire for philosophy to synthesize, to achieve a grasp of 'that 
overall knowledge which the particular sciences have so conspicuously re- 
nouncedtbut argues that such a synthesis would have to do more than 'unite 
the special sciences mechanically: they would have to be transformed in- 
wardly by an inwardly synthesizing method'. 
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However, it is not possible 
for philosophy to perform this task since, 
'philosophy stands in the same relation to the 
special sciences as they do with respect to 
empirical reality. The formalistic concept- 
ualisation of the special sciences become for 
philosophy an immutably given substratum and 
this signals the final and despairing renunciation 
of every attempt to cast light on the reifi23tion 
that Iies at the root of this formalism. ' 
4 
Hence, neither science'nor philosophy can, for Lukacs, provide a way out 
of the reified structures and formalism that has been established by the uni- 
versalisation of the commodity form. As we shall see, Lukäcs once more 
sets out a problematic - the impossibility of a traditional philosophical 
synthesis - which provides a starting point for Mannheim's subsequent 
attempt to provide a dynamic synthesis of perspectives. Once more, the 
logic of Lukcl'jcs' argument blocks any path towards Mannheim's solution of 
this problem. 
In his analysis of classical philosophy - which can'in part be understood as 
ä philosophical-sociological critique of the development of modern philosophy - 
Luk&cs argues that it was bourgeois society itself - its structure and its 
J 
organisation - which prevented modern philosophy from solving the problem 
of the thing-in-itself, the relation between subject and object and other 
'antinomies of bourgeois thought'. It is a philosophy which 'springs from 
the reified structure of consciousness' and which ultimately remains within 
its confines since 
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' it did not manage to do more than provide 
a complete intellectual reproduction and 
the a priori deduction of bourgois society. 
It is only the manner of this deduction, 
namely the dialectical method that points 
beyond bourgeois society. And even in 
classical philosophy this is only expressed 
in the form of an unsolved and insoluble antinomy. X235 
Even at its most critical moments it was unable 'to break out of the limits 
imposed on formal and rationalistic (bourgeois, reified) thought'. In terms 
of a sociology of knowledge, what Lukacs offers us here is an account of the 
way in which the reifications in commodity structure permeate all aspects 
of life; these reifications permeate human consciousness and give it a 
particular structure; at an abstract IeveI, these reifications are 'reproduced' 
in philosophy in the form of a series of insoluble antinomies; this philosophy 
possesses a similar (identical) structure to that of bourgeios society since 
it, too, attempts to 'universalise rationalism' . There isa danger in such 
an analysis of reading back the structure of a specific society into the past 
in order to account for the structure of thought of earlier philosophers who, 
though 'bourgeois', can hardly be said to have lived in a society that was 
thoroughly 'bourgeois' . 
However, in the course of his analysis of the antinomies of bourgeois 
thought, Lukäcs also makes other connections between consciousness and 
society which refine and complicate the simple notion of a 'reproduction'. 
Reference has already been made to Lukäcs' argument concerning the in- 
f creasing control of society by the bourgeoisie. In the present context Lukäcs 
even seems to suggest that it is 'the thought of bourgeois society' which 
'acquires increasing control over the details of its social existence, sub- 
jecting them to its needs. On the other hand it loses - likewise progressively - 
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the possibility of gaining control of society as a whole '. 
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This apparently 
idealist stance in which consciousness determines existence is a central 
theme of Lukacs'analysis in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. There 
is thus no simple mechanistic base-superstructure dichotomy at this level of 
Lukäcs' analysis. Instead, there is an attempt to argue that when con- 
sciousness has permeated the material basis of society (division of labour, 
commodity structure) it in turn reacts back upon the consciousness. This 
is presumably Lukäcs' view of the role of the natural sciences, as when he 
argues that 
'all human relations (viewed as the objects of 
social activity) assume increasingly the object- 
i ve forms of the abstract elements of the con- 
ceptual systems of natural science and of the 
abstract substrata of the laws of nature. ' 237 
Lukacs here, as elsewhere, is prone to obscuring the material nature of 
scientific activity and in fact ascribing to its intellectual content (its 
theories, its laws) a determining function which it would be difficult to 
substantiate. Nowhere does Lukäcs attempt to answer the question as to 
why it is, even within the framework of his own views, that the natural 
sciences can exert such a decisive influence. Presumably this could only 
be' because they are central to the reproduction of surplus value and capital 
accumulation, as Marx argues in Capital. However, as with the roots of 
reification, this dimension of his analysis is absent. 
I/ 
Lukäcs is indeed at pains to show that neither science nor philosophy are 
I 
capable of a transformation of bourgeois society since both are caught up 
in the systems of reified relations of that society. The only way out of this 
reified consciousness lies in the development of the revolutionary conscious- 
ness of the proletariat and its realisation in praxis. In the course of this 
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final section of the essay on reification, Lukäcs not merely elaborates upon - 
and sometimes contradicts - his earlier discussion of class consciousness 
and the means whereby knowledge of society as a totality can be appro- 
priated but also develops a theory of the relationship between consciousness 
and existence that is relevant for the development of the sociology of 
knowledge. This is especially true of his critique of a reflection theory of 
truth and his treatment of the relativism problem. 
Lukäcs develops the problem of mediation in greater detail than in his essays 
on class consciousness and orthodox Marxism. As in the essay on class 
consciousness, Lukäcs asserts that 'the objective reality of social existence 
is in its immediacy "the same" for both proletariat and bourgeoisie' . But 
he goes on to argue that the 'specific categories of mediation' through which 
this immediacy becomes 'the authentically objective reality' are 'funda- 
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mentally different' and that this is related to their different positions in the 
economic process. In a critique of the neo-Kantian standpoint on historical 
knowledge and its reliance - at least in Rickert's work - upon 'cultural 
values' as an index of its objectivity, Lukäcs argues that the bourgeoisie is 
unable to advance beyond the level of immediacy; it remains trapped in the 
givenness of its existence. The proletariat, however, is able to advance 
beyond the level of immediacy as far as Lukäcs is concerned because 'once 
this immediacy turns out to be the consequence of a multiplicity of 
mediations' the worker's consciousness 'is the self-consciousness of the 
0 
of the commodity; or in other words it is the self-knowledge, the self- 
revelation of the capitalist society founded upon the production and exchange 
of commodities' 
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And it is not merely a question of becoming conscious 
since 'this knowledge brings about an objective structural change in the 
247 
object of knowledge' 
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For the working class this implies that the aware- 
ness that its commodity - labour power - is a use value which generates 
surplus valuo 'becomes social reality'. 
What Lukäcs offers us is the same problem which was confronted in the 
essay on class consciousness, and even earlier, namely, the radical 
disjunction between a level of empirical immediacy and objective possibility, 
between the 'given' consciousness of the proletariat and a philosophy of 
history in which only proletarian class consciousness yields a knowledge 
of the totality of society. What is different is that here the problem is 
raised a stage further along the path to class consciousness. Nowhere does 
Lukäcs specify to any degree of concreteness how this class consciousness 
emerges. Instead, he takes up the implications of the situation in which 
it has emerged and leaves the process by which workers become aware of 
their position within the commodity structure obscure. In turn, this can 
again only open up the possibility for stimulating this process from outside - 
from the intervention of the revolutionary party. In other respects, the 
view of capitalist society remains the same as that found in the essay on 
class consciousness. Thus, for example, Lukäcs argues that with regard 
to commodity production 'interrupted abruptly now and again by "irrational" 
catastrophes, the way is opened up for an infinite progression leading to the 
through-going capitalist rationalisation of society as a whole' . 
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It is by removing this reified veil from the world produced by this rational- 
isation that we are able to recognise that history is a process which is made 
by human beings. When this occurs, the ' image of a frozen reality that 





However, to take man as the measure of all 
things can lead to a relativist standpoint. Lukfcs argues that 'relativism 
moves within an essentially static world'. He seeks to distinguish this 
relativism from his own position which attempts to expose the historical 
function and meaning of particular truths. To do this he argues that 
'it is one thing to relativise the truth about 
an individual or a species in an ultimately 
static world ... And it is quite another 
matter when the concrete, historical function 
and meaning of the various "truths" is revealed 
within a unique, concretised historical process. 
Only in the former case can we accurately speak 
of relativism. ' 243 
All relativism rests ultimately on the assertion of some absolute and in its 
i 
present-day versions represents merely a symptom of the crisis in contem- 
I 
porary society. In a passage that is central to his understanding of relativ- 
ism and which unwittingly offers a critique of the positions of both Scheler 
and Mannheim, Lukäcs asserts that what modern relativists do is. _, 
'to take the present philosophy of man with 
its social and historical limits and to allow 
these to ossify into an "eternal "Iimit of a 
biological or pragmatic sort . Actuated 
either by doubt or despair they thus stand 
revealed as a decadent version of the very 
rationalism or religiosity they mean to oppose. 
Hence they may sometimes be a not unimport- 
ant symptom of the inner weakness of the 
society which produced the rationalism they 
are "combating". But they are significant 
only as symptoms. 1 
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Indeed, Lukäcs goes further and argues that at the present time 'the only 
i 
possible function of truth is to establish the various possible attitudes to 
an essentially uncomprehended world in accordance with man's needs in the 
struggle to master his environment'. In this reified world, truth can only 
be objective 'relative to the standpoint of the individual classes and the 
249 
objective realities corresponding to it'. 
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In other words, within this 
context, truth can only be relative in Lukäcs' second sense of the term. But 
his argument does not stop here. He goes on to suggest that once mankind 
has understood and changed 'the foundations of its existence' the notion of 
truth wil I, take on its true form as the ' (societal) self-knowledge of man'. 
This is because the grounds for the existence of the relative and the absolute 
will have disappeared in the process of de-reification, a process which 
commences 'when the proletariat becomes conscious of its own class point 
of view'. >- 
What Lukäcs seems to be arguing here is that what is true is related to the 
historical process, which is capable of being transformed. This implies 
that truth is not relative to a static historical process which is posited as an 
absolute but that certain groups are at given periods of time capable of trans- 
forming this historical process of which they are a part. In present circum- 
stances this is, for Lukäcs, represented by the proletariat. Hence the im- 
portance of the transformation of its consciousness in order for it to trans- 
form capitalist society. In turn, as we have seen, this does not imply that 
the actual working class at any one point of time is capable of effecting this 
transformation. Rather it means for Lukäcs that there exists an objective 
possibility for its role as the transformer of society. Unfortunately, we 
also know that Lukäcs' argument for stating that the proletariat is the identi- 
cal subject-object of history rests very uneasily beside his notion of their 
.F 
concrete situation and that the links between the two are unsuccessfully 
eI aborated. 
Lukacs adopts a theory of reality as a process of becoming which means, 
250 
in turn, that his criterion of truth is not a simple correspondence theory. He 
argues that 'the criterion of truth is provided by relevance to reality. This 
reality is by no means identical with empirical existence. This reality is 
not, it becomes' . 
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However, the dominant stance adopted towards 
'reality' by a reified consciousness is a contemplative one - subject and 
object are always separate entities. Lukäcs argues that thought itself must 
be conceived of as a form of reality that is in the process of changing. 
This notion of reality as a process of becoming also has an important im- 
plication for historical knowledge. Lukacs asserts that 'as long as man 
concentrates his interest contemplatively upon the past or future, both ossify 
into an alien existence. And between the subject and the object lies the un- 
bridgeable "pernicious chasm" of the present'. 
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It is possible to see this 
specific problem of historical knowledge as lying at the heart of Mannheim's 
discussion of ideology and utopia and his attempt to grasp knowledge of the 
present. In Ideologie und Utopie, for example, Mannheim too conceives of 
a 'total coincidence between existence and consciousness in a universe 
which has ceased being in a state of becoming'. 
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it must remain an open 
question for the moment as to whether Mannheim finds a way out of this 
'pernicious chasm'. 
1 0* Lukäcs thus appears to reject a correspondence theory of truth. He argues 
this most sharply when he suggests that 
I 
'thought and existence are not identical in 
the sense that they "correspond" to each 
other, or "reflect" each other, that they 
"run parallel" to each other or "coincide" 
with each other (all expressions that con- 
ceal a rigid duality). Their identity is 
that they are aspects of one and the same 
251 
real historical and dialectical process. 1249 
In a sense what Lukaocs is asserting here is not a correspondence theory of 
truth but an identity theory of truth in which the problem is shifted further 
back to that of how to grasp the 'real historical and dialectical process' . 
And we know that for Luk1cs this is not produced through reflection, through 
the mere recognition of 'the process of becoming but through the realisation 
of such insights into practice. It is for this reason that Lukäcs asserts that 
'proletarian thought is in the first place merely a theory of praxis which only 
gradually (and indeed often spasmodically) transforms itself into a practical 
theory that overturns the real world' . 
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This not merely highlights once 
more 'the crisis of proletarian consciousness' and its importance but also 
points towards a necessary component of any theory and critique of ideology: 
namely, that a theory of ideology which asserts that ideological thought Is 
contemplative and is therefore unable to grasp (i. e. transform) reality must 
presuppose a theory of action. Similarly, Mannheim's theory of ideology 
is concerned precisely with the problem of how ideologies. prevent people 
from acting. In Lul. &cs' theory of reification we have an account of why the 
process of reification is a barrier to praxis, of why the frozen categories of a 
reified world merely cause people to reproduce the illusions of that world and 
prevent them from understanding its real basis. A critique of ideology 
therefore necessarily presupposes not merely the hermeneutic problem of 





Although it has not been possible to develop all the subsequent arguments 
in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and though the outline of Lukäcs' 
development has only been schematically presented, it should now be possible 
to return to the question which was posed at the beginning of this chapter; 
namely, what relevance is Lukäcs' work to the development of the sociology 
of knowledge in Germany? 
It is certainly true that Lukäcs' major work did not lead to the establishment 
of a major tradition in the sociology of knowledge in Germany. However, 
his extension of the critique of ideology to a theory of reification and his not- 
ion of false consciousness did play a central role in the development of 
Critical Theory, however much writers in that tradition - like Horkheimer - 
were already critical of Lukäcs' position. But the relevant articles produced 
by this group in the period under. consideration are concerned either with a 
critique of Mannheim (Horkheimer and Marcuse) 
251 
or with the reception of 
Marx's early writings (Marcuse). 
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In any case, it must be emphasized 
that, by and large, the early Frankfurt School distanced themselves from the 
sociology of knowledge tradition and the relationship between its members 
and Mannheim, for example, who was Professor of Sociology at Frankfurt 
from the summer semester of 1930 until 1933, was not close. Jay suggests 
that, at least in the early years of this tradition's development, the work of 
i Karl Korsch may have been more important in their formulation of a neo- 
Marxist position. 
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Within the more orthodox Marxist tradition, Lukäcs' Geschichte und Klassen- 
253 
bewusstsein suffered heavy criticism from writers like Rudas254 and 
Deborin. 
255 
Indeed Lukzcs himself in 1924 in his study, Lenin, 
256 
re- 
tracted his earlier position. It was therefore unlikely that Lukäcs' Geschichte 
und Klassenbewusstsein would have exercised a powerful influence upon the 
orthodox Marxist position. Positive critiques of his work were, however, 
provided by Revai, 
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Marck558 and, not surprisingly, Ernst Bloch. 
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But 
it remains doubtful whether one can say that Lukacs' work stimulated the 
development of a critical Marxism in this period - with the possible except- 
ion of the early writings of the Frankfurt School . Writers who did provide 
either contemporary critiques of ideology, such as Szende, or'critiques of 
orthodox Marxism, such as Korsch, appear to have developed their ideas in- 
dependently of Lukäcs, even though in Korsch's Marxismus und Philosophie - 
likewise condemned by the Comintern along with Lukäcs' Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein - there are many lines of thought which move In a direct- 
on similar to those of Lukacs. 
In this context, one can at least argue that Lukäcs provides a critique of 
orthodox Marxism both of the Second International and of the Comintern. 
More especially, Lukacs restored to Marxism the dialectical dimension which 
lay in Hegel 's philosophy and in Marx's own writings. What this implied 
was that Lukäcs aligned himself - however temporarily, in view of his re- 
traction of his views in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein - with those 
attempts at the development of a dialectical and historical theory of society - J 
along with writers like Korsch and Gramsci - which ran counter to the in- 
creasingly dominant mechanistic materialism. 
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More specifically, 
Lukäcs' work pointed. towards the rejection of a simple base-superstructure 
254 
theory of ideology with its associated reflection theory of truth. This is 
important in terms of the development of the sociology of knowledge since 
it was this caricature of the Marxist position which was the subject of cri- 
tiques by Scheler, Mannheim and others. However, this does not mean 
that the German sociology of knowledge tradition adopted Lukacs' standpoint, 
although Mannheim, whilst not accepting it, usually took it into account at 
crucial points of his development. Rather, it is the case that this tradition 
largely identified Marxism with its caricature and often attempted to reduce 
Lul< cs' position to such a caricature. This is particularly true, for example,. 
of Scheler's treatment of Marxism in this context. 
However, it has already been argued that there i 
amore 
compelling reason for 
taking Lukäcs I position into account. The relationship between the work of the 
early Lukäcs and that of Mannheim in Germany requires substantial re-examin- 
ation. Kettler has already demonstrated In Marxismus und Kultur the close 
links that existed between the two writers in Hungary up to the revolution in 
' 1919. At the substantive level, it has often been argued that the works of 
Lukäcs and Mannheim have much in common, at least in terms of their choice 
of problems though not their treatment of them. Gabel has argued this case 
most forcefully in a series of articles 
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and in his work False Consciousness. 
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He argues for instance that 
'Histoire et Conscience de Classe est sans doubte 
I'un des ouvrages les plus consequement dialect- 
iques de toute la litt6rature marxiste; avec 
Ideologie et Utopie de K. Mannheim, c'est 
aussle I'un des deux classiques du problemý63 
do I' id6ologie at de la fausse conscience. ' 
Similarly, Lucien Goldmann, although he often distanced the two writers con- 
siderably, did, on occasion, place Mannheim within a critical tradition in 
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which few other commentators would locate him. With reference to the 
relationship between Lukäcs' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and other 
European theorists, Goldmann suggest that, 
'A peine pare, il out un retentissement extra- 
ordinaire, fit naitre une sorte "d'ecole" 
thdoretique, dont les principaux repr6sentants 
furent: Karl Korsch, Herbert Marcuse et 
Karl Mannheim, mais suscita aussi des 
reactions Os gnergetiques dans les milieux 
du marxisme traditionnel 116s aux deux 
grands courants internationaux de la social- 
democratie et du communisme. ' 264 
Whilst few would probably agree with Goldmannss grouping together of these 
writers in this context, ' it does nonetheless point to a line of interpretation 
which must be taken into account at least as far as Lukacs and Mannheim are 
concerned. 
Perhaps the boldest statement of the case for reassessing Lukäcs' relevance 
for the sociology of knowledge and that of Mannheim in particular is that 
advanced by Watnick who, with reference to Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, 
states that 'it was Lukäcs' book which supplied much of the impetus for the 
development of a sociology of knowledge, particularly the form it took In the 
work of Mannheim', =especially since 'Lukäcs was the one to furnish him with 
two of his principal methodological tools'. 
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Yet as we have seen in our 
examination of Scheler's work, it would be difficult to argue that Lukäcs' work 
provided the impetus for his sociology of knowledge, even though a case can 
be made for suggesting that Scheler's attempt to confront the critique of ideol- 
ogy may have been in response to Lukacs' work. Therefore, whilst Watnick 
goes too far in attributing to Lukäcs the foundations of the German tradition 
in the sociology of knowledge, his argument is on firmer ground in'the case 
of Mannheim. This case has been made more recently by Lichtheim who has 
256-'ý. 
argued that (Ideology and Utopia (1929) was the positivist's rejoinder to 
History and Class Consciousness. Mannheim ... adapted what he could 
use for his own purpose' . 
266 
An attempt to substantiate this connection at 
a more concrete level has been made by Huaco who argues that compared with 
the central themes of Lukäcs' work 'Mannheim developed a synchronic or. 
atemporal version of essentially the same argument. There is a complete 
change of actors, but the formal similarity remains fundamental'. 
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it 
is these and similar claims which will be examined in the next chapter. 
What alI these arguments have in common, in contrast to the claims advanced 
by Adorno, Horkheimer and Lenk, is a view of the major works of Lukäcs and 
Mannheim in this period which seeks to break down the sharp demarcation line 
between Lukäcs' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein and some elements of 
the German sociology of knowledge tradition, especially the work of Mann- 
heim. It has been argued earlier that such arguments need not assume that 
Lukäcs was intent on writing a treatise on the sociology of knowledge in 
order for these connections to be made. Rather, a more general case can 
be made for suggesting that Lukäcs' early writings including Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein are central to a fuller understanding of the development 
of the sociology of knowledge tradition in Germany. 
Firstly, it has been shown that many of the roots of Lukäcs' early writings 
on the sociology of culture and the critique of ideology lie within a tradition 
0 
of German sociology (Simmel, Weber) and philosophy (DIIthey and neo- 
Kantians such as Rickert and Lask) that is shared by many of the writers in 
the sociology of knowledge. Of course, it is difficult to generalise such a 
statement which is more true for Mannheim than it is for Scheler. None- 
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theless, when commentators like Lenk offer an account of the German trad- 
ition in the sociology of knowledge - especially that of Scheler and Mannheim - 
in terms of its commitment to a 'tragic consciousness' that derives from, 
amongst others, Simmel and Weber, it is difficult not to extend this line of 
argument to Lukäcs as well whose thought certainly exemplifies, at various 
stages a 'tragic consciousness'. Lenk also argues, quite correctly, that 
the sociology of knowledge in Germany must be understood within the context 
of a wider sociology of culture, then this argument too applies not only to 
Scheler and Mannheim but also to Lukäcs. In some respects, even, It might 
apply more to Lukäcs than to either Scheler or Mannheim. One reviewer of 
Lukäcs' Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Siegfried Marck, suggests that 
his philosophy of Marxism does not rest upon methodological questions of 
sociology and economics)as in the case of writers like Max Adler but rather 
'provides a comprehensive philosophy of culture, indeed from Lukäcs' stand- 
point, implies the sole possible solution to the fundamental cultural philo- 
sophical problems of the present time. This basic problem however is the 
"crisis" of contemporary culture '. 
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A theory of bourgeois culture and its 
critique - especially in the analysis of reification - was certainly a central 
concern of Lukäcs ' work, at least down to 1923. Indeed, it has already been 
suggested that not only does much of Lukäcs' early work uphold a theory of 
cultural alienation - another version of the alienated mind thesis - but in 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein this alienation sometimes appears to be 
total. It is not possible to escape all-pervasive nature of reification without 
i 
presupposing some kind of 'leap into freedom'. In Lukäcs' case, this is 
a philosophy of history which assumes that the proletariat is, potentially, 
the identical-subject-object of history and can escape the universal reification. 
perhaps it is this pervasive reification to which Bloch refers when he speaks 
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in his review of the 'exclusively sociological homogenisation of the process. 
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of history. Herein lies an element of continuity in Lukäcs' work since even 
in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein the critique of alienation remains 
trapped within an idealist framework in so far as its critique of capitalist 
society continually takes its orientation from the culture of that society 
whilst ignoring, for instance, the process of ideological production. 
Secondly, it has already been suggested that Lukäcs' work, both his earlier 
writings and his analysis of reification and class consciousness, presents 
and attempts to solve many of the problems subsequently raised in the 
sociology of knowledge. This is most apparent in his treatment of the 
critique of ideology, and the relativist problematic. One could go further 
and suggest that his statement of such central problems in the sociology of 
knowledge within the German tradition in fact antedates their being taken up 
by Scheler and Mannheim as well as other writers. 
In a similar manner, one can argue that, especially in Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein, Lukäcs presents the most forceful contemporary state- 
ment of the need for a critique of ideology. Since the central figures in the 
sociology of knowledge tradition in Germany also saw a central practical 
problem of their time as the cultural and ideological crisis - though from very 
different standpoints - this tradition too had to confront these crises. In so 
doing, it would not be too far-fetched to argue that it would probably feel 
f 
compelled to confront what was the most powerful presentation of the crisis 
of capitalist society within a sociological-philosophical framework that was 




Finally, although this is necessarily an ex post judgment, Lukäcs' wort', 
unwittingly provided a critique of some of the ways in which central aspects 
of the sociology of knowledge were taken up. Again, this is especially true 
of the manner in which Mannheim developed many of the strands of the 
sociology of knowledge which he almost certainly felt compelled to confront 
as a result of his extensive knowledge of Lukäcs' treatment of ideology, 
history and the relativist problem. Though one need not accept Lukäcs' 
critique, it must be conceded that, at times, it is almost as if Lukäcs is 
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